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Economic t heory is an attempt to explain motives and consequences of individ­
ual actions by modelling the interaction of economic agents and deducing the­
ories that relate economic variables at the aggregate level. This approach has 
contributed significantly to the understanding of economic issues and forms 
the basis for economic policy. Yet economic research can only make useful 
contributions as a social science if it does not shy away from confronting its 
theoretical predictions with observable phenomena.
Rationality is the predominant behavioural principle of economic theory. 
With few exceptions, economic models build on agents that behave in a ratio­
nal way. But in its purest form rationality fails to describe. let alone explain, 
several aspects of human behaviour. Observable characteristics such as trust 
or fairness cannot be explained within the standard framework of individual 
utility maximization. While then1 is no doubt that rationality remains a useful 
benchmark for describing behaviour in many circumstances, the undeniable 
existence of something beyond its reach not only challenges positive economics 
hut also puts into question predictions of standard economic theory.
Experimental techniques are increasingly being used in economics in order 
to investigate the motives and economic consequences of individual actions. 
They have proven useful in the laboratory, mainly to investigate the founda­
tions of individual behaviour in a controlled environment. But also in the field 
experimental methods are advantageous, particularly to identify the effect of 
economic policies by comparing tlu* treatment with a control group.
In general, the increased availability of economic data, both at the micro- 
and at the macroeconomic level, has lead to a surge in empirical testing of 
economic hypotheses. Parallel to that, rapid advances in computing tech­
nology have made quantitative techniques available to a wide community of 
researchers; a development which has had positive eiFects on applied eco­
nomic research. Ultimately though, economic policy will only benefit from 
these improvements to the extent that quantitative techniques are applied in 
an appropriate wav and results are interpreted carefully.
1
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2 Introduction
This thesis combines several of the above mentioned aspects. It uses exper­
imental methods to shed light on fundamental aspects of human behaviour 
and discusses the use of econometric techniques in the policy relevant areas 
of development economics and international finance.
The thesis consists of two parts. The first part is an experimental analysis 
of a repeated ‘trust game', and is organized in three chapters. It investigates 
the motives that determine the (‘volution of trust in economic interactions and 
discovers significant differences in attitudes towards trust according to gen­
der and (liltural background. The two self-contained chapters in the second 
part look into the performance of econometric techniques, and discuss their 
application to schooling decisions in developing countries and the properties 
of exchange rates. The remainder of this introduction gives a lion-technical 
summary of the thesis and its main contributions.
In tlie original form of the trust game, one player, the sender, is given a 
certain amount of money. He can then decide how much he wants to transfer 
to another player, the so-called receiver. On the way to the receiver's account, 
the amount sent is tripled. Then it is the receiver's turn to decide how much 
of the tripled amount he wants to transfer hack to the sender, without any 
obligation to do so. Tin* money sent can be interpreted as an investment 
in a project, the increase as the return on investment. The project itself is 
managed by the receiver who decides how to divide the surplus. Making a 
transfer is an action involving trust because the sender deliberately increases 
iiis vulnerability to the receiver's action. A high return by the receiver is 
interpreted as a reward for the trust that the sender put into the receiver and 
is an indication of the receiver’s trustworthiness.
The trust game is particularly interesting because the predictions of game 
theory are in sharp contrast to the observed outcome in the experimental 
laboratory. The prediction says that a receiver will not return any money, 
because (‘very cent returned reduces his own payoff. Consequently, anticipat­
ing this reaction, a rational sender would never transfer anything in the first 
place. However, experiments have shown that players trust their anonymous 
counterparts blindly and receivers in turn reward senders for this behaviour 
even if they will never actually meet their opponent.
The setup of the experiment analyzed in this thesis modifies the basic setting 
in three ways. First, players are matched in groups of five. Hvery sender ran 
choose  one receiver out of the four other players in his group. The players* 
nationality, gender, age and the number of siblings are public information 
within the group. The second modification is that all players assume the 
roles of sender and receiver because they choose each other simultaneously. 
The third alteration is that the same group interacts repeatcdljj for six times.
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Hence, a dynamic environment is created in which trust can emerge as the 
result of a repeated interaction. These modifications, however, do not alter 
the predictions of standard game theory; repeatedly applying the argument 
sketched above leads to the same result that trusting an opponent is not 
rational.
Chapter 1 looks at the1 general behaviour of subjects in this experiment.1 
Participants show a high degree of trust in that they transfer and return 
substantial amounts throughout the game. The chapter provides evidence 
for alternative motives that might be causing this non-rational behaviour. 
It finds that players behave reciprocally by rewarding good behaviour, such 
as someone choosing them as a player and making high transfers, with high 
returns and future contacts. The chapter also shows how players learn from 
previous playing experience. For example, if players see that a certain act ion 
leads to a high payoff, they tend to repeat it and they do the opposite if they 
learn that their behaviour was not suc cessful. To a certain degree players 
also behave rationally because they transfer less towards the end of the game. 
In conclusion, Chapter 1 finds evidence for motives that -  in addition to 
rationality -  give a more complete description of players* behaviour in the 
game.
The most important extension of the game analyzed here with respect to 
previous studies lies in the option of choice added to the trust game. In the 
present setting players choose* their preferred partner among four players. The 
reasons driving the choice are the subject of the analysis in the remaining two 
chapters of the first part of this thesis. What makes this setup especially 
interesting is that not only the characteristics of the decision maker and his 
preferred choice are observed, but also the characteristics of the alternatives 
that were not chosen. Using this information. Chapter 2 finds that male 
players have* a higher propensity to contact female players as opposed to male 
players,'while female players do not discriminate in their choices. However, 
this discrimination does not pay off in terms of higher returns made by women 
and is therefore not rational from a payoff point of view.
Perhaps the most striking finding of the experiment is the discrimination 
that occurs along the lines of nationality. Dividing the fifteen European na­
tionalities that participated in this experiment into two geographical regions 
(North and South) evidence is provided in Chapters 2 and 3 that southerners 
are discriminated against, and mainly so by northerners.2 As shown in Chap­
ter 3. this discrimination builds up in the course of the experiment rather than 
dying out with experience. The reason for this discrimination is that rather
1 This chapter is joint work with Andrea ¡rhino, Karl Srhlag and Eyal Winter.
2 Chapter 3 is joint work with Andrea ¡rhino, Karl Srhlag and Eyal Winter.
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than for not being trustworthy (i.e. having a low propensity to reciprocate to 
senders by making a generous payback for a transfer received), southerners 
are being punished ior their own low level of trust, meaning that they have a 
low propensity to contact another player with a generous transfer in the first 
place. For this reason southerners end up leaving the game with lower payoffs.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this experiment are twofold. First, 
observed behaviour differs substantially from predictions of standard economic 
theory. Individual behaviour is guided by motives such as reciprocity, and 
individuals adapt their behaviour as a response to previous experience. The 
existence of diverse motives and learning mechanisms not only points to the 
rather incomplete view of human behaviour in standard models, but also puts 
into question predictions of models that rely exclusively on individual utility 
maximization.
Second, the analysis shows that individual characteristics such as cultural 
background and gender influence attitudes towards trust, and that these vari­
ations lead to significant differences in the way individuals treat each other. 
While the aim of the analysis is not to give a conclusive answer to the question 
of why such discrimination occurs, its men1 existence has wide reaching im­
plications. especially in the European context. Regional differences in Europe 
regarding standards of trust -  as established in the experiment - may pose 
impediments to a process of European unification that is characterized by 
political and economic uniformity. In more practical terms, the results point 
at potential difficulties encountered by firms when operating in a culturally 
diverse Europe*, as trust is an important factor in business relationships.
The second part of the thesis combines methodological issues with concrete' 
economic problems, and each chapter has impeal ant policy implications aside* 
from making a methodological contribution.
Chapter 4 deals with the evaluation of a large scale poverty reduction pro­
gramme1 undertaken by the1 Mexican government in the late nineties, called 
PROGRESA . Lew secondary school enrolment ratios are* recognized as a ma­
jor obstacle to breaking the* poverty cycle. No education leads to few employ­
ment opportunities, which in turn implies a low income. Children in poor 
countries are often deprived of school education and obliged to contribute to 
household income* through work. To increase secondary school enrolment, the 
Mexican government offered a cash payment to poor households that was paid 
conditional on the school attendance of the children. The rationale is that 
upon receiving income support families can afford to send their children to 
school.
HHiinm
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What makes PROGRESA an exceptional case is that this programme was 
implemented as a randomized experiment. This means that part of the tar­
geted population was not offered participation in the programme. For this 
reason, the effect of the programme can easily he identified simply hv com­
paring its efFect on those that received the transfer with what happened to 
those that did not. Social experiments such as TROCHES A are rare* because 
policy makers, for ethical and social reasons, are often reluctant to conduct 
such field experiments. But in most eases the underlying economic problem 
-  such as schooling decisions in the Mexican case -  is far too complex to 
be addressed in an experimental setup in a campus laboratory. However, the 
need for evaluating such programmes remains, and it is difficult to identify the 
effect of policies without a proper control group. Microsimulation methods 
are one way to overcome the lack of experimental data. Starting from a sin­
gle individual as the decision making unit, microsimulation methods simulate 
how individuals would react if they faced certain situations -  thus making 
an experimental setup unnecessary. Chapter 4 combines a micros!initiation 
method with the social experiment PROGRESA. In particular, a mierosimu- 
lation of the programme is carried out and then compared to the real efTect 
of the policy. This procedure offers a benchmark for the simulation technique 
and enables discussion of the accuracy of the microsimulation technique and 
hence an assessment of its usefulness for policy advice.
The analysis shows that the prediction of the microsimulation method 
comes close to the real effect. The overall performance of the technique is 
satisfactory and some critical issue's are discussed in the chapter. But in addi­
tion to validating a microsimulation technique, the analysis in Chapter 4 gives 
empirical evidence for the functioning of conditional cash transfer schemes in 
practice. The data support the view that lack of education is often the result 
of financial constraints faced by poor households in developing count lies. The 
demand for schooling is high, but only if households get income support can 
they afford to send their children to school.
The chapters dealt with so far look at the immediate consequences of indi­
vidual behaviour. But economic theory is also concerned with the relation of 
economic variables at the aggregate level. For example, the purchasing power 
parity theory states that the same basket of goods should cost the same in any 
country, once differences in price levels and currencies are accounted for. The 
rationale for this theory is that if any deviations from the parity wen' per­
sistent. arbitrage opportunities would emerge and as a consequence of trade 
the relative prices of the goods would eventually move back to equilibrium. 
This implies that observed exchange rates, corrected for price level differences, 
should fluctuate around a long-run equilibrium value.
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But observable data is always influenced by random shocks, making it diffi­
cult to infer from t he exchange rate of one country a ‘typical' rate, and thus to 
find evidence for or against the purchasing power parity theory. Investigating 
the exchange rate of many countries simultaneously is one way of broadening 
the basis for the argument, and data sets with a cross section and a time scries 
dimension are increasingly being used to investigate macroeconomic phenom­
ena. But the use of both the cross section dimension and the time dimension 
leads to certain statistical particularities, which are the subject of the analysis 
in Chapter 5. As is the case for exchange rates, data may not always be inde­
pendent across countries: exchange rates of different countries are exposed to 
the same shocks, creating sectional dependence in the data. This dependency 
causes problems for several panel estimators and its effects are analyzed in 
Chapter 5 using simulation t eel mi (jues.
In particular, the chapter investigates and demonstrates the distortions that 
testing procedures may have if applied to macroeconomic data sets that do 
not fulfil the assumption of cross sectional independence. The chapter high­
lights the importance of carefully checking the appropriateness of econometric 
techniques prior to their implementation and discusses how this can be done 
in the case of the tests considered.
JL U B Ü . .........................................
Part I
An Experimental Analysis of the 
Repeated Trust Game
r um 1 I I." i-t-V1111;'-'
CHAPTER 1
Learning to Trust: Analyzing Motives in 
a Repeated Trust Game1
1.1 Introduction
The1 purpose of this paper is to investigate trust ami trustworthiness in a 
dynamic set ting. We set up an experiment where trust can emerge as the re­
sult of an experimentally controlled repeated interaction between individuals. 
Hence, we do not only study the general propensity of people to trust, hut 
alst) the motives that determine the evolution of trust.
In the (rust game a player is given 100 units of the experimental currency 
and is allowed to staid some of it to a different player. During the transaction 
the transferred money is tripled. Finally, the recipient is allowed to return part 
of the triplet! transfer without any obligation to tit) so. The money sent can 
he interpreted as an investment in a project, the increase during the transfer 
as the return on investment. The project is managed by the recipient who 
decities how to divide the surplus.
Tht' way that game theory analyzes this trust game is to invoke backwards 
induction, l'or any given amount transferred, the receiver is best off not re­
turning anything. Knowing this, the sender will not send anything in the 
first place. The outcome of this behaviour is incilicient. and is reminiscent 
of the Prisoners' Dilemma where similarly an incilicient outcome is predicted 
by game theory. Any efficient outcome (equivalent here to maximizing tin* 
sum of the payoff of the sender and of the receiver) is characterized by the
1 I his chapter is joint work with Andrea Jchino. Kail Selling ami Eva] Winter.
1)
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sender transferring all 100 units (so the recipient receives ‘100 units). In our 
experiment we implement a repeated trust game where players have the op­
portunity to select a new opponent in each round. However, given that there 
is a finite number of rounds ((> in our experimental design), the backwards 
induction argument still yields the same result. Xo player should ever send 
anything.
Tin* rational prediction is mainly a theoretical benchmark, and experiments 
show that subjects trust (send money) even when the trust game is played 
only once. Berg et al. (1995) find that subjects send slightly above 50 points 
and return slightly less to the sender and keep over 100 points for themselves. 
Among their subjects it was not rational, given the behaviour of the recipients 
who on average return 47 points, to transfer anything. Burks et al. (2003) 
show that if two subjects get money to send to each other simultaneously (so 
both are sender and receiver) then subjects send again about 50 points but 
return much less, namely on average 21 points. Here it is even less rational to 
send money, because subjects seem even less trustworthy when they are both 
sender and receiver. Our design is related to Burks et al. (2003) because all 
subjects are senders and possibly also receivers. It is also related to Oochard 
et al. (2000) as we repeat the game a finite number of times.
As rationality is a poor predictor we test for other motives such as reinforce­
ment. reciprocity and directional learning. We find that much of the observed 
behaviour in the game can be explained by the two motives reciprocity and 
reinforcement learning. Players reward opponents for their choices and their 
actions if their behaviour was favorable. This is visible in the choice, the trans­
fer made and the ratio returned. In addition, payoff oriented reinforcement 
of actions is also observable. Players are more likely to repeat their actions if 
they have proven successful. Finally, the end game effect that can be observed 
both in the transfers made as well as in the ratio returned is indicative for 
some degree of rationality.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 relates our 
experiment and the main findings to the existing literature. The experimental 
design is briefly described in Section 1.3. Section 1.1 presents some general 
descriptive statistics on the game. Different behavioural motives are briefly 
discussed in Section 1.5 before an econometric analysis is undertaken in Sec­
tion 1.0 . The last section concludes and discusses directions for further re­
search.
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1.2 Related Literature
Wliile sociologists mainly use attitudinal surveys on rather vaguely defined 
eonee])ts of trust and trustworthiness, economists have recently been trying to 
be more precise on the issue and its conditioning (actors. Glaeser et al. (2000) 
combine survey data and experimental data in an attempt to quantify the 
general perception of trust towards different groups surrounding an individual.
Then* is evidence that trust and trustworthiness art* related to tin* socio­
logical background of people, for example. Huehan et al. (2000) find some 
support for the relationship between trust and social distance across coun­
tries. Fershtniaii and Gncezy (2001) find different levels of trust according 
to tin* opponents’ origin. Oroson and Buchan (1009). among others, identify 
gender as yet another determinant for trust, with women being trusted more 
than men. These results stress the importance of controlling for confounding 
factors when the emergence of trust in an economic interaction is analyzed.
Our experimental design combines several elements of previous studies. The 
basic trust game with one sender and one randomly matt lied receiver is known 
from the study by Berg et al. (1995). In this study pairs are matched with 
assigned roles as sender and receivers to play a one shot trust game. We follow 
the extension by Burks et al. (2002) that both players assume the role of a 
sender and receiver at the same time. However, contrary to this study, this 
was known to the players from the outset. We also combine the element of a 
repeated game as analyzed by Cochard et al. (2000). but also run a control 
treatment with one shot interactions. In addition, we add the element of a 
free choice, which to our knowledge has not been investigated in this context. 
Our results compare nicely to the existing literature as indicated by Table 1.1.
With experimental economies being a rather new field in economies, a thor­
ough econometric analysis of experimental data is more the exception than the 
rule. Numerous studies content themselves with basic descriptive statistics. 
Tile advantages of an econometric analysis is that confounding factors can he 
controlled for. preventing the premature interpretation of results. However, 
to link tlie experimental setup to the correct econometric specification is not 
always an easy task. For example, with the exception of very simple games, 
the derivation of a likelihood function is intractable for more complicated 
settings. Hence, the correspondence between the theoretical model and the 
empirical specification is not always perfect. An exception in this context is 
the analysis by El-Gamal and G ret her (1995) who are aide to translate their 
(simple) game one-to-one into a likelihood function, estimate and identify the 
relevant parameters. Identification is a particular problem in the context of 
behavioural economies. As Manski (2002) [Joints out. several behavioural by-
12 1.3 Experimenta/ Design
Table 1.1: Results and related literature
N
avg. sent 
(0-100)
average
returned main features
Berg et al. (IP!)")) 32-2 52 47° assign«*! roles, one shot
Burks et. al. (2003) 22-2 05 85" assigned roles, one shot
Burks et al. (2003) 20-2 47 21" .S’ and /?, one shot
Cochard et al. (2000) 30 2 42 3!)9C assigned roles, one shot
Cochard et al. (2000) 16-2 75 r>G9e assigned roles, repeated
this study
repeated 110 70 ->r/" S and IL choice,
random assignment 110 07 random assignment
Note:  Assigned roles means subjects were assigned roles as sender or receiver. S  and ¡1 means subjects act both as a sender and receiver, N  is the total number of partici­
pants, indicating the number of pairs that played. a amount sent back, ,J ratio returned, 
conditional on having received a positive amount.
pot beses might be observationally equivalent, making it impossible for the 
econometrician to distinguish between them. Our aim is to characterize typ­
ical behaviour at different- stages of the game. We confine ourselves to find 
empirical support for or evidence ag¿iiiist such hypotheses controlling for con­
founding factors.
1.3 Experimental Design
The reader is referred to Appendix A .l for a full documentation of the ex­
perimental setup, including a transcript of the instructions and screenshots. 
Hen1 we describe only the main features. A total of 110 subjects participated 
in a computerized setup in three sessions.2 Each of the sessions consisted of 
six treatments. In each treatment, subjects were randomly matched in groups 
of five players to play the repeated trust game described below. Each player 
had information about the nationality, the gender, the age and the number of 
siblings of the four opponents in the same group.
Free Choice Treatments
Treatments one to four and treatment six were so called 'free choice' treat­
ments (fl-f'5). In stage one of tin* game the subject decided who and how 
much of his initial endowment- of 100 to transfer to a chosen player. Not 
making any transfer was also an option. In stage two. subjects saw who of the
2 Using tin1 Z-Tn*<> software {Fisehbarlier, 1ÍM)9).
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other players had chosen them and how much each of them had transferred. 
In addition, this amount was shown multiplied l>y three. Subjects could then 
decide how much to transfer back to each player they had received a trans­
fer from. In stage three subjects were presented a summary of ¿ill transfers 
and returns they had been involved with that happened in this period/ The 
three stages were repeated six times. Then, groups were reslmilled and a new 
treatment was played.
Control Treatment
Between the fourth and the fifth free choice treatment- subjects were informed 
via the screen about a small cl 1 tinge in the game. They were again matched 
in groups of five players, but instead of being able to choose a fellow player, 
they were randomly assigned one of the fellow players (see Figure A .5 in the 
Appendix). We also call this the predetermined treatment. The random 
assignment was implemented by selecting one of the choices with equal prob­
ability. Hence, it was still possible that the same player receives transfers 
from various players or from no player, but these events were random. In 
every period of this treatment players faced a new. random choice of the same 
group. Alter this treatment, subjects played a hist free choice treatment.
1.4 Descriptive Statistics
The following statistics are organized around the course of the game, start­
ing with statistics regarding the choice, then the amount transferred, and 
lastly the amount returned. They provide a rough description of the playing 
behaviour. Empirical evidence and interpretation of types will be discussed 
in Section 1.6. t ’nless indicated differently, the statistics do not include the 
control treatment.
Choice
In each period subjects had the option to choose one of the four players in 
their group to transfer points to. T his group of players remained unchanged 
for six consecutive periods. Table 1.2 summarizes by treatment and period 
how often subjects decided not to change their chosen partner. The analysis, 
period by period, shows a slight increase in periods 2-5 from 53 percent to 57 
percent of the players who stay with the same partner, hut this share drops 
to just 17 percent in the last period.
See screenshots in Figures A.2. A.:i and A.d in the Appendix.
11 1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.2: Persistence of choice of player 1
treatment
period o f  treat mem
totalo 3 4 5 0
fl 0.-12 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.47 0.48
12 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.54 0.40 0.53
ra 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.53
f4 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.04 0.45 0.55
f5 0.52 0.53 0.01 0.58 0.41 0.53
total 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.57 0.47 0.52
Sate:  The lable shows for each treatment/period combination tlit* 
fraction of players that (hose the same partner as in the previous 
period. Each treat merit /period combi nation was played 110 t inn's.
There was also considerable persistence in the choice of partner exceeding 
one period. From Table 1.3 it can be seen that while the in the majority of 
cases a i»layer was chosen only once (58 percent). 21 percent of the players 
remained with the same choice for at least two periods or more. 2 percent did 
not change the player throughout an entire treatment. Conditional on switch­
ing to a new player and having received a positive transfer in the previous 
peri oil. 02 percent el lose a player from which they had received before.
T a b le  1 .3 : Persistence of choice of player 2
number o f consecutive periods
0 1 2 3 4 5
absolute 1899 003 339 225 150 78
fraction 58 18 10 7 5 2
A’ofr: The table shows the absolute number and the frac­
tion of cast's in which a player chose another player for the 
number of consecutive periods displayed in the first row. 
This table includes observations for all periods.
Transfer
The average transfer was 70 tokens. Figure 1.1 shows how the transfer de­
pends on period and treatment, where the control treatment is also included. 
It reveals a significant drop in the last period of each treatment. All free 
choice treatments exhibit the same effect over time. On average, the amount 
transferred increases from 72 in period 1 to 83 in period 4. decreases slightly 
to 80 in period 5 before it drops to 5(i in the last period, well below the value
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oi' the starting period. The average amount transferred rises from (if in (lie 
f'l treatment to 81 in fa treatment (solid lint* in Figure 1.1). The average in 
the eontrol treatment is (i(> anti therefore as low as the first treatment. The 
control treatment was the fifth treatment, and as can he seen from Figure 1.1 
the transfer behaviour in the sixth and last treatment resumes the pattern of 
the previous free choice treatment. This shows that subjects understood well 
the difference between the control and the fret* choice treatments.1
Figure 1.1: Average transfer per period and treatment
c  F4 1 f ' contro! | [ ~  f5<0 O I—---- ------------------ 1-----------------------! 1----- ------
period
per treatment ----------per period'treatment
There is a clustering of transfers at certain values, as Table 1.1 illustrates, 
fu 5(i percent of tin* eases the full amount of 100 points was transferred. A 
second point mass is at the value of 50. which was the amount transferred in 
0 percent of the eases in the fret* choice treatment.
Return Ratio
The ratio a player got hack from his initial transfer is defined as r — C7/(.‘l-/). 
where G  is the amount returned and t is the initial transfer which is multiplied 
by three upon arrival on tin* opponent's account. Hence. r < [0. I). As can be 
seen in Figure 1.2. the average* return ratio (0.51) does not have such a large 
variation between the free choice treatments (0.51-0.50) but is significantly 
lower in the control treatment (O.oO). The end game effect is also quite visible 
in the free choice treatments, where the ratio drops from an average of 0.58
-1 For a histogram of transfers period by period, .see Figure A.ii in the appendix.
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T a b le  1 .4 : Distribution of transfer
percentage
t = free choice pretieterm iim i
0 7 18
1 <  t <  49 12 i
50 9 12
51 <  t  < 17 17
100 50 40
Note: The table reports thè pcrcentage
sha re of transfer« / that fall in t hè range in­
dicateti in thè first column.
in periods 1-5 to 0.33 in the last period. In the predetermined treatment the 
return ratio around is around 0.45 for the first three periods and then drops 
steadily to just 0.22 in the last period.
F igure 1 .2 : Average ratio returned per period and treatment
period
per treatment ---------- per periocLlreatment
Tilt1 return ratio also clusters at certain values, as shown in Table 1.5 . In the 
free choice treatments tin* biggest ¡joint masses are at 1 and at 2/3 . followed 
by 1/2 and 0. Looking at Figure A.7 in the appendix we see that the end 
game effect is driven by the large share of zero return ratios (37 as compared 
to 8 percent in periods 1-5). In comparison, we find 48 percent of return ratios 
equal to zero in the last period of the predetermined treatment.
Both the transfer sent and the return ratio received increased with number 
of consecutive times a sender contacted a receiver, as reported in Table l.(i.
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Table 1.5: Distribution of the rot urn ratio
percentage
r  _ /fee choice f )/•(•< Jot erwined
0 12 20
0 < r  <  1/3 (i 9
1/3 9 13
A A 1—► n: 7 10
1/2 Iti 22
1/2 < r  <  1/2 7 7
2/3 Is 13
2/3 <  r  <  1 7 3
1 IS 3
Soto:  III«' table reports the percentage share of 
return ratios r tliat fall in the range in< lira ted in 
the first column.
Average transfers increase substantially from (»8 to DO. and the return ratio 
increases from 0.51 to 0.02 after 5 consecutive choices. Interestingly. if a player 
was eliosen for four consecutivi' times or more, the return ratio drops again.
T ab le  1.6 : Transfer and return ratio for con­
sertiti ve choices
number o f consecutive periods
0 1 2 3 1 1
/ OS Si SS 90 90
r 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.53
Sot e: 1 he table reports the average transfer t ami 
the average ratio returned r  for the number of con­
secutive periods that a sender chose» the sante re­
ceiver.
Payoff
The payofl ?r is defined as the payofl a sender gets from a single interaction, 
be. n - 100 — / -l (7. from Table 1.7 we see that llit' average payoffs are higher 
in the free choke treatments.
I liis section can be summarized as follows. Players do not choose their coun­
terparts at random, instead, they show a substantial reluct mice to switch to 
new players. II so. they seem to prefer those players who they have been 
chosen by beiore. Previous interaction seems to have a positive effect both
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T ab le  1 .7 : Payoff in different treatments
period o f treetm('lit
1 2 3 4 5 (i tot ill
free choice 133 lti'S 171 i ad ir>o lot 132
predetermined 127 123 123 112 93 S3 111
Note: The table displays the average payoffs ~ 100 — t (- G in
each period for tlie free choice and the predetermined treatment 
separately.
on the transfer and on the ratio that is returned to a sender. One can further 
soe from the analysis that players transfer and return more in each repetition 
of the game up to period 4. In period 5 the end game effect starts, which 
is visible by stagnating or slightly decreasing transfers. The end game ef­
fect is strongest in the last period where substantially less is transferred and 
returned.
1.5 Motives and Behavioural Theories for Making 
Predictions
Several motives and learning theories compete in explaining the* way people 
behave. Below we present some of the most common, namely reinforcement 
learning, reciprocity, directional learning and rationality. We will then develop 
hypotheses based on these motives for choice, transfer and return and test 
them. Our approach is to utilize the qualitative predictions of these motives 
rather than fitting explicit functional forms derived from them.
Reinforcement Learning (RIF)
Fieinforeement Learning deseri lies success oriented behaviour according to 
which the subjects choose1 actions or strategies depending on how success­
ful they were in the past. Success is measured in terms of earned payoffs. 
Originating from psychology and biology, whore it has been widely studied 
in both humans and animals, this learning strategy has recently been intro­
duced to economies (Erev and Both. 1998). Accordingly, individuals treat the 
environment as a decision, do not utilize information on how payoffs are gen­
erated find in particular ignore the fact that their opponents are also making 
choices. The subject is assumed to randomize over its actions according to 
some distribution. Positive reinforcement means that when facing the same 
decision again, the same1 action is chosen with a higher probability. Typically.
............ ....— -------------------------------------lr—
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positive reinforcement is more likely the more successful an action was. Neg­
ative reinforcement in turns means that the same* action will he chosen with 
a smaller probability.
Reciprocity (RCP)
Reciprocity is a motive1 oriented behaviour. Cooperative and friendly be­
haviour is rewarded and unfriendly or non-cooperative behaviour is punished, 
possibly at a cost. Falk and Fischhacher (1990) provide a formal definition 
of reciprocity in a specific game theoretic setting;. It is important to high­
light that altruism, in contrast to reciprocity, is an unconditional altitude 
(sec* e.g. Cox (2002) and Falk (20(J‘i)). whereas reciprocity conditions on the 
actions of others.
Directional Learning Type (DLT)
The Directional Learning approach was developed by Selteu and Stoccker 
(10'Sh) for simultaneous move1 games. According to this theory, after some 
time people evaluate their experience and adjust their behaviour according to 
what would have been a better decision provided that the opponents would 
not change their behaviour. DLT does not make any predictions about the 
quantitive change1 of behaviour, but indicates the qualitative direction of the 
change.
Rationality (RTN )
The finitely repeated trust game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilib­
rium in which each player sends zero in each period and returns zero whenever 
something positive1 is received. This can be derived using the standard pro­
cedure of backwards induction, whereby anticipating a zero return in the last 
period from a rational player, no player will ever transfer any points in the 
preceding period, and so forth.
1.6 Econometric Analysis
1.6.1 The Choice of a Player
The motives outlined in Section l.o (RIF. HCP. DLT. RTN) will be used to 
predict how choice probabilities should relate to specific histories. Hypotheses 
are formulated from the perspective of a sending player.
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H y p o th e s is  R C P  1 One is more, likely to choose a player from  which a 
transfer was received in the previous period and who transferred a lot.
H y p o th e s is  R C P  2 One is more likely to choose the same again if that 
player returned a lot.
H y p o th e s is  R I F  1 One is more likely to choose the same again i f  the payoff 
was high.
H y p o th e s is  D L T  1 One is more likely to choose the same again if that 
player returned more than one sent (returned ratio is greater or equal than 
1/3).
The framework in which the theoretieal predictions will he addressed is the 
conditional logit model (McFadden, 1973).5 The model is motivated using a 
random utility model representation. Define
Uijt as the utility of i if i. chooses j  in time period ƒ. and 
J 1 if e chooses j  in
djjt, = \
^0 otherwise.
The time index 1 stands for the six periods of the game. Conditional on 
participating in the game (i.e. not making a zero transfer), each player has 
four choices, j  =  {1 ,2 , 3 ,4 } ,  in each period. The four choices are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. The basic random utility model is defined as:
U{jt = +  Sdjit-1 4- Xpijt-i +  vAij + (ijt (h i)
for j  =  { 1 ,2 .3 .4 } .  Following the notation above. j means that player / 
1ms chosen j  in the previous period. Similarly, d ja - i means that player j  has 
chosen player i in the previous round. Finally, means that i and j  have 
formed a pair in the previous period and is the interaction of the previous 
two variables. Note that, put together, these variables cover all possible cases 
in which there was interact ion. as compared to the ease in which the players 
have not interacted in t — 1. The other covariates Xij include the remaining 
choice specific characteristics such as gender, nationality1' (both interacted 
with the corresponding attributes of /). age, and siblings. Notice that the
5 For a discussion of the conditional logit model in this context see also Section 2.2.1 in 
Chapter 2.
(i Throughout the paper we group the nationalities into participants from North and 
participants from South. Further analysis of the effect of nationality on the playing 
behaviour can he found in Chapter 3.
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pivvious choice of i is intcrpre*te*d as a characteristic of tin* choie-e j  in t. By 
I Ik* same token, the fact that a player was chosen by some other player in 
period t — 1 becomes a characteristic of that player in t. Hence, previous 
playing behaviour can be seen as observable choice specific attributes in /.
So far the model only accounts for the choice relating variables, c.g. if a 
a player was chosen or not. In an additional set of estimates, the random 
utility model presented in equation (1.1) will he enriched by adding variable's 
characterizing the previous behaviour in more detail. To this end. the choice 
variable's de-*fine*d above* will be interne-teal with variable's indicating a spenifie- 
behaviour, as outlined in the* hypotheses. Define* Ujt-\ as the* transfer f from 
/ to j  in period / — 1 and C rjt- j  as the amount player / got back from player 
j  in period / — 1. Them.
riji- 1 fo.K-l•1 • tjjf— i
is the* ratio i got back from j  in t — 1
—100 — Ijjt- 1  I i is the payoff of player / in / — 1 .
In addition, the variable* the* amount / received from j  in / — 1 will he*
use'd. Notice that these variable's only take* positive value's if the* re*spe*etive* 
choice* specific dummy variables (Mined abenv take the* value* erne* and are* zero 
otherwise. Ferr example, tJlf„i only takes positive* values if d}ii_\ is erne*.
Flayer i chooser player j  if this yields highest utility. Ilene-e*.
VUhjt -  1) - F (b ^  > Vikt) Mk /  j.
Table* :i.l0 and 1.9 contain the* estimation re*sults of various sjX'e ifioations 
of the* conditional lergit model. For eemvemienee*. the choiev variables are* re*p- 
resc'iiteel using arrows, where* is reim*sented by a clashed arrow / + j
and the* pair variable* by a double arrow i +-* j.
Consider specification CM. This model disregards any success or failure 
of pre’vious ehoices and forms the* basis for the* following analysis. It is evi­
dent that having chosen a player beibre and having he*en chosen by a player 
makes it more* likely to choose that player again. The effects are* of the same* 
order of magnitude, with the* effect of / j  be*ing slightly bigger. Intere*st- 
ingiy. the* effect of having formed a pair doe*s not signilicantly alter the* ehoiev 
prol »abilities. sugge*sting that there* is no pail-specific e*flee-t. In the* follow­
ing spe*eiiieat ions this variable is dropped. Notice that this simple* moele*l can 
predict b9 percent of the* choicvs correctly.
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T able  1.8 : Choice: conditional logit estimation results 1
CT C2 C3 C l
i j .19
(.1*1
i — + j T ifi 1.18 -.40 -.01
(.06)*** (.04)*** (.10*** (.12)'**
; j 1.37 -.05 .22 .21
(.07)*** (-17) (-17) (.17)
i j  ' tji * .02
(.002)***
.02
( .002) * * *
.02
(.002)***
' — ♦ j  * Lj * 2.95 
(-10)* * *
•
i- — * j  * ~ij * • .01
(.0007)***
Obs. 10100 10100 10100 10100
Pseudo H2 .25 .20 .30 .31
Correct Predictions .59 .59 .02 .02
Note: All variables refer to the previous period, i —+ j  means that t lias chosen j ,  and 
/ e— j  means j  has chosen i. The interaction of both is denoted by / —* j .  t j t is the 
transfer received from j ,  r,j the return ratio and -¡ j  the payoff. Reported values aie co­
efficients, standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** , *** denote significance to the 10, 5 and 
1 percent, level of a test that, the coefficient is zero. Control variables included are: age 
and siblings of all 4 players, gender and nationality of i interacted with the attributes 
**1 j .  Pseudo R 2 is the percent of variance explained by the model compared it) a model 
which includes a constant only. C orm  t predictions indicates the share of observations 
ill which the highest estimated probability pj  coincides with the actual choice.
Hypothesis I1CT 1. which says that tIk* probability of choosing a player is 
increasing in the amount received from that player is addressed in specification 
('2  in the table, where the variable which indicates that / +■— j  is multiplied 
by the amount transferred. Indeed, the likelihood of choosing a player who 
transferred previously is increasing in the transfer received. Hence, hypothesis 
I1CP 1 finds empirical support.
Hypothesis 11 CP 2. which states that choosing the same player again is more1 
likely if that player returned a lot. is addressed in specification C3. where the 
ratio the player returned in the previous period is added. Notice that this 
specification also controls for the amount received by a player in the previous 
playing round. The significance of the interacted variable i —+ j  • gives 
empirical support for Hypothesis IICP 2. The inclusion of the return ratio 
increases the predictive power of the model to (>2 percent. Notice, however, 
the significant negative coefficient of the indicator variable / —+ j .  'Phis
turn iUHttUtttiiiUUUttUti maum
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means that only if the return ratio is bigger than 0.17 players will reciprocate 
behaviour and choose that player more likely.'
In specification C 1 we then add the payoff resulting from this interaction. 
Here we find that reinforcement depends on the success of the1 previous action; 
if the payoff was above (it), we find evidence for positive reinforcement as the 
probability of choosing the same again is higher, confirming HIF 1/ Negative 
reinforcement is triggered when tin*  payoff is below fit), which is the case in 
Id percent of the cases. We do not include both the returned ratio and the 
payoff in the same regression because i — + j  • and i j  ■ are highly 
eollinear.
T able 1 .9 : Choice: conditional logit estimation results 2
Co 0 «
i <r— j .20 .11
(•IT) (.17)
i + - .)■  Iji .02 .02
(.002)*** (.0021* **
l{y —+ j  A  Tij > 1/2} l.Od
(.05)***
-
1{/ —+ j  A rij < 1/2} .12
(.09)
i i > IV l.dK
(.or,)**»
i—1 i i s. > -"i A -.28
(.lr0‘*
Obs. 10100 10100
Pseudo H2 .29 .28
Correct 1’redid ions .01 .01
St tic: Sec1 notes to I able ;i. 10. The symbol " A is tlie logical "ami" operator and 1 {...}
is the indicator function which takes value olie if the expression inside the parenthesis
is true, for example. l{ i  ---» j  A r(J > 1/2} takes value one if i has chosen j and in
addition the ratio returned was greater or equal than 1/2.
Hypothesis R (T  2 is a more general version of DhT 1. While the former 
just makes a general statement about how the return ratio affects choice, the 
latter is very specific in determining a break point at 1/d. lb  slu'd more 
light on the functional form, specifications C5 and CO in 'fable 1.9 test for a
7 To find the point at which the return ratio contributes positively to the probability of 
choosing a player (assuming a linear relationship') solve - 0 .  jOy 2.92/,^ > 0 lor rrJ.
*  Again, to find the [Joint at which the payoff contributes positively to the probability of
choosing a player solve — (Mil -t 11.017r>j > 0 for z rj.
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change in slope at 1/2 and at 1/3. respectively. A return ratio of 1/2 is the 
median return ratio. From specification CO it becomes evident that players 
chose the same player less likely if the ratio returned previously was lower 
than 1/3. This can interpreted as evidence for DLT 1. For a breakpoint at 
1/2 no such evidence can be found, players* probability of choosing the same 
player remains unaffected by the variable (see Co).
Table 1.10 summarizes the main results of this section.
T able  1 .10 : Choice: summary of findings
...probability o f i choosing j  is higher evidence
RCT 1 if i received a lot from j yes
RC P 2 if j  returned a lot previously yes
DLT 1 if j  returned more than i sent yes
R IF  1 if i had a high payoff yes
1.6.2 The Amount Transferred
After a player has chosen who to send to. players could el loose how much 
of their endowment of each period to transfer. Our motives will he used to 
predict changes in the amount transferred. These motives are formulated anal­
ogously to the choice setting, where an increase in transfers is the equivalent 
action to increasing the probability of choice.
Hypothesis R C P  3  Conditional on choosing a player from  which a transfer 
was received in the previous period, the current transfer is increasing in that 
} ra nsfer rer.ei ird.
Hypothesis R C P  4 Conditional on choosing the same player again, the. 
transfer is increasing in the. ratio returned in the previous peri oil.
Hypothesis R I F  2  Conditional on choosing the same player again, ihr trails- 
fc r  i s i n c rt in si ng i n the pa y o ff i rev i red i 11 t h c prei > i o us period.
Hypothesis D LT 2 Conditional on choosing the same player again, the 
f ra ns f a  ■ is h igh cr (lower) i f  the ratio ret a i n ed in t h r pier io us pci i od /.? gre a ter 
(smaller) than 1/3.
Hypothesis R T N  1 The transfer is lower in the last period.
....... ...... - --------------
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The following analysis gives econometric evidence for the hypotheses outlined 
above, controlling lor confounding factors. The test idea is to see if tlit* events, 
which are characteristic for a certain motive, lead to a significant difference 
iti transfers. The framework in which the hypotheses will he addressed is
Ujt - o (lt jt~ j -f 3d jit- \ -f SA jt f  ifZzt t Uijjf-
which forms the basis for the analysis, lijt is the transfer sent from i to j  
in period t. The variable dlj t-\ and dju-i are defined as in the previous sec­
tion. The matrices A' Jt and Zn contain a set of j  and i specific characteristics, 
respectively, and uit is a random error component. According to the hypothe­
ses. the choice variables and dJlt_i will he i lit (Tact ed with variables that
characterize previous playing behaviour such as the amount transferred or 
the ratio returned. Because there are repeated observations for the same in­
dividual in the sample, the standard errors are corrected for within-individual 
correlations/'
To facilitate the reading of the tables, the following notation is introduced. 
Let .S’ denote the sender and R the receiver.* 10 Consistent with the notation 
above,
• .S’ — + R denotes that S  has chosen R in i — 1
• S  «■— R denotes that R has chosen S  in i — 1
• $  — R denotes that S  and R had no interaction in / — 1.
Notice that these variables sum up to one. In the subsequent analysis. 
S ~ R will be the omitted variable. The hypotheses distinguish between llie 
behaviour towards a player according to whether he is the same or different 
choice as in the last period. Hence, the variables are interacted with a variable 
that indicates whether the same choice was made in t and ƒ — I. If a variable
corresponds to the set of same choice or the set of different choice will be
indicated by * and <ƒ. respectively.
Consider Table 1.11. Specification T1 forms the starting point for the anal­
ysis. transfers are higher ii the same subject is chosen again, on average bv 7 
points. Having been chosen by a player previously increases transfers sent to 
that player on average by 11 points. In specification T 2 the amount received 
is interacted with the indicator that S was chosen !>v R (S <-— R). In order
i> Sec Moult oil (liWfi).
10 The notation differs from the (¡ . j )  not atioii used in the analysis of choice, because at
this stage of the game players have already chosen a particular receiver among the j
possible options.
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T able  1 .1 1 : Transfer: estimation results 1
T 1 T2 T3 T4
S  - 4  R 7.22 6.75 -.44 -5.1
(1.54)*" (1.52)*** (3.35) (3.7)
* 1 1 10.98 -19.2G -15.42 -12.73
(1.53)"* (4-56)*** (4.41)*** (4.36)***
(S  4 -  ƒ?) . tji * .33
(.05)***
.28
(.05)***
.24
(.05)***
{S  — 4 R) • Tij \ s • 16.37
(3.29)***
•
r i j  1 d • 8.14
(3.19)**
•
(S  — 4 R) • 7Tij \ s ■ • .1
(.02)***
7Î i j  j d • • .06
(.01)***
Ohs. 2540 2540 2540 2540
R2 .21 .22 .24 .27
■Vote: All variables refer to the previous period. S  — -» R  indicates that the sender chose 
t he receiver and S  <•-- R  that the receiver chose the sender, tjj is the transfer received 
from j ,  i'ij the return ratio and 7rij the payoff, j s and | d means that the variable is in­
teracted with same ($) or di fie rent (d) choice. Reported values are coefficients, standard 
errors corrected for repeatobservations of the same individuals in parenthesis. *, ** 
. *** denote significance to the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of a test that the coefficient is 
zero. Control variables are: gender, age, siblings, and nationality of sender and receiver, 
dummies for sessions, treatments and for each period.
to determine the effect of received transfers on own transfers, one has to take 
into account the coefficient of the variable (S  * — ƒ?), which is negat ive and 
significant, because this is the intercept of the functional relation between the 
amount received and transfer made. For example, with an intercept of —19 
and a slope of 1/3. the results suggest that only if the transfer received was 
higher than 57 points this had a positive effect on the own transfer. This is 
evidence for hypothesis R C P 3.
Hypothesis RCP 4. which relates transfers to the ratio returned in the pre­
vious period, also finds empirical support, as can he seen from specification 
T3. This is evident from the positive coefficients of the previous choice mul­
tiplied with the return m tio received and interacted with same and different 
choice. In this case the coefficient of (S  —4 R) becomes insignificant. How­
ever. upon having received a high return ratio players increase their transfer 
even if they choose a different player. Hence, the additional reward when
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choosing the same player is tlit' difference 10.-1 — 8.1 — 8.3. which is still sig- 
niiicant. The insignificance of .S' — -> ƒ? points to the fact that transfers are 
increased even if the return ratio is small. In other words. l t d *  4 also holds 
in tiie unconditional formulation.
The results for hypothesis R IF  2 arc similar, for which evidence is provided 
in specification T4. As in tIk* choice setting we consider RC’F and RIF sepa­
rately due to collinearity of payoffs and n't urn ratios. Players do increase their 
transfer after high payoffs. However, again they do so m/cr/r/Zcss to whether 
they repeat their choice or not. hut do more so in ease of a repeated choice 
(0.1 — 0.00 - 0.01). Similar to the RCP hypothesis above, the insignificance 
of .S' —-* H is evidence that transfer increase even if payoffs were very small. 
Here we speak of positive reinforcement for all payoff values. A comparison 
of the explanatory power of RCP 4 and RIP 2 shows that the latter one has 
a Ret ter lit to the data. Hence, we will refer to evidence for reinforcement as 
strong.
Hypothesis DLT 2 is addressed in Table 1.12. We find evidence of directional 
learning as the coefficient of the variable that indicates that more was returned 
than sent. 1 {r,;; > 1/3} |.s. is significant. This means that when having got 
hack less than sent, the transfer decreases significantly by 23 points (18 — 
( — a) — 23). Notice that this effect is smaller (7 — ( —5) -- 12 points) when 
transferring to a new player. In T7 we investigate the alternative cutoff point 
at 1/2 . While the effect on transfers is still significant for the same choice, it 
is now only 2 points.
Finally, hypothesis RTX 1 is widely confirmed by the data. Table J.13 
reports the coefficients for the period dummy variables included in the regres­
sions for two specifications - the results for any other specification arc similar. 
It is evident that transfers increase slightly in the third period relative to the 
second, but drop on average by o points in the last period. This is the case 
in both regressions T3 and To. where once the ratio ret unit'd and once the 
amount received was included. Hence, the end game effect is additional to 
any decreases in transfer that could have been induced by lower receipts or 
return ratios in the previous period.
Table 1.14 summarizes the main findings of this section.
1.6.3 The Amount Sent Back
In the last stage of the game, subjects divided how much of any amount 
transferred to them (multiplied by 3) to staid back to the original sender. 
Let Gijt be the amount that the sender (who is indexed by /) gets back from
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T a b le  1 . 12 : TVansfer: estimation results 2
T 6
5 — 4 R -5 .31
(4.54)
3.43
(2.23)
S + — R -1 7 .3 2
(4.28)***
-17.15
(4.46)***
( S  «—  R) ■ t a .31
(.05)***
.31
(.05)***
I f a i  >  1 / 3 } | s 17.98
(3.93)***
•
l { r «  > 1/ 3} | d 6 .53
(2.26)***
•
I f o i  > 1/ 2} | s - 5.75
(1.76)***
-1 IV ■ 1.37
(i*D
Ohs.
R 2 2540.24
2540
.23
Note: See notes to Table 1.11. The function 1{...} is the indi­
cator function which takes value one if the expression inside 
the parenthesis is true.
Table 1.13: Transfer: estimation results 
T3
for period dummies 
T 5
period 3 1.56 1.35
(.80)* (.80)*
period 4 1.24 1.07
(.93) (-92)
period 5 .018 -.28
(1.05) 0-04)
period 6 -4.95 -5.26
( 1.91)** (1.89)***
Note: Efforts to be interpreted with respect to period 2, See notes to 
Table 1.11.
receiver j .  From a receiver’s perspective, the variable Gijt is the amount he 
pays back to the sender, and will henceforth be called Pjit- This variable, 
which is naturally hounded by 3 times the amount received. (3 • tju). will he 
the measure of return used in this section.
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Table 1 .14 : Transfer: summary of findings
...transfers are higher if evidence
i t e r  :j the ratio returned was high yes
HOP 1 the receiver sent a lot yes
1UF 2 the payoff was high strong
DLT 2 the receiver returned more than l/:i yes
...transtirs are tower
HTX 1 in the last period yes
Due to the nature of the gam(‘. when players take1 the decision how much 
to transfer hack, they know already who has chosen them in this period t. 
Hence, in period t receivers know if they are playing in a pair or not and by 
whom they have been chosen.
The hypotheses are formulated from the perspective of the player that takes 
action, he. the receiver.
Hypothesis R C P  5 The amount paid hack is higher if the. transfer received 
was high.
Hypothesis R IF  3 The amount paid hack is higher if received from a player 
fo r  the second time.
Hypothesis D LT 3 The amount paid back is lower if received from a player 
fo r  the second time.
Hypothesis R TN  2 The amount paid hack is lower in the last period.
The choice of players in stage one of the game leads to a particular feature 
of the data analyzed in this section. A player might have been chosen l>v 0 . 1. 
2. •'! or even 1 other players. Hence, at each period t there are between 0 and 
I observations for each player of an amount paid back. In total, of course, 
there are as many observations as for the initial transfer.
The framework to be used in this section goes along tlit* lines of the analysis 
of the transfer. Consider the equation for the amount ratio returned
ƒ jit - odjit 1 ‘hijit—i 1 ¡dijt—i 1 6A a 1 gZj, -j itjif.
where the variables are defined as above. The variable d sli indicates if in
addition to having been chosen by sender h receiver j  also chose / in period
/. For player j  to make a move in /. it has to be that he was chosen by
he. dijt — 1.
m m
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T a b le  1 .1 5 : Amount paid back: estimation results
P I P 2 P3 P4
S  — > R 24.21 13.3 12.04 17.71t-1
(5.88)*** (4.8)*** (4.78)** (4.5)***
S  <—  R 1.G9 3.33 2.89 -1.52t-1
(5.99) (4.65) (4.62) (4.64)
S  ♦— Rt 32.08 2G.25 25.67 19.45
(5.16)*** (4.56)*** (4.54)*** (4.6)***
tjit • 1.83
(.09)***
.14
(.28)
•
ƒ 2l jit ■ .01
(.002)***
■
period 3 -3.95 -7.24 -0.14 -14.38
(4.34) (3.77)* (3.77) (9.06)
period 4 -10.14 -12.57 - 12.10 -3.95
(4.93)** (3.84)*** (3.86)*** (7.98)
period 5 -28.42 -29.73 -29.08 -1.17
(6.3)*** (5.6)*** (5.63)*** (7.93)
period G -74.83 -05 -65.22 -4.90
(7.82)*** (7.06)*** (6.99)*** (9.63)
ijc  period 2 • 2.11
(.11)"*
t , i - period 3 • • • 2.18
(.12)***
tjv  period 4 - - ■ 2.01
(.in***
tji* period 5 - • • 1.77
(.13)***
tji~ period G • • - 1.49
(.17)***
Const. 35.02 -109.44 -04.35 -55.84
(68.58) (57.85)* (58.4) (57.81)
Obs. 2540 2540 2540 2540
R 2 .22 .42 .43 .42
Note: Variables refer to periods as indicated b}’ the subscripts. S  is sender and R is the 
receiver, ijn is tlw* transfer R  received in t. Control variables are: gender, age, siblings, 
and nationality of sender and receiver, dummies for session and treatments.
- .... ..........
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Table 1.1”) presents results for four specifications. The labels S  for sender 
and R for receiver remain unchanged, even though it is now the receiver to 
take action. Note that hv default, the sender must have chosen the receiver 
in period /. otherwise the receiver does not make a move. I hus. either S  and 
/? formed a pair in ( (if (5  +■— R )f is one), or S  chose R but not vice versa.
Specification PI forms the starting point for the analysis. We find that 
payback is on average about 21 units higher when receiving a transfer from 
the same subject for the second time. This is evidence supporting hypothesis 
HIT 3 and is evidence against hypothesis I.)LT 3. We also find that a subject 
pays back about 33 units more if he also sent a transfer to this subject in the 
same round. This effect is not directly associated to oik* of our hypotheses. 
Xotiee that sending a transfer to this subject in the previous round lias no 
significant effect (see coefficient of .S' + R).
In specification T2 of Table 1.15 one can find support for hypothesis RCP 5. 
The amount received increases the amount paid back. In particular, the coef­
ficient of the transfer received is 1.8. Together with the insignificant constant 
this shows that on average for each token sent, which is multiplied by three, 
subjects pay back 1.8 . or. equivalently 00 percent of the amount received. The 
functional relation between the transfer received and the amount paid hack 
is not linear, as can be seen from the positive and significant coefficient of 
the variable t2^ in specification 1*3. However, the curvature' does not have a 
substantial impact in the range 20 to 100 where 00 percent of the transfers 
can he found, and a linear relation can be seen as a good approximation.
One might bo pressed to interpret tlie decreasing period dummies in PI to 
P 3 as evidence' for hypothesis RTN 2 that payback is lower ill the last periods. 
However, when we add interaction terms between period number and transfer 
received (sec* P-1) we find that the period dummies become insignificant. In­
stead. now we find a significant decrease in the ratio returned from 70 percent 
in period A to 50 percent in period 0 . While transfers are lower in final periods 
(as shown in previous section) loss can only be paid back. Nevertheless, the 
decline in payback can he explained only by a declining return ratio. In other 
words, the* rate of the decline of payback is stronger than that of the decline 
in transfers.
Table 1.10 summarizes the main findings of this section.
* * .'*?»'an: hm m  m u m  it »  i i it tm m m
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T a b le  1 .1 6 : Amount paid back: summary of findings
...th e  amount paid  hack is higher evidence
HOP 5 if the transfer received was high yes
R IF  3 if received for consecutive periods yes
...th e  amount paid  back is lower
DLT 3 if received for consecutive periods no
RTN 2 in the last period no
additional findings
pay back is higher if transfer sent to same player 
the return ratio is lower in last periods
1.7' Final Remark
This paper analyzes the determinants of trust and trustworthiness in an ex­
periment where trust can emerge as the result of repeated interaction between 
individuals. We add an element of choice to the setting of a repeated trust 
game, in that players have the opportunity to choose among four players. For 
each opponent , players see information such as age, nationality and gender. 
The influence of four different behavioural and learning theories is looked 
at: directional learning, reinforcement learning, reciprocity and rationality. 
The econometric analysis goes along the three stages of the game: choice, 
transfer and return, controlling for confounding factors. It sheds light on the 
behavioural motives behind each decision. The low degree of formalization 
and a certain degree of observational equivalence makes a clear di scrim ¡na­
tion between the competing approaches impossible. While it is not possible 
to attribute the entire playing behaviour to a single type, at each decision 
several motives seem to influence the decisions taken, some being of higher 
explanatory power than others. It was shown that a mixture of several mo­
tives is at play at each stage of the game. In the same way as rationality does 
not offer a satisfying explanation for the behaviour of the players, none of the 
alternative motives such as reinforcement or reciprocity is able to capture all 
facets of the observed behaviour.
• j
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CHAPTER 2
Choosing Who to Trust
2.1 Introduction
Most derisions in daily life involve a discrete choice, ( ’onsinncrs decide to buy 
a second-hand car from one particular dealer and not from another, holiday 
makers choose one hotel among many at their destination, etc. Many of these 
decisions involve a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the charac- 
teristics of the choices and consequences of decisions. Because markets are 
imperfect and it is impossible to incorporate all contingencies into contracts, 
people often have to rely on their believes and attitudes when engaging into 
economic interactions. For example, at a certain point a consumer will just 
have to trust the word of the car dealer that the car he is about to buy is 
working properly. While economic theory is mostly about the interaction of 
anonymous agents, in reality people pay attention to identifying characteris­
tics. 'IVust. broadly defined as the the conscious engagement in actions that 
increase one’s own vulnerability (Kollock. 1991). is likely to depend, among 
others, on cultural background. Differences in the way daily life is organized 
in societies are likely to induce differences in the level of trust people place 
in strangers.1 Varying at tit ink's towards trust are also likely to be the re­
sult of gender differences. 'File local authorities of Mexico City, for example, 
have introduced all female teams of traflic police in an attempt to reduce the 
incidence of bribes, because they trust women to be less corrupt than men 
(Buchan et ah. 2001).
1 Fni' evidence on this, see c.». C'roson and Buell an (liH)U).
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As tlie list of examples above suggests, many real life situations often display 
a degree of complexity that is difficult to capture in a simple and tractable 
model. But to understand human behaviour it is important to identify the 
reasons why individuals decide the way they do; why the consumer trusts one 
car dealer more than any other. What adds to the difficulty is that observable 
data, even if collected at the individual level, very rarely includes information 
about all options faced by the individual. But if something is to he said about 
why an individual prefers one choice over another, it is essential to know the 
characteristics of all choices.
The experiment analyzed in this part of the thesis offers the possibility to 
shed some light on the determinants of trust in a discrete choice setting. In­
dividuals were matched in groups of five players to ¡day the repeated trust 
game. Every period each player could choose one among the four other players 
in his grout) to play tbe game. Each player had information about nation­
ality. gender, age and the number of siblings of all other players in his or 
her group. This trust game was repeated for six periods before groups were 
reshuffled.2 The experimental setup allows to track the presence of trust and 
trustworthiness along three dimensions. The first and probably most impor­
tant dimension is choice. Because the division of the surplus in the trust game 
depends on the willingness of the receiver to reward the sender, the sender 
should think carefully which player to trust. Having made that decision the 
next dimension of trust is how much the sender wants to transfer to the re­
ceiver. Lastly, the amount that the receiver returns to the sender is a measure 
of Iiis trustworthiness. At this stage the initial believes of the sender about 
the t rust worthiness of the receiver are either confirmed or not.
The information collected in this setup is exceptionally rich because in 
addition to the individual's characteristics, the characteristics of the entire 
choice set are observable to the econometrician. Ilence this is one of the 
rare eases in which it is possible to apply the choice framework developed by 
McFadden (1973), more specifically, the conditional logit model to determine 
what leads subjects to trust one player but not another.
This chapter analyzes which of the observable characteristics of the [»layers 
influenced their choice of a player, how these determinants evolved in the 
course of the game and if any significant deviation from randomness is payoff 
relevant. The analysis shows that male players have a strong preference for
2 For details about the ex peri mental setup the reader is referred to the description of the 
experiment in Section l.;i on page 12 and to the Appendix A.l. Players could decide 
if they wanted to make a positive transfer to any of their fellow players or they could 
decide not to make a transfer at all. In the subsequent analysis only cases in which 
players actually derides to play will be considered. The analysis here only includes the 
first four treatments where individuals had free choice.
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transferring points to female players, while female players do not discriminate 
in such a way. Interestingly, this behaviour is not payoff relevant, in the sense 
that women do not reciprocate transfers more than men by making higher 
returns. Along the lines of nationality, this chapter discovers a significant 
preference of northern players to play with players from the same1 region, 
discriminating against southern players. The evolution of this discrimination 
and its payoff relevance is subject to an in-depth analysis in Chapter 3.
2.2 An Application of the Conditional Logit 
Model
2.2.1 Specification
The multinomial choice model is best motivated by the random utility model. 
Call I'ij the utility of player i if he decided to choose alternative j  and define
[ l  if i chooses j .
(*ij — \
0 otherwise.
In the experiment, each player has four mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
choices, j  =  {1 .2 .3 . 4 }. The random utility model relates the characteristics 
of individual / and of the choice j  to the utility level (/,;. Hence:
Utj — n ib  f 7Zj + f ij. (2. 1)
where M* contains /-specific information such as nationality and gender of 
player / and Zj contains information that varies across choices. It includes all 
information that player z has about his fellow players j  {gender, nationality, 
age. siblings). The errors art' assumed to be independently distributed 
both across i and /.
In general, in the conditional choice model, it is not possible to identify 
coefficients of variables that do not vary within groups.* This does not mean, 
however, that individual effects are nut accounted for: /-specific characteristics 
just do not affect the relative probabilities of choice. Effects of attributes of a 
player i such as gender and nationality can he identified if they are interacted 
with choice varying characteristics. By doing so. and given some variation 
across choices, it is possible to identify the effect of /-specific characteristics 
relative to the characteristics of j .  To this end. define the following interacted 
variables:
In this ease a group refers to the one out of four players choice faced by each individual 
ill each period of each treatment.
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nmiij takes value one if both i and j  are male and zero otherwise,
f f i j  takes value one if both i and j  are female and zero otherwise,
NNij takes value one if  both i and j  are from North and zero otherwise,
SSij takes value one if both i and j  are from South and zero otherwise.
Note that these four variables are a complete set of interactions of gender 
and nationality.'1 For example, if i is male, may take values 0 or 1.
but ƒ f i j  is obviously zero. In addition, define the following two variables of 
j-speoific characteristics:
aye.j the age of player j ,  
sibj t he number of siblings of player j .
Define the vector AY, =  (nmiij* f f i j ,  aye.j. sibj) and a corre­
sponding parameter vector ¡3. then the random utility model becomes:
Ct j — 6X ij 4- tij.
Player i chooses player j  if this yields highest utility. Hence.
P (d M =  l )  =  P(f/y
(2.2)
Assume further that the errors an1 distributed independently identically across 
i and j  and with F (tij)  =  e x p (—e-fy ), so that the model takes the form of 
the conditional logit model (Maddala. 1993. pp. GO-Gl). Then the probability 
of a choice j  is
m j  = D =
e >3Xij
(2.3)
which is the standard McFadden (1973) conditional logit specification.4 5
The log-likelihood function logL(d) is the sum over all such probabilities 
for all J  =  4 choices, for all individuals /, for all periods p and treatments /:
iog / .(/ ?)= 5 Z  H  i l  los r(,/v =
T= l /»=1 t-l j= l a
4 For the analysis of nationality the participants were grouped into two geographical 
regions North and South, see also the discussion in Chapter 3. Table 3.1 on page 51 
lists the countries, their average latitude and number of participants in the experiment.
5 Notice that throughout the experiment subjects were constrained in the number of 
alternative choices, and the choice set was complete and mutually exclusive by design. 
Hence, the underhung assumption that derives from the particular error structure of 
the conditional logit model ami which f>oses a problem for many of its applications, the 
assumed independency of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). is fulfilled by construction.
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where T  — A. P  -  (>. N — 110. which yields a total of 2040 units facing a four 
choices decision problem. In !(>(> cases players decided not to play the game 
so that 2471 units remain, or. equivalently. 0890 observât ions.f*
The goodness of fit of the model can be assessed by the share of correct 
predictions made by the model. This is the percentage of correct choices pre­
dicted by the model disregarding the contribution of the error component uj. 
The predicted choice is the choice that was attributed the highest probability. 
More specific-ally, consider the choice in a specific treatment t and a specific- 
period p. Define:
The. lit for a particular period/treatment combination pi is measured by:
where 1 { .. .}  is an indicator function that takes value one if the expression 
inside the parentheses is true and zero otherwise.
2.2.2 Estimation Results
Table 2.1 reports estimation results for equation (2.3) for three sub-samples 
of the data. The first specification CM uses all observations for the first four 
treatments, the second column (specification 02 ) uses only the data from the 
first period of the first treatment, while the last specification 03  is restricted 
to the first period of all four treatments.
The results show a clear discrimination taking place along the lilies of na­
tionality. Over all periods and treatments (specification 01). northern players 
have a strong preference for other northern players. On average, the odds of 
a northern player choosing a northern player instead of a southern player are 
1.38. Southerners also have a preference for northern players, although the 
effects an* not significant. Still, the odds of a southerner choosing another *
(> Contrary to tin* analysis in ( liapter 1 tin* analysis tines not include tlit* last free olioiee 
treatment, where subjects just had completed the predetermined treatment of forced 
interactions.
ji -  max Pij . where Pl} =
j
Denote the ac tual choice of individual / as
j*  =  maxj
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player from South are just 0.91. In the first period of the first treatment 
(specification C2), where much less observations are available, the odds for 
nationality go into the same direction, but they are not statistically significant. 
If the sample is restricted to the first periods of all treatments (specification 
C3) the preference of North for North is reconfirmed.
But nationality is not the only dimension along which discrimination takes 
place. The effect of gender is also clearly visible. Male players have a strong 
preference to contact female players throughout all specifications. This effect 
is particular strong in the first period of the first treatment (02). In this 
case, the odds of a male player choosing another male player are just 0.53. 
compared to 0.70 overall. The effect is borderline significant even tough this 
specification includes very few observations.
Other demographic variables also influence choice. Overall, the effect of age 
is positive and significant. The odds of a player being chosen increases with his 
age, hut the magnitude is very small. The significance is not confirmed in the 
sub-samples of the data, where the odds of choosing a player are unaffected 
by his age. Interestingly, there is a consistent pattern when it comes to the 
influence of siblings on choice. Compared to the excluded case that tlu* player 
chosen is a single child, the odds of a player being chosen increase with the 
number of siblings that he or she has and peak at three siblings.7
The share of correct predictions in both specifications is well above the 
random prediction of 0.25. In particular in the specification of the initial 
choice (first period, first treatment), where no playing experience influences 
the players' choice. 43 percent can he predicted by this simple model.
Not ice that the estimates presented in specification C l in Table 2.1 include 
estimates of all periods. However, in the second period of the game players 
have already made experiences with their choice and might revise their deci­
sion. It is therefore interesting to see how the estimates evolve in the course 
of the game. Figure 2.1 {dots the first five coefficients from equation (2.2) 
estimated for each period />. together with the corresponding standard error.
The evolutions of the coefficients of the gender variables confirms the gen­
eral picture that emerged from the table above. There is a strong preference 
of males to play with females at early stages in the game (see the first panel 
of Figure 2. 1). Interestingly, in the second period there is a pronounced revi­
sion of this preference when males are indifferent in their choice, before the 
preference Starts building up again in the course of the game.
7 The cases of sibj = 3 and sibj = 1 +  include 5 and 7 subjects only, so the peak at sibj — 3 should not bo over-interpreted. In results not reported here, inti’rad ions of the 
number siblings of i and the number of siblings of j  were also included in the estimations. 
While this increased slightly the predictive power of the models, no consistent pattern 
emerged. The same is true for age.
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Table 2 .1 : Conditional Logit estimation results
Cl 0 2 03
A A ij 1.38 1.40 1.34
(.09)*** (.54) (-22)*
s .% 0.91 0.67 1.20
(.07) ( .28 ) (-21 )
mm-ij 0.76 0.53 0.61
(.or.)*** ( . 18)* (.IO)***
f i n 0.97 1.36 0.99
(-08) (-52) ( . 19)
(UJCj 1.03 0.95 1.01
(.01)*** ( .0 3 ) ( ,U2 )
Mbj =  1 1.09 1.59 1.11
(.08) (-07 ) (.21)
sibj = 2 1.34 2.34 1.17
(.12)*** ( 1.07 )* ( .2 0
Hibj = 3 1.32 4.11 2.29
(.]?)♦* (2.91)** (.98)***
+il 1.60 1.18 1.39
(.19)*** (.8 9 ) (•■JO)
01 >s . 9896 420 1716
Correct Predictions 0.31 0.43 0.35
treatments T  included 1.2.3.4 1 1.2.3.1
periods p included all 1 1
Note: The table reports odds ratios, standard errors in parenthe­
ses. *, ** and * * * is the significance of a a test at the 10. 5 and 
1 percent level respectively that the odds ratios are different from 
one. Correct predictions indicates share of cases in which the max­
imal predicted probability coincides with the actual choice of i.
There is no such effect for female players, none of the estimates is signifi­
cant ly different from zero (see second panel of Figure 2.1).
The preference of northern players to choose northern counterparts is pos­
itive and significant throughout the game. For southerners a change in pref­
erence can be observed. As the fourth panel in Figure 2.1 shows, they start 
off with a slight preference for South, but end up choosing more players from 
North as the game evolves. As will become clear in the Chapter 3. this is 
directly related to differences in playing behaviour between South and North.
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F ig u re  2 . 1 : Coefficients over periods
coefficient of mm coefficient of ff
periods
coefficient of NN
coefficient of age
coefficient of SS
Note: Scaling differs from graph to graph. Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals
The results form this section can be summarized as follows.
• Men (‘liter the game with a strong preference to contact women. While 
this preference weakens considerably in the following period, it still turns 
out to he significant in subsequent periods.
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• Women instead do not discriminate based oil the gender of their coun­
terparts.
• Northern players discriminate against southern players in that they are 
more likely to choose someone from North throughout the game.
• While southern players have an overall tendency to prefer northern play­
ers. this is only at borderline significarne and it builds up in the course 
of the game.
2.3 Does it Pay Off to Discriminate?
The question that emerges is if the observed discrimination [»ays off, i.c. if it 
is rational for men to contact women instead of men.8 If women are more 
trustworthy than men. it is rational for mem not only to contact them more 
often but also to make higher transfers, because they can expect to get a high 
return. In order to verify this, the gender discrimination will he analyzed in 
terms of the transfers sent to other players and how much is returned.
Indeed, male players make higher transfers, but they do so to both men and 
women. The left hand side of Table 2.2 reports the average transfers made 
hv male and female senders to their male and female counterparts. The first 
observation is that, both, over all treatments hut also in the first period of the 
first treatment, men transfer more points than women. Second, ewer all four 
treatments, the raw data also suggests that men receive more than women. 
Notice however, that in the first period of the first treatment, female's send 
substantially less to men than to women (33 vs. 43).
The relevant question in this context is not if men in general trust more1 
than women, but if men trust women more* than men.9 To test the significance 
of difference's in transfers sent between genders and control for confounding 
factors, the following framework is used. Denote by the* transfer seuit by 
player / to player j  and define an indicator variable ja m j  that takes value one1 
if the recc'iveT j is female'. The1 following regression is estimated:
ti a  4 n fenij  4 dX 4 (2.4)
The matrix A' contains the control variable's age1, nationality and siblings of 
the sender and the receiver. If a sen tier sends more to a female receiver, the
S Tli<* discrimination based on nationality is subject to the analysis in Chapter 3 and will 
not be discussed here.
i) Men, in general, make higher transfers than women, even controlling for confounding 
factors (results not reported here).
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estimated coefficient a should be different from zero. The right hand side of 
Table 2.2 reports results for the regression in equation (2.4) by sender groups.10 
Controlling for observational characteristics, none of the above differences is 
significant. A first result of this section is that, judged on transfers received, 
male and female players do not differ significantly. If anything, female players 
make low transfers to male players at early stages in the game. Interestingly, 
while male players strongly prefer female players as partners, they do not trust 
them more in the sense that they make higher transfers to them.
T a b le  2 .2 : Gender effects on transfers received
male female
receiver receiver 0 s.e /-vai.
7 ’ =  1, 2,3 ,4 male sender 83 8Ü -1.49 2.54 -0.59
(obs.) (927) (028)
female sender 77 73 -2.57 3.10 -0.83
(obs.) (G01) (318)
p =  i , r  =  l male sender 5G 54 -5.46 10.12 -0.54
(obs.) (36) (30)
female sender 33 43 7.93 9.53 0.83
(obs.) (21) (18)
Note: The left hand side of the table reports the average transfer to male and fe­
male receivers by sender groups, for the first four treatments and for the first pe­
ritai, first treatment separately. The right hand side of the table reports, bv sender 
groups, results of the regression =  a + a  ƒ tv i j  -\-SX +  where f t n \ 3 takes value 
1 if the receiver j  is female. A" is a matrix of control variables including age, nat ion­
ality and siblings of sender and receiver, a, is an error component. Standard errors 
in tlie first row corrected for multiple observations per individual, /-value reported 
for the test «  — 0.
But does the return behaviour give a reason for males to discriminate in 
favour of females? To investigate this question, a similar analysis is carried 
out for the amount returned. Define the ratio returned to a sender i as r* =  
CV7/(Ti ■ ti) where b is the original transfer and Gi is what receiver j  returned 
to player i. Table 2.3 reports on the left hand side, by gender of sender 
and receiver, the ratios returned. In the table, rows are senders, columns 
are receivers. It appears as if. over all treatments, both sexes tend to return 
more to the same sex than to the opposite sex. To see if these differences are 
significant. the following regression (analogous to equation (2.4)) is estimated.
10 Standard errors are corrected for the fact that in the upper row of the table repeated 
observations for players were used, see Moulton (1980).
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In the regression:
rt — ¿>T rf fewj  -f ¿A' d cz (2.5)
one can test the significance of gender effects of the return ratio by testing if 
the coefficient ¡i = 0. The right hand side of Table 2,3 reports this by sender 
groups. Over all treatments the differences ¿ire not significant. However, in the 
first period of the first treatment, despite the fact that then' ¿ire only so few 
observations, it can be seen that males get back significantly less from females 
than from males (0.17 vs. 0.55). Notice that the average return ratio from 
males to females instead is 0.03. much higher than any other value observed. 
Clearly in their first contact, the two sexes treat each other very unequally.
Table 2 .3 : Gender effects oil the ratio ret unit'd
male fern ¿lie
receiver receiver s.e /-Veil.
T  " 1 .2 .3 . 1 male sender 0.50 0.53 -0.02 0.03 -0.01
(obs.) 
female sender
(027)
0.5:1
((¡28)
0.58 0.01 0.03 0.51
(obs.) ((¡01) (;S18)
P = 1 ,7 ’ = 1 male sender 0.55 0,17 -0.17 O.Ofi -2,59
(obs.) 
female sender
(;«;)
0 .0.1
(HO)
0.18 -0.15 0.09 -1.77
(obs.) (21) (18)
Note: Tilt' left hand side of the table reports the average ratio returned bv male 
and female receivers to sender groups, for the first four treatments and for the 
first period, first treatment separately. The right hand side of the table reports, 
by sender groups, results of the regression n — b-\- .i f f  i»j -f 6X  + m,  where /Mis­
takes value 1 if the receiver j  is female. >V is a matrix of control variables includ­
ing age, nationality and siblings of sender and receiver. < is an error component. 
Standard errors in the first row corrected for multiple observations per individual, 
f-value reported for the test A — 0.
2.4 Discussion
from the results above one can conclude that the initial trust put in women 
by men in contacting them more often is not followed hv higher transfers, and. 
more importantly, is not reciprocated by higher returns.
One possible interpretation is that men initially believed that women are 
more trustworthy and lienee expected them to return more. But after realizing
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that they receive less from women in general, and that women do not. meet 
their own standards in the ratio returned (in particular they return far less 
than men do to the opposite sex) they revise their beliefs and switch to other 
players. This explanation is supported by the increased probability of males 
ill choosing male partners in the second period, as scon in the* first panel of 
Figure 2.1.
Had subjects read the literature on gender and trust and behaved accord­
ingly. the picture would have been less clear. The literature does not offer a 
conclusive answer to which gender is more trusting and which is more trust­
worthy. In an international study of the trust game. Croson and Buchan 
(1999) find that women do not give significantly more than men but that 
they are significantly more reciprocal in their return behaviour. Here it would 
have been rational to transfer more to women. Ilcwvever. in their study, the 
gender of the players is not made public among participants. Evidence for 
significant gender differences when the sex of the opponent is known is pro­
vided by Eckel and Wilson (2003). But in their simplified version of the trust 
game, they find that women are more likely to trust than men. but do not 
observe any differences in payback behaviour.11 More related to the present 
study is Buchan et al. (2001). who carefully investigate how information about 
the opponent's sex affects trust and trustworthiness. In a standard one shot 
trust game, they vary the information that sender and receiver have about 
their (matched) opponent. While they find that men send significantly more 
than women throughout their treatments (as in this study), in their treat­
ment where the sex of both sender and receiver is common knowledge they 
do not find any additional effect, neither in transfers sent nor in the amount 
returned.
These findings are consistent until the result of study. The common belief 
that women are more trustworthy than men is not confirmed in a setting 
when* both partners have information about their opponents' sex.
2.5 Concluding Remark
In a setting of the repeated trust game with an element of choice, wdiere 
players had information about their opponent's gender, age, and nationality, 
the choice* of a player wos found to be influenced by these characteristics. 
Using the conditional choice model of McFadden (1973) the analysis reveals 
that, especially upon first contact, men arc* more likely to contact women 
than other men. The second important finding is that subjects from northern
11 In their study the first mover could not deride how much to transfer to the receiver, 
but only if the total amount should be transferred or not.
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European countries arc more likely to choose players from the same region. 
However, the discrimination that takes place based on the gender information 
is not payoff relevant: women do not reciprocate transfers with higher returns.
The effect of gender on trust and trustworthiness as investigated by the 
literature does not yet yield a conclusive picture. While there is some evidence 
that women are trusted more, this expectation cannot always be confirmed. 
Outside the experimental laboratory, these differences are likely to be more 
complex, and perhaps largely contextual. Whether female car dealers are 
more successful than their male1 counterparts remains an open question.
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CHAPTER 3
Trust and Trustworthiness Among 
Europeans: South -  North Comparison1
3.1 Introduction
Most economic interactions are preceded by a stage in which agents select 
partners. Entrepreneurs select their counterparts for a partnership, firms 
select suppliers, consumers select retailers and employers choose workers from 
pools of applicants. The initial choice of a partner as well as the decision about 
the volume of activity to a large extent depends on the agent's beliefs about 
the prospects of building trust and reciprocity with potential partners. If the 
interaction takes pi are repeatedly, experience will play a role as well. Selectors 
are expected to return to those* partners who proved to he trustworthy, and 
avoid those who failed to reciprocate. In a global environment where economic 
interactions go across countries and culture's, national diversity may have* a 
substantial impact on agents' initial beliefs regarding partners as well as on 
the (‘volution of their interaction over multiple transactions.
In this paper we* report on experimental results that describe the* impact of 
cultural diversity on agents' choice's of partners as well as on the outcomes of 
ceonemiic interactions. Our subject peiol invoice's participants from different 
European nationalities. Dividing the* continent into two regions our objec­
tive is to compare1 subjects" perceptions about trust and reciprocity between 
northern and southern Europe by studying subjects' choices of partners and 
the volume of economic activity.
1 This chapter is joint work with Andrea 1 rhino, Karl Selling and Eval Winter.
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The issues of trust and reciprocity in economic interactions have been given 
a considerable attention by the recent literature in experimental economics. 
Berget al. (1995) addressed these issues by designing a trust game experiment. 
The standard format of a trust game involves two players. The "sender" 
who is assigned an amount of money x  by the experimenter decides on a 
transfer 0 < t < x  to be made to the "receiver", who will receive three times 
the amount of this transfer, i.e.. if the sender concedes the amount t to the 
receiver, then the latter receives 3/ (while the sender loses just /). Following 
the transfer made by the sender, the receiver has to decide how much she 
wants to return. The amount that the receiver decides to return is denoted 
by g €  [0,3/] and is equal to what the sender gets back. While the unique Nash 
equilibrium prediction of the game is for the receiver to make zero payback 
and therefore for the sender to make no transfer at all, Berg et al. (1995) found 
that senders did make considerable transfers, which are backed by substantial 
paybacks. Among other papers that study subjects' behavior in this trust 
game is Buchan et al. (2000), which involves a comparison across different 
countries including the US, China, Japan and Korea focusing on the effect of 
preliminary discussions within groups on behavior in the trust game.
Our framework differs from this strand of literature in three major aspects. 
First, we are not interested in differences across countries when subjects in­
teract with partners of the same nationality. We are instead interested in 
differences across countries when subjects from different nationalities jointly 
play together our version of the trust game. Second, to highlight the role of 
the choice of partner in real settings we have allowed participants to choose the 
partner to whom they make a transfer. Finally, we have designed a dynamic 
version of the trust game to allow trust and reciprocity to be built up and to 
enable us to study the evolution of trust in our multi-cultural framework. Our 
version of the trust game will be described in greater detail in Section 3.2.
Somewhat more related to our framework is Fershtman and Gneezv (2001) 
which reports results on a one shot trust game played between Ashkenazi 
(Jews of European descent) and Sephardi (Jews of Middle Eastern origin) 
Israelis. They found that Sephardi subjects were discriminated against in the 
amount of transfers they received although their payback behavior wasn't dif­
ferent from that of their Ashkenazi counterparts. In contrast to their frame­
work in which matching was lixed and the interaction involved a one shot 
game, in our framework each subject can act both as a sender and a receiver; 
subjects choose their partner and interact repeatedly within the same group. 
These features will allow us not only to detect discrimination but also to 
go more deeply into its roots by analyzing the way it evolves over different
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We have conducted our experiment in an environment where a major role 
of nationality is least expected. Our subject pool involves Ph.D. students at 
the European Fniversity Institute (Eld) in Florence, The EUI whose main 
objective is to provide advanced academic training to Ph.D. students in a 
European perspective, attracts young intellectuals from E F  member countries 
with substantial international exposure and with a typical fluency in at least 
three European languages. If the role of nationality within this group is 
strong, we would expect it to be even stronger among the general population 
of Europe.
Our results, presented in Sections 3.3. 3.4 and 3.5. indicate discrimination 
against South in terms of number of contacts, carried out mainly by northern 
subjects. However, the most interesting finding is the fact that this discrim­
ination builds up rather than dying out with experience. More than for not 
being trustworthy (i.e. having a low propensity to reciprocate by making a 
generous payback for a transfer received). Southern Europeans are being pun­
ished for their own low level of trust (i.e. having a low propensity to contact 
another player with a generous transfer), and for this reason ends up leaving 
the game with lower payoffs.
As discussed in the concluding Section 3.0. we find these results particularly 
striking because of the international exposure of our group of subjects. We 
interpret these results as an indication that cultural differences in standards 
regarding trust and reciprocity, possibly related in our case to the stage of 
development or to the role of the family in the two regions, may be sufficiently 
robust to persist even when individuals change their original habitat.
3.2 The Design
The design of our experiment is described extensively in Appendix A.l. Here 
we limit ourselves to a summary of its most important features. We conducted 
three sessions with a total of 110 participants hired among E l l Ph.D. students 
from different European countries. Upon entry, subjects were asked to fill in 
a form in which they had to specify their nationality in addition to other hits 
of personal information (gender, age and number of siblings) that still allowed 
their identity to he kept anonymous. This was mainly done in order to blur 
the fact that our interest lies with the issue of nationality. In each session 
subjects played six treatments in each of which they were assigned randomly 
to a group of five players. At the beginning of each treatment the personal 
information about the other players was made public within the group.
Ill the lirst four treatments subjects were allowed to choose without restric­
tions the partner with whom they wanted to interact among the four subjects
i s m a m m ............... ........... .............
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in their group. Every one of these treatments involved G periods with the 
following structure: At the beginning of the period, each player received an 
endowment of 100 points, equivalent to 0.35 Euros. Subjects were then given 
the opportunity to transfer any part of the initial endowment to a single player 
of their choice within the group.2 If a sender made a transfer of / to a receiver 
she received 31. Then each subject who received a transfer had an option to 
return back any part of it to the person who made him the transfer and the 
period ended. All decisions were made via computer terminals. At the end 
of each period a subject saw on the screen only the actions and payoff of 
the interactions in which she had been involved (i.e. the one in which she had 
been a sender if she had transferred a positive amount to some player, and the 
ones in which she had been a receiver if she had received a transfer from one 
or more other players). Thus, subjects did not know at the end of a period 
what had happened between other pairs of players.
The fifth treatment differed from the previous four because subjects were 
randomly matched to another player at the beginning of each period. Thus, 
they did not have the possibility to choose a partner and could only send to 
the player randomly assigned to them. The sixth and final treatment was 
instead identical to the first four.
Most of our analysis will involve the first four treatments, since the last two 
treatments are distorted by the absence of free choice in the fifth treatment. 
However, we will also look at how imposing a partner in the fifth treatment 
changes the behavior of subjects in the last treatment in which the choice of 
partner is again free.
hi reporting the results we will refer to two characteristics of players: “trust” 
and "trustworthiness” . Trust concerns sending behavior. It refers to the 
propensity of a player to contact another player and to make high trans­
fers, which we interpret as a propensity to trust the receiver to recipro­
cate.3 By looking at the aggregate data within each region we will pro­
vide analysis regarding the extent to which region II  trusts region /\. where 
IL K  €  {North. South}. This will be done by looking at the propensity by 
which players from region H  choose to make a transfer to players of region 
K  as well as the amount of transfers they make. Trustworthiness stands for 
the tendency of a player to reciprocate by making a generous payback for 
a transfer lie/she received. At the regional level it will be measured by the
2 Note that choosing no partner was possible, in which case the transfer was equal to 
zero.
3 Note that, in our framework, lack of trust can emerge either because senders assign a 
small probability to the event that their partner will reciprocate or because senders are 
risk averse. The distinction between these two possible reasons for not trusting others 
is outside the scope of this paper.
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average return ratio, i.e. what receivers return to senders as a fraction of what 
they have received. The precise statistics will he explained later. We provide 
the analysis at the regional level and not at the country level as we fail to 
have sufficiently many observations for each country pair separately.
3.3 Results
The evidence provided in this paper is based on the aggregation of countries in 
two regions (South. North) according to their average geographical latitude. 
Table 3.1 lists the countries represented in each region, the average latitude 
(in degrees) of each country and the number of subjects per country.
Table 3 .1 : Nationalities: frequencies and av­
erage latitude
country av. latitude participants
Southern countries
Greece 39 9
Portugal 39.3 1
Spain 40 11
Italy 42.5 17
France 40 12
Northern countries
Austria 47.2 0
Belgium 50.5 5
Germany 51 Hi
Poland 52 3
Netherlands 52.3 8
Ireland 53 5
United Kingdom 51 8
Denmark 5G 3
Sweden 02 4
Finland 01 2
Note: For average latitude see CIA (2003).
Table 3.2 provides some general descriptive statistics based on the follow­
ing notation. The variable /A is the frequency of northern players seen by 
sender i in her group. With five randomly selected players in each group 
a sender sees four players and thus the variable takes the following values: 
/tv e  {0 , 0 .20.0 .5 . 0.75 , 1}. For each of these values we have a column in
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Table 3.2. Notice that whenever this variable takes value 0 the sender faces 
only players from South and hence cannot choose a player from North. The 
converse is true if f tN — 1.
We denote the average frequency of zero transfers (i.e. no choice of partner) 
for senders of region H  G {A7, 5 }  by Z^(t =  0). These frequencies are reported 
in the first row of Table 3.2 for each value of . Interestingly, with the 
exception of the shift from /A =  o to ƒ  A — 0.25, Z s(t 0) decreases 
with the fraction of northern players seen by the sender, indicating that on 
average North are4 more willing to trust when a larger number of interactions 
with North is possible. The opposite pattern prevails instead for South si ne'e 
Zs(t — 0) increases with /A.
T a b le  3 .2 : Descriptive statistics
______________ f t ______________
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 I average
ZK(t = 0) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.00
Zs(t = 0 ) 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.07
75 78 80 80 77 79
ts 00 77 GG 07 71 09
n.a. 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.00 0.56
r$ 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.55 n.a. 0.54
"a K.send- 177 147 154 103 173 158
il S.seru i 132 103 136 147 149 140
A'.rec 137 110 100 90 82 105
a S .r rc 88 74 92 80 98 87
~ N .to ta l 314 204 200 259 255 202
a"S .to ta l 220 237 227 233 247 233
Note: /A is the frequency of northern players seen by sender ? in her group. Z x ( t  — 0) is the fraction of zero transfers for senders of region K . is the 
average transfers sent by region K. r -^ is the average return ratio chosen by re­
ceivers of region K . This figure is not available for northerners (southerners) in 
the cases in which only southerner's (northerners) are seen by senders. The payoff 
for a sender of region K  from making a transfer is defined as 7Ta\ =  100—/+</ 
where y is what the sender gets hack. The payoff for a receiver of region K  from 
receiving transfers is defined as (sum of total amounts received by other
players — sum total amounts returned to other players). The total payoff is the 
sum i t  k.total -  7r/\,se»t/ + 7r/v.r«•• A' is equal to N or 5  denoting North and South 
respectively.
4 In the sequel we will use the terms “South” and “North" to refer to the plurality of sul> 
jects from the two regions. Thus, “South" and “North" will he short for “Southerners 
and “Northerners".
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The average transfers by senders of the two regions are denoted by In and 
is  and are displayed in the second row of the table. For all values of /,A 
northern senders transfer more tokens than southern senders, which indicates 
that North have a larger propensity to trust. In the first column of the table it 
is also worth noting the relatively low amount transferred by southern senders 
(GO tokens) when the potential partners are all from South.
Denoting with U the amount that sender i gives to her partner and with 
(ji what sender i gets back, we define the return ratio as /■* =  $•. The third•yfi
row of Table 3.2 reports the average return ratios chosen by the northern 
(r/v) and southern (r<?) receivers to which a sender / makes a transfer, for 
each value /A.r’ On average, the return ratio chosen bv northern receivers 
is just 2 percentage points higher than the one chosen by southern receivers 
(5G% vs. 54%). Finally, we define the overall payoff earned by sender i as 
nimsend 100 — U+gi,  while the payoff for the same subject viewed as a receiver 
is defined as 7 — (sum of total amounts received by other players — sum 
of total amounts returned to other players). Thus the total payoff for subject 
/ is the sum 77%Jt,tu[ = 7ti^ erui + 7r r^ec. The averages of these payoffs for the two 
regions {77s\ n^(l. 7rA\ri.c, 7Ts.m., 7T\’j0tni . xs,taua) are displayed in the last
rows of the table. On average, and independently of the sending, receiving 
or overall perspective, northern subjects walk out of the game with higher 
payoffs.
In the following, we will investigate the wav that such differences emerged in 
the course of the game. We will also analyze how robust- these differences are 
and if they are statistically significant. Because we are interested in situations 
in which players actually had a choice, we will exclude the cases where /A is 
0 or 1. i.e. the cases in which a sender sees only southern or northern partners 
in her group.0
3.3.1 Discrimination against South
The level of trust by players from region I f  to players of region I\ can be 
measured l>v two indicators: (i) the propensity by which a region H player 
contacts a region K  player to make a positive transfer and (ii) the amount of 
transfer made by region H players to region K  players. Since the frequency 
of players from the two regions is not the same in each group of players, con­
tact opportunities betwmi regions are not uniformly distributed. Thus one 
has to he careful in analyzing senders' behavior in terms of both (i) and (ii). 5*
5 Note that these figures are not available for North (South) in the cases in which only 
South (North) are seen by sender i.
(i Note that this exclusion does not raise concerns because group composition is random.
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However, note that the group composition is determined by the computer in 
a completely random fashion. We can. therefore, exploit the exogenous vari­
ability of group composition to test whether the region of potential partners 
affects the choices of {»layers or. on the contrary, players choose their partners 
independently of regional considerations.
Let /?* be a dummy variable taking value 1 if the receiver chosen by sender 
i is from North and 0 otherwise. If sender i chooses her partner disregarding 
the region to which the receiver belongs the following equality must hold
W )  •ƒ,* V (3. 1)
where E  denotes the expectation operator. This equality says that, if the 
choice is random with respect to region, on average the fraction of northern 
receivers chosen by a sender must be equal to the fraction of northern players 
seen by the sender in her group. Figure 3.1 plots the sample counterpart of 
the expectation on the left hand side of equation (3.1) for each value of /-v 
between .25 and .75.' This is done for senders in the two regions separately as 
well as for all senders. A point above the diagonal indicates a preference for 
North since it means that the average frequency of choosing North is greater 
than the proportion of North seen by the sender.
We find that almost all the points lie above the 45 degree line. While those 
corresponding to southern senders are closer to it, the points for northern 
senders lie much further away. Of course, in the case of all senders, the points 
are situated in between those of North and South. Tlius the figure suggests 
the existence of a generalized preference for choosing a northern partner as a 
receiver, a preference which is stronger for northern senders. Note that since 
is dichotomous, and specifically bounded from above at 1, the distance 
from the 45 degree line has to decrease with /A even in the presence1 of a 
propensity to favor North.
In order to assess whether the deviations from random choice displayed in 
Figure 3.1 are statistically significant we proceed as follows. Consider the 
regression X? ~fiN = D + u, (3 .2)
where I)  is a constant term and iq is a zero mean random noise* component. 
Note also that ƒ* is randomly assigned. Given equation (3.1). a test for 
the hypothesis that senders choose recipients disregarding nationality can be 
framed as a test for the* null hypothesis that
H o: D =  0 (3.3)
which implies that i f f  — ƒ  A is zero mean noise. 7
7 For /A = 0, E(/t;v ) is of course equal to 0. For ƒ Af =  1, conditioning on positive 
transfers ) is equal to 1.
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Figure 3 .1 : Deviation from randomness towards North (first 4 treatments)
• -----  all senders — # ------ N senders ------i*------  S senders
Table 3.3 reports the results of this test for the three lines displayed in 
Figure 3.1. The evidence of a preference towards North in choosing a partner 
is statistically significant- when aggregating over all senders and even more* so 
when confining only to northern senders. However, the preference of southern 
senders towards North is not statistically significant. Since we have repeated 
observations for the same sender in different periods and treatments, the stan­
dard errors are corrected to account for wit hill-individual correlation of the 
error component.
Figure 3.2 displays the estimates of the constant term D in equation 3.2 for 
each of the first four four treatments, with 90% confidence intervals. The1 fig­
ure suggests that the extent of deviation from randomness in favour of North 
increases during the development of the game. D is not distinguishable from 
0 in the first treatment, but increases in the subsequent treatments, becom­
ing significantly different- from 0 (at the 10% level) in the fourth treatment. 
Figure 3.3 displays the same statistic for northern senders and the tendency 
towards increasing discrimination against south appears even stronger.
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Table 3 .3 : Deviations from random choice over all periods of 
the first 4 treatments
All senders N senders S senders
D 0.044 0.002 0.022
s.e. 0.018 0.020 0.025
[hvalue 0.008 0.008 0.193
obs. 2107 1215 952
N o te : The table reports results from the estimation of the regression 
Y = D  +  Uj bv sender group. i?N is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the receiver chosen by sender i is from North and 0 otherwise. fl* is t he frequency of nort hern players seen by sender i in her group. D  is a constant parameter to be estimated, c* is an error component. 
Standard errors are robust and take care of within-individual correla­
tion of the error component. p-values are for the test that D — 0. The 
cases in which ƒ* is 0 or 1 are excluded. Note that ƒ* is randomly as­
signed.
No such evidence appears instead to characterize the behavior of South, as 
described by Figure 3.4.
Thus, the combination of results from Table 3.3 and Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 
suggests the. possibility that discrimination by North against South does not 
decrease with experience and actually builds up rather than being a strong 
prejudice with which North enter the game. This conjecture is further ex­
plored in the analysis that follows.
F ig u re  3 .2 : Coefficient D over treatments, all Senders
m saam aatm m
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Figure 3.3: Coefficient D over treatments. Northern Senders
Figure 3.4: Coefficient I) over treatments. Southern Senders
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Next we concern ourselves with the magnitude of transfers made bv senders 
differentiated by region. Table 3.4 shows the matrix of transfers sent by region 
H to region A', with K .I l  €  {Ar. 5 } .  The top panel refers to the first four 
treatments, while the bottom panel refers to  the earliest interaction in the 
game, occurring in period p  — 1 of treatment T  — 1. In this table, the 
comparison between columns within the same row indicates how the transfers 
received by North and by South differ. Overall, in treatments 1 to 4, North 
receive more than South from northern senders. However, early in the game 
(p — 1 ,T  =  1) the opposite happens: South receive more than North from 
northern senders.
Table 3 .4 : The m atrix of transfers between regions
Southern
receiver
Northern
receiver average
All periods Southern sender 73.83 73.87 73.80
T =  1.2 .3 .4 Northern sender 81.37 80.38 84.39
average 77.80 81.20 79.70
p = L T = 1 Southern sender 28.92 47.45 40.15
Northern sender (13.38 54.91 57.G7
average 47.93 52.09 50.02
Note: The table reports simple averages of positive transfers from "rows" to 
"columns". The cases ill which the fraction ƒ,' of northern players seen by 
sender i is 0 or 1 are excluded. Note that, this fraction is randomly assigned.
In order to test the statistical significance of the differences shown above, 
we estimate the following regression:
t j  —  o r +  6 r /?^  6r X j  4- Tj | (3-4)
where tj is the transfer sent to receiver j .  Rj  is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if receiver j  is from North. Xj  is a vec tor of dummy variables denoting 
the gender of the sender and of the receiver and Tj is an error component.8 
The coefficient fir measures the extent to which transfers received by North 
differ from transfers received by South. Its estimates and standard errors are 
reported in Table 3.5 for all senders and separately for northern and southern 
senders.9
8 The inclusion of observed characteristics like age and number of siblings <lnes not change
our results in equation 3.4 as well as in the other estimated equations that ft>1 low. At 
least in the case of age this is likely to be due to the lack of sulfieient variation of this
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Table 3.5: Differences between the transfers sent to northern and south­
ern receivers
By all Senders By N Senders By S Senders
All periods & 3.24 5.44 -0.35
T =  1. 2 .3 ,4 s.e. 1.89 2.02 2.82
f-value 1.71 2.07 -0.13
obs. 2330 1271 1059
P = T T = 1 fir 4.00 -3.51 11.31
s.e. G.91 10.08 9.93
f-value 0.58 -0.35 1.14
obs. 90 51 39
Note:The table reports robust standard errors and corresponding /-values for the
test that ¡3, = 0 in the regression t j  = ar + 3rRj + S, X j  -+ Tj b\’ sender groups.t j  is the transfer sent to receiver j .  Tij is a dummy variable taking value 1 if re­
ceiver j  is from North. X j  is a vector of dummy variables denoting the gender of 
the sender and of the receiver. Tj is an error component.. The estimateti «»efficients .% are not numerically identical to the corresponding differences between columns 
of Table 3.4 because of the inclusion of controls for gender. The eases in which the 
fraction f ’t of northern players seen bv sender i is 0 or 1 are excluded. Note that 
this fraction is randomly assigned.
The first row of the table reports results for the first four treatments, taking 
into account the within-individual correlation of error components. It shows 
that, on average and controlling for gender, a northern receiver is given 3.24 
tokens more than a southern one and that most of this bias is attributed to 
northern senders: in the second column the point estimate is 5.44. These 
differences are small in size but statistically significant at the 10% and 5% 
levels respectively. However, at early stages of the interaction (see the second 
row of the table) the picture is different. There is no statistically significant 
evidence of preferences of one group over the other and. if anything, the ¡joint 
estimates of /jr for the transfers sent by northern senders even indicate that 
North made higher transfers to South than to North.
We conclude this section by summarizing its main observations:
• South is contacted less often and receives less transfers than North, with 
most of this discrimination attributed to the sending behavior of North.
• The bulk of the discrimination is in the fact that South is contacted less 
often.
variable in our sample of young Ph.D. students.
0 Tbe estimated coefficients are not numerically identical to the corresponding differ­
ences between columns of Table 3.4 because of the inclusion of controls for gender.
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• The discrimination against South does not decrease with experience and 
is actually less significant at earlier stages of the game compared to when 
it is judged based on the overall behavior.
In the next section we attempt to investigate the source of the observed 
discrimination and explain how it emerges. To this end we will compare 
South and North in terms of their payback behavior as well as their overall 
tendency to make transfers.
3.3.2 Why is South Discriminated Against?
We will not attempt to give a conclusive answer to this question. However, 
further analysis of payback behavior and the evolution of sending behavior 
may offer some hints. We start with three conceivable conjectures for the 
source of discrimination:
(A) Discrimination by North against South is a result of pure prejudice that 
cannot be supported by the behavior of South.
(B) Discrimination by North against South is a consequence of the fact that 
the return ratio of South is smaller than that of North.
(C) South receive less transfers than North because South themselves trans­
fer little (to both North and South).
We start by comparing North and South in terms of the transfers they make 
to others. Going back to Table 3.4. if we compare different rows of the matrix 
within the same column, we see how transfers sent by North and South differ. 
In all cases, i.e. independently of the region of the receiver. North transfer 
considerably more than South. In other words North trust more all receivers. 
This is true when we average over the first four treatments, as well as when we 
look at period 1 of treatment 1. It is interesting to observe that in this early 
interaction North transfer more to South than to North, and South transfer 
very little to themselves.
To test the significance of these differences the appropriate regression to be 
estimated is /•» — ci.s 4 rtfSi T 6&.\i + Oi (3.o)
where ti is the transfer sent by sender L is a dummy variable taking value 
1 if sender i is from North. A'» denotes the gender of the sender10 and Oi is an
10 The gender of the receiver cannot be included in this case because of the presence of 
zero transfers, i.e. situations in which there is no receiver.
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error component.11 The coefficient measures the extent to which transfers 
sent by North differ from transfers sent by South. Results are reported in 
Table 3.G for transfers sent to all receivers and separately to northern and 
sout hem recei vers.12
Table 3.6 : Differences between the transfers sent by northern and southern 
senders
To all Receivers To N Receivers To S Receivers
All periods /i 10.35 12.24 5.92
T — 1,2 ,3 , 4 s.e. 3.88 3.08 4.05
/-value 2.07 3.33 1.40
obs. 2310 1219 918
II II N»
-
* 12.80 7.04 28.41
s.e. 0.97 8.02 11.02
/-valut* 1.84 0.89 2.45
obs. 87 53 29
iVofe:Tlie table reports robust standard errors and corresponding f-values for the test 
that = 0 in the regression f, -  h¡,5/v + SsX i + by receiver groups. is the
transfer sent by sender i. S.P is a dummy variable taking value 1 if sender i is from 
North. X i denotes the gender of the sender. The gender of the receiver cannot be in­
cluded in this case because of the presence of zero transfers, i.e. situations in which there 
is no receiver. 0¡ is an error component. The estimated coefficients ¡3S are not numer­
ically identical to the corresponding differences between the rows of Table 3.4 because 
of the inclusion of controls for gender. The cases in which the fraction ƒ ’ of northern 
players seen bv sender i is 0  or 1 are excluded. Since this exclusion restriction operates 
differentIv from the perspective of senders and receivers, the number of observations in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.0 differ. Note that this fraction is randomly assigned.
The first row of the table reveals that, controlling for gender, North transfer 
significantly more than South (on average 10.35 more tokens to the group 
as a whole, and 12.24 more tokens to northern players). North's tendency 
to transfer more than South is very high also at the earliest stage of the 
interaction (12.80 tokens more than South to the group as a whole in row 
T = l.p  =  1.) But perhaps the most interesting observation here is the fact 
that North treat South (in terms of transfers) much better than South treat 
itself (on average 28.41 more tokens in T = l.p  = 1).
11 Standard errors are computed taking into account within-individual correlation of the 
error terms.
12 Tlie estimated coefficients j r «re not numerically identical to  the corresponding differ­
ences between rows of Table 3.4 because of the inclusion of controls for gender.
62 3.3 Results
In Figure 3.5 we consider the evolution of the game by looking separately at 
each of the first four treatm ents, and the evidence confirms again that North 
tend to transfer more than South on average.13 If we interpret a generous 
transfer by a sender as an indication that, the sender trusts the receiver to 
reward him/her later in the game (either by making a generous payback or 
by making a generous transfer in a subsequent period) then Table 3.6 and 
Figure 3.5 clearly indicate th at North are endowed with the propensity to 
trust others more than South and that this holds also at a very early stage of 
the game.
F ig u re  3 .5 : Transfer comparison N and S
North ----------- South
We next move to compare North and South in terms of their payback be­
havior. Here we estimate the regression
r{ =  6 +  7rZ?f +  ifrXi -{-pi , (3.6)
where r* =  ^  is the return ratio chosen by the receiver for sender i. is a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the receiver chosen by sender i is from North, 
Xi is a vector of dummy variables denoting the gender of the sender and of the 
receiver, and pi is an error component. The coefficient *)> measures the extent 
to which northern receivers choose a higher return ratio than southern ones.
13 Note tliat the differences in transfers between North and South reported in the figure 
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in each treatment.
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Results are reported in Table 3.7 for all senders and separately for northern 
and southern senders.1J
Table 3 .7 : Differences in the return ratio chosen by northern and south­
ern receivers
For all senders For N senders For S senders
All periods  ^- ir 0.017 0.028 -0.011
T  =  1, 2, 3 .4 s.e. 0.023 0.033 0.032
/-value 0.75 0.80 -0.34
obs. 2107 1215 952
p =  i , r  =  i 7r 0.108 0.100 0.015
s.e. 0.0G3 0.080 0.110
/-value 1.72 1.93 0.41
obs. 82 49 33
Note: The table reports robust standard errors and corresponding /-values for the 
test that 7 r =  0 in the regression r, =--- 6 f- ^ R f  +  V r^t + (h by sender groups, r, 
is the return ratio chosen by the receiver for the sender i. is a dummy vari­
able taking value 1 if the receiver chosen by sender i is from North. A'f- is a vector 
of dummy variables denoting the gender of the sender and of the receiver, p, is an 
error component. The cases in which the fraction ƒ ' of northern players seen by 
sender i is 0 or 1 are excluded. Note that this fraction is randomly assigned.
Judged on the basis of the first four treatments (see the first row of the 
table), the return ratio chosen by northern receivers is not significantly higher 
than the one of southern receivers, independently of the region of the sender. 
The picture changes, however, when we look at the earliest stage of the game1 
(the first period of the first treatment) in the second row' of the table. Here 
we see that southern receivers return significantly less than northern receivers 
as a fraction of what they received in the initial transfer. Moreover, note that 
the difference is particularly large when the sender is from North.
Taken together, the evidence provided above is against conjecture (A). We 
see little evidence for discrimination against South at the outset. On the other 
hand. South return less than North as a ratio of wlmt they receive in the 
earliest stage of the game.10 Moreover. South send lower transfers throughout 
the game. This suggests that the discrimination against South that builds up 145
14 Standard errors are computed taking into account within-individual correlation of the 
error terms.
15 Note that this conclusion differs from that of Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) whoestale- 
lish that the discrimination against Sephardi receivers is irrational as payback behavior 
in the two groups was essentially the same.
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later in the game may have to do with South's tendency to return less at the 
earliest stage of the game (conjecture B) and/or to make lower transfers in 
general (conjecture C).
We further explore the validity of these conjectures by looking at the way 
contacts are positively reinforced and reciprocated from period to period. In 
Table 4.8 we test whether the choice of a sender in the second period differs 
from randomness conditioning on the choice made in the first period. We 
therefore estimate equation (3.2) again but this time only on the observations 
for the second period of all treatm ents and separately for the eases in which 
North or South were chosen in the first period. We then test the null hypothe­
sis (3.3) for this case. Note that this hypothesis, if accepted, would imply that 
senders choose their partner randomly in the second period, and in particular 
independently of what they did in the first one.
Table 3 .8 : Reinforcement of deviations from random choice with 
respect to previous choices
period 2 all senders N senders S senders
N chosen in /> — 1 D 0.169 0.212 0.101
s.e. 0.032 0.038 0.055
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.034
obs. 204 125 79
S chosen in p =  1 - D 0.086 0.065 0.109
s.e. 0.038 0.050 0.048
p-value 0.012 0.13« 0.013
obs. 165 85 80
Note: This table tests whether the choice of a. sender in the second period 
differs from randomness conditioning on the choice made in the first period. 
The equation ƒ?/ — ƒ/ -  1) \ u, is estimated, by sender groups, only on 
the observations for the second period of all treatments and separately for 
the cases in which North or South was chosen in the first period.Rf* is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the receiver chosen by sender i is 
from North and 0 otherwise. //v is the frequency of northern [»layers seen 
bv sender i in her group. D  is a constant parameter to be estimated. n.( 
is an error component. Standard errors are robust and take care of within- 
individual correlation of the error component. values are for the test that 
I) = 0. The cases in which fft is 0 or 1 are excluded. Note that ƒ' is ran­
domly assigned
The roeffidents reported in "S chosen in p — 1" were multiplied with (-1) so 
that a positive sign indicates reinforcement of a southern choice.
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This conclusion is. however, rejected by the evidence of Table 3.8. The first 
row of the table shows that if North are chosen in the first period the preference 
for North is reinforced by all senders in the second period. Moreover North 
reinforcement of a previous northern choice is greater than that of South. 
The evidence of reinforcement of a previous southern choice is instead very 
weak (see the second row of the table), particularly when the sender is front 
North. We conclude that North's higher standards in terms of return ratios at 
the outset of the game generate a stimulus that leads subjects (in particular 
northern senders) to reinforce a previous transfer to North. It is indeed easy to 
see why the initial higher standards of North in terms of return ratios should 
stimulate transfers to North later in the interaction. In our version of the 
trust game it is clearly optimal to make high transfers to subjects who have 
previously proven to be trustworthy. Thus, taken in isolation, the evidence of 
Table 3.8 would support conjecture (B).
Table 3.9: Ileturn ratios over treatments
r  =  i
ClII T  =  3 T  =  4
rN 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.56
obs. 57 58 59 59
r$ 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.51
obs. 47 47 47 50
p-value 0.40 0.78 0.60 0.22
Note: The table reports, for each treatment, the average return ra­
tios chosen by northern and southern receivers. The reported figures 
are computed by first averaging the return ratios of each subject in a 
given treatment ami then by averaging across subjects in each region, 
that is: i'k .t =t =  1/Af *T t =t , where r i T=T is the average ra­
tio that subject i returned in treatment T — r  and M  is the number 
of individuals from region K  t hat received a transfer at least once in 
that treatment. I\ stands for North and South, respectively, /»-values 
are for the test on the equality of and f.s, controlling for gender.
However. Table 3.9 confirms, from a different perspective, what was al­
ready suggested by Table 3.7: there is no indication that the initial difference 
in trustworthiness between North and South persists during the evolution 
of the game, both in terms of economic dimension and statistical signifi­
cance. This table reports, for every treatment, the average return ratio chosen 
by each northern and southern subject for all the transfers they received.lb
10 The«» figures are computet! by first averaging the return ratios of each subject in a 
given treatment and then by averaging across subjects in each region, that is: f/v- j* -T -=
Gf) 3.3 Jiesu/fs
It is important to realize that by considering the average return ratio cho­
sen by each subject, we do not give more weight to subjects who. because of 
their relatively higher trustworthiness, are contacted more often. All subjects, 
independently of their region, are more trustworthy in the fourth treatment 
than in the first, and in no treatment the difference between the two regions is 
statistically significant. Moreover, additional computations show that in both 
regions the subjects who are initially less trustworthy (those who return less 
than the median in treatments 1 and 2) increase their return ratios equally, 
on average, in treatments 3 and 4 (from 0.34 to 0.41).
We know instead that throughout the entire game North transfer signifi­
cantly more than South (see Table 3.6 and Figure 3.5). Thus, the difference 
in the propensity to trust, more than the difference in trustworthiness, ap­
pears to be likely to explain why South is discriminated against in a fashion 
that does not fade away during the evolution of the game. In other words, 
also conjecture (B) finds less support in our data. But, is it possible that the 
persistently higher tendency of North to trust other subjects is reciprocated 
by their partners with more frequent transfers to North?
Table 3.10 shows that subjects tend to trust those who trusted them. In 
this table we estimate how the odds that a subject i trusts a subject j  depend 
on the existence of previous interactions between i and j .  These estimates 
are based on the Conditional Logit Model as described extensively on page 
20 in chapter 1. The first row of column 1 indicates that the odds that / 
transfers to j  in period 2 are 3.38 times higher if i has chosen j  already in 
period 1. as opposed to choosing another partner. The second row of the 
same column shows that the odds of the same event are even higher (6.83) if 
j  has transferred to i in period 1 as opposed to making another choice. Both 
estimates are highly statistically significant. Thus, the subjects of our study 
are more likely to transfer not only to partners that they have previously 
trusted, but also to partners who trusted them.
The second column of Table 3.10 interacts the dummies of the first column 
with an indicator for whether the transfers or the return ratios received from 
/ in period 1 were larger than the corresponding median lewis in the sam­
ple. The estimated odds ratios for these interactions are larger than 1 and 
highly significant as well. The first one (3.32) indicates that if i chose j  in 
period 1. / is more likely to go back to j  in period 2 if j  previously returned 
more than the median in the sample. Thus, as expected, higher trustworthi­
ness is rewarded with a higher likelihood of a transfer in subsequent periods.
\ /M  i'i.T—T- where f’(.r=r is the average ratio that subject > returned in treatmentT  — t  and M  is tlie number of individuals from region K  that received a transfer at 
least once in that treatment. I\ stands for North and South, respectively.
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T ab le  3.10: Reciprocation of previous positive experiences
period 2
1
all pe 
2
Tiods
3 4
dijp- \ — 1 3.38
(.3«)***
2.02
(.31)***
3.31
( . 16)***
1.74
(.12)***
djip— i  ~  1 6.83
( 1.0(5)***
4.50
(.85)***
4,51
( .30)***
2.93
( .27)***
d-ijp—i — 1 A 1 i ^  med(r)} 3.32
( .79)***
• 3.71
( .39 )***
djip~i — 1 A i ^ med(f.)} 3.00
(.82 )***
2.38
( .27)***
Obs. 1728 1728 8180 8180
Pseudo R 2 0.26 0.3 0.26 0.3
Correct Predictions 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.62
N ote : = 1 denotes the event that i has chosen j  in the previous pe­
riod, and dj,p-i = 1 means j  has ciiosen i in the previous period. “A" is the 
logical “and" o]»erator, and 1 {...} is the indicator function which takes value 
one if the expression inside the parenthesis is true. “med()" is the median of 
the variable. Reported values are odds ratios, standard errors in parenthesis. 
*, ** , *** denote significance equal to the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of a test 
that the odds ratio is one. Control variables included are: age and siblings of 
all 4 players, gender and nationality of i interacted with the attributes of j. 
Pseudo iR  is the percent of variance explained by the model compared to a 
model which includes a constant only. Correct predictions indicates the share 
of observations in which the highest estimated probability f>j coincides with 
the actual choice.
The second interaction is. however, more interesting for our purposes. It in­
dicates that if j  transferred to i in period 1. i is more likely to transfer to j  
in period 2 if the previous transfer from j  was larger than the median in the 
sample.
Thus, also a higher degree of trust from others is rewarded with trust. The 
same analysis is replicated in columns 3 and 1 for all periods with similar 
results.
Interestingly trust is rewarded with trust independently of the region of 
the subject who trusted first. Results not reported for brevity indicate that 
when South and North contact another player in period 1. they are equally 
more likely to he contacted by this player in period 2. On the other hand 
northerners have a significantly higher tendency to reciprocate a contact from 
any other player. So the extent to which trust is rewarded with trust depend
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on the region of the subject who is called to reciprocate. More specifically, 
trust is rewarded with trust by all subjects, but more so by North than by 
South.
We have seen the tendency of all subjects, and in particular of northern 
subjects, to reward with a generous transfer those from whom they previously 
received high transfers. There is more than one reason for doing so. This 
behavior can be a consequence of a natural desire to return a favor by a favor, 
or it may be a tool to signal others that a high level of transfers is expected in 
the future as well. But there is also a third possible explanation: Figure 3.0 
shows that “trust” and “trustworthiness” , as measured respectively by average 
transfers and average return ratios are highly correlated in the subjects of our 
study. Hence it is possible that subjects are reciprocating with high transfers 
to those from whom they received high transfers in the past because they 
are aware of this statistical correlation and realize that the return ratios from 
these individuals can he expected to be high. It is reasonable to assume that 
all these three explanations play a role in motivating subjects to make high 
transfers to those who made high transfers to  them.
F ig u re  3.6: Correlation of Trust and Trustworthiness, all Senders
j •  North O South ............. regression line (all subjects)
Note; correlation 62, slope 71.27
Summing up. our evidence suggests that the higher northern tendency to 
trust all other subjects throughout the game stimulates a higher frequency of 
transfers to North from all other subjects and in particular from northerners. 
In other words, it suggests that even if southern and northern standards in 
terms of return ratios are very similar, the fact that South fail to approach
-------------------------------------------- fe
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North’s standards in terms of transfers sustains the reluctancv of North to con­
tact South with high transfers throughout the game. We therefore conclude 
that conjecture (C) receives the highest support in our data. Put differently, 
more than for not being trustworthy. South ait* being punished for their own 
low level of trust.
Our finding concerning South's level of trust is consistent with Knack and 
Keefer (1997) who seek to find the correlation between social capital and trust 
on the one hand and economic performance on the other. Their analysis builds 
on the World Values Surveys that contain questionnaire data on thousands 
of respondents from 21 countries. To assess the level of trust they rely on 
the following question posed in each country: “Generally speaking would you 
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people” Their measure of trust is defined to be the percentage 
of respondents replying “most people can be trusted". All but two countries 
(Poland and Greece) represented in our experiment appear in the survey. 
Excluding these two countries, the average trust measure for North is 43.4% 
and only 2G.8% for South.
Similar conclusions are also reached by Guiso et al. (2003). who find that 
disparities in relative trust between people of different countries affect the 
level of trade. While they explain their evidence just as a consequence of 
stereotyping, our results indicate that differences in trust may emerge and be 
reinforced by repeated interactions between nationalities, even when agents 
are not characterized by strong stereotyping at the outset of the interaction.
Moreover note that while both Knack and Keefer (1997) and Guiso et al. 
(2003) base their findings on questionnaires, our findings are based on revealed 
preferences that emerge from subjects' decision making.
3.4 Payoffs
On average, making a transfer pays off well. Even when disregarding the 
fact that a subject increases his/her chance of being made a high transfer in 
a subsequent period by making a high transfer, subjects' payback behavior 
generates positive profits. On average, subjects made GO Cents profit on every 
Euro transfer in payback only. South are therefore being punished for their 
low level of trust. Figure 3.7 plots the average payoffs (in points) of North 
and South at each of the six periods within treatments 1 to 4. Figure 3.8 
shows the average payoff across periods for each treatment. These two figures 
reveal that North dominate South in terms of payoffs at each and (‘very period 
(averaged over treatments) and at each and (‘very treatment (averaged over 
periods).
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F ig u re  3 .7 : Payoff comparison N and S. per period
fig u re  3 .8 : Payoff comparison N and S. per treatment
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3.5 The consequences of forcing interactions
It is interesting to observe that forcing interactions appears to reduce the dif­
ferences between the two regions. This is suggested by Table 3.11 where we 
compare descriptive statistics for the treatments T  = 4 , T  — 5 and T — fi. 
As explained in Section 3.2, the fourth treatment is the last one of the initial 
series of treatments in which subjects had fn'e choice of partner. In treatment 
T = 5 they were instead matched randomly with another subject, while in the 
last treatment they had again free choice. Not surprisingly, the impossibility 
to choose the partner reduces considerably the degree of trust and trustwor­
thiness and therefore the average payoffs. But the most interesting result 
of this table is that after being forced to interact without choice of partner, 
subjects from the two regions appear to behave more similarly than they did 
before. If we compare the first and the last columns of this table, we see 
that the differences between the two regions in terms of transfers and payoffs 
are considerably smaller in treatment T — fi than in treatment T =  4, and 
this happens even if average transfers go hack to the levels ol»served before 
treatment T = 5.
T ab le  3 .11: Descriptive statistics for treatments T  — 1. T  = 
5 and T =  fi
T  =  4 T  = 5 T  =  (»
bv 85 08 82
is 78 G5 80
TN 0.5fi 0.38 0.48
rs 0.51 0.39 0.50
N .h fh t i 274 22() 204
7t\S' .to ta l 251 241 259
Note: I /v- is the average transfer made by senders of region K , is 
the average return ratio chosen by receivers of legion A', and 7 
is t lie average total ¡layoff earned by subjects of region A \ K  is equal 
to N  or S  denoting North and South respectively. In treatment .' 
senders were not allowed to choose a partner.
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3.6 Discussion
We have discovered significant differences between southern and northern 
Europeans in a dynamic version of the trust game. South is discriminated 
against, mainly by North, as overall it is contacted less often and ends up 
leaving the experiment with lower payoffs. We suggested that the observed 
inferior treatment that South receive can find its roots in South's own behav­
ior in the game. South pay back less on transfers it receives at early periods 
of the game and make substantially lower transfers than North practically 
throughout the game.
While South have a slight bias in favor of North, this bias is not st atistically 
significant as is the case for North's bias in favor North. This difference 
between North and South can be explained by the principle that “Losses 
loom greater than gains’’ which follows from Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s 
prospect theory; We have seen that a higher reciprocity standard prevails 
in the North (where by reciprocity we include both the return ratios and 
the propensity of making high transfers in the future.) It is reasonable to 
assume that these differences in reciprocity also reflect different expectation 
about reciprocity in each region. This means that on average when North 
make a transfer to South, North are disappointed by the outcome (they make 
a loss with respect to their expectations), whereas transfers from South to 
North leave South with gains (relative to their expectations). Because losses 
loom greater than gains the forces that drive North away from South are 
greater than those which drive South away from South, which explains why 
the discrimination against South appears stronger for Northern players.
It would be a serious challenge to provide an encompassing explanation 
of the different standards of North and South in terms of both trust and 
trustworthiness as emerged from our experiment and from the evidence of 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Guiso et al. (2003). While this is outside the 
scope of this paper we suggest two directions here; The first possibility is 
that these differences emerge merely from an income effect: Assuming that 
“generosity" and “reciprocity'' are luxury (normal) goods, people will tend to 
“consume" more of them the greater is their income. Thus the higher level 
of income and stage of development in the North during recent history would 
be responsible for cultural differences regarding trust and trustworthiness, 
reflected in our results.
The other possible explanation is that differences in terms of trust and 
trustworthiness between South and North have to do with the different role 
of the family in these two regions. In both social and economic activities the
IWiffiffiHirHHifiiHigg vm
3.6 Discussion 73
family plays a much greater role in the South than in the North.17 With 
family ties less intensive in the North, people in the North rely on networking 
outside the family more than people in the South. Trust and trustworthiness 
outside the family is thus more crucial for social and economic success in the 
North.
We point out that regardless of the preferred explanation and even if both 
the income effect and the family effect are weak, a convergence to two sub­
stantially different population equilibria in two societies can emerge from a 
grain of difference that reinforces itself in a dynamic trajectory that leads to 
substantial differences. This suggests the possibility that a small group of 
individuals endowed with low trust and trustworthiness can cause a snowball 
effect by which more and more people adopt their standards as trust and 
trustworthiness pays off less and less.
Our findings have two types of implications. Firstly, the fact that agents' 
choice of partners in economic interactions is not arbitrary and may depend on 
characteristics that appear to be payoff irrelevant (region in our case) is a mes­
sage worth taking into the theoretical literature. Secondly, our findings make 
a valid point in the European perspective. The significance of the regional 
role as established in our experiments highlights the question of whether the 
persistence of cultural and national diversity across regions within unified Eu­
rope should not impose any impediment to achieving economic and political 
uniformity.
17 See, for example, Bentolila and Icliino (2003) and their references.
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CHAPTER 4
On the Use of Ex-ante Evaluation 
Techniques: The Case of School 
Enrolment in PROGRESA
4.1 Introduction
The (‘valuation of policies is of particular importance in the context of devel­
opment economics, where programmes aiming at poverty reduction and the 
improvement of the human capital of the poor are being implemented at a 
large scale. This importance derives from the key role that is attributed to 
poverty reduction in the process of economic and social development1 and from 
simple considerations of political accountability. Hence, policy makers need 
tools to assess the impact, of such programmes. Ideally, evaluations should 
not only be carried out after the completion of a project, hut also prior to 
its implementation. Ex-ante evaluation techniques give answers to questions 
regarding the direction and the magnitude of effects that are likely to occur 
upon implementation of a policy. These methods thus help to improve the 
design of the policies and to avoid policy failures. By providing quantifiable 
results at early stages of project planning, these tools art* an important part of 
impact analysis and programme monitoring. Ex-ante evaluations are carried 
out using microsimulation methods.2 To date, little is known about the ac­
1 See, for example, the World Dewlopiunit Report 2000 on “Attacking Poverty” (World- 
hank. 2000).
2 Mierosimulation is a general term for methods designed to simulate systems at th e  level 
of individual units rather than the overall population. Different models re q u ire  different
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curacy of microsimulations. The use of such techniques is gaining popularity 
and an assessment of the forecasting abilities seems urgently needed. How­
ever. the evaluation of evaluation methods is a nontrivial t ask. This is mostly 
because very rarely situations occur in which the actual impact of a policy 
can be compared to the predictions of a microsimulation, simply because it is 
difficult to identify the impact of the policy in the first place. The reasons is 
that often a counterfactual to which the microsimulation could be compared 
to is not readily available.
This paper tries to fill this gap, and, for a particular type of programme, 
an evaluation of a microsimulation technique is carried out. Mori1 specifically, 
a microsimulation of a conditional cash transfer programme is done using 
the data from PROGRESA. Because this programme was implemented as a 
randomized experiment, the actual effect of the policy is easily identifiable 
and it thus offers a perfect benchmark for the evaluation.* 3 PROGRESA is 
a well known programme in rural Mexico, which is in place since 1997.4 It 
aims at improving the educational attainment and health status of the poor 
rural population. One of the main goals of the programme is to increase 
secondary school enrolment ratios. To this end, eligible families are offered 
a cash transfer conditional on the school attendance of their children. The 
rationale is that low school enrolment ratios are mainly due to the necessity 
of children to contribute to  household income in poor families.
In Latin America, the daily activities of 17 percent of the children aged 
between ñ and 14 (some l(i million children) are considered as child labour 
(ILO, 2004). There is a clear distinction between between child work and 
child labour. While child work comprises light activities that are not con­
sidered harmful to the educational opportunities of the child, all activities 
that damage children's physical and psychological health and are detrimen­
tal to its future development, in particular education, are defined as child 
labour (Anker. 2000). Hence, the above figures point to an alarming prob­
lem in developing countries. Lack of education substantially narrows future 
employment opportunities and thus makes it less likely for children to break 
the poverty -  no education circle. It is here where the effect of a conditional 
cash transfer programme begins. School attendance, especially at secondary 
level, comes at a cost for the household. Children that go to school cannot 
contribute to household income -  be it through domestic activities or through
micros} nail at ion techniques.
3 In that sense, the approach taken in this paper is similar to the study by Lalonde 
(19^0) who also uses experimental data as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of 
the difiereilce-in-differences estimator for differently constructed counterfactuals.
4 It is now called OPORTUNIDADES. To give some idea of its magnitude', the yearly 
budget equals roughly Ü.2 percent of Mexican GDP (Attanasio et a]., 2001).
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formal labour income.5 In addition, even if education itself is free, school 
attendance is often associated with additional costs for transportation and 
school materials, such as books. In this trade off between future and current 
income poor households that would decide against education for their children 
are offered a cash incentive to send their children to school.
In this paper the likely effects of such a programme are simulated using data 
from a survey conducted before the introduction of the programme. A model 
of occupational choice is used to simulate the potential impact of PROGRESA 
on school enrolment ratios. To avoid any suspicion of working backwards 
from the data to the method, an existing modelling framework (Bourguignon 
et ah, 2002) will be used and no new method will be proposed. Moreover, the 
mierosiinulation exercise will follow closely the aforementioned paper. In this 
model, children decide between three occupational choices: they (fther work, 
work and attend school, or go to school only. The contribution of children 
to the income of a household through domestic work is explicitly accounted 
for. The model identifies the key elements that are necessary to simulate the 
impact of the programme.
This paper shows that the predictions of the model conn1 close to the real 
effect. Moreover, disaggregated by age and gender, the real effect is within 
bootstrapped confidence intervals of the simulation exercise. While the over­
all performance of the microsimulation is good, some critical aspects of the 
method become apparent. In particular, the uneven distribution of the sample 
over the three occupational choices causes the model to have a poor fit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section intro­
duces the model and discusses how it can be used for an ex-ante simulation. 
Section 4M presents the results of the simulation exercise. In Section 4.4 re­
sults from a standard ex-post evaluation are presented and related to similar 
findings in the literature. Ex-ante and ex-post results tire compared and some 
lessons from the simulation are drawn in Section 4.5 before the last section 
concludes.
4.2 Ex-ante Evaluation: Theory
Choosing a model for a mierosiinulation exercise involves finding a compromise 
between structural sophistication and feasibility. While some structure is 
necessary in order to identify the effect of relevant variables and relate them to 
the variables through which the programme operates, one has to bear in mind
5 Especially in in ¡»tor rural an1 as children often have to contribute to household produc­
tion. either by working on the fields or by taking care of younger siblings, and for these
reasons are not sent to school (OECD, 200:{).
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that the ultim ate goal is to simulate a programme, which requires tract ability 
and robustness across specifications. However, structural models have the 
advantage of offering further insight into individual behaviour through the 
identification of key parameters. On the other hand, many aspects of a fully 
structural model, while interesting, are often irrelevant for the simulation, as 
long as the structure of the model is flexible enough to accommodate them, 
hi addition, many parameters made explicit in structural approaches often 
cannot be identified due to the simple lack of convincing instruments, which 
further reduces the empirical value of rich structural models.
The background from which theories of child labour and schooling deci­
sions may draw ranges from household time allocation decisions to lifetime 
income considerations and the effects of human capital ac cumulation through 
(foregone) education. Attanasio et al. (2001), for example, develop a struc­
tural model in which each child maximizes its lifetime earnings and takes its 
schooling decisions accordingly, given a market wage and some intertemporal 
discount factor. The conditional transfer affects the rate at which children 
substitute their earning losses against education. Ill this context, the authors 
study the impact of varying levels of an educational grant, given some value 
for the discount factor. While appealing from a modelling point of view, one 
could argue that in rural Mexico the trade-off around which their model is 
built is often dominated by liquidity constraints. Poor households in rural 
Mexico do not have access to the -  poorly developed -  financial intermedi­
aries that could facilitate this intertemporal decision. This, in combination 
with the lack of lifetime planning horizons in poor families, can bo seen as a 
limitation of the applicability of their model.
Todd and Wolpin (2003) develop a dynamic structural model at the house­
hold level. This approach addresses the major shortcoming of other models 
that optimize at the individual level by considering interactions between deci­
sions taken within a family. In their model, parents maximize parental lifetime 
income by choosing an optimal fertility rate and deciding upon the time al­
location of their children. Fewer but better educated children are seen as 
an alternative that becomes more attractive the lower the costs of education. 
The framework hence addresses more fundamental questions than the men* 
schooling decision and could be useful for assessing the long-term impact of 
the cash transfer. In the present case, where the time horizon is of two years, 
it is however unlikely to observe alterations in the fertility behaviour.
Finally. Bourguignon. Ferreira and Leite (2002) develop a model of a dis­
crete labour supply decision, where a child, contributing to the household 
income, decides either to go to school, to work, or to mix between the two op­
tions. T he trichotomous framework is especially suitable for developing eoun-
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tries where many children do both, attend school and are engaged in some 
kind of economic activity, especially in rural areas (see for example OECD 
(2003), Table A ll) .  The reduced form of their model also encompasses con­
tributions of children to home production, an important but often neglected 
aspect that is prevalent among the rural poor. The model relates household 
income and children's earnings to the labour supply outcome for each child. 
It is silent with respect to the other aforementioned aspects such as interac­
tions at the household level or lifetime earnings considerations. The model 
was developed around the Bolsa Escola programme in Brazil, a conditional 
cash transfer scheme which shares the main characteristics of PROG It ESA.
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the performance of microsim­
ulation techniques. Because the outcome of the simulation will be compared 
with the already known effect of the programme, it does not seem appro­
priate to propose an entirely new framework for the ex-ante evaluation of 
PROGRESA. Any new suggestion would inevitably be prone to criticism for 
being the outcome of a process that moved from the data to the theory rather 
than vice versa. Hence, after the options outlined above, the general frame­
work used in this paper is taken from Bourguignnn et al. (2002). Moreover, 
in a first step, the method developed in their paper will be closely followed to 
ensure a high degree of comparability.
4.2.1 A Model of Occupational Choice
The model of Bourguignon et al. (2002) (henceforth BFL. See also Bour­
guignon et al. (2003)) is based on the following assumptions. The unit of 
decision is the child and not the household. Hence, eonsidering the intra- 
household labour allocation, it is assumed that schooling decisions of children 
are taken independently from each other, and labour market outcomes of 
other family members are unaffected. Further, the composition of households 
is taken as exogenous, and effects on fertility are disregarded.
Let the variable Si be a choice variable that takes one of the following values 
j  for each child •/, i =  1, .„A7:
{Ü if i does not attend school 1 if i works and attends school 2 if i attends school and does not work.
Under choice j  =  0 it is assumed that individual i works full time, either being 
engaged in domestic activities or by working on the market. Similarly, under 
choice y =  2 it is possible that children allocate some time to domestic work 
in a way that will be described below.
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In the framework of a multinomial choice model, each i will make* an optimal 
choice according to:
Si =  A- if S *(.)  >  Sj(.) for all j  i  L
where Sj(.) is some function Sj(Xi* of the following variables:
: characteristics of i (age. schooling etc.)
Hi : characteristics of the household of i (parental education etc.)
Yij : income of the household of i when choosing j  
i'ij : i.i.d. shock.
The household's income Yij is the sum of f  s own income and the income of 
the rest of the household. V A f t e r  combining all non-income variables into 
Zi =  [A'*, Hi] and linearizing the model it takes the following random utility 
representation:
Uij — -jZ i k  O j(i —i k  yij) k  . . (4*1)
Even though this specification does not explicitly model all aspects surround­
ing the schooling decision, it contains the relevant variables through which the 
programme operates, namely the household income (which will be affected by 
the transfer) and the income of a child working on the market. Note also that 
the coefficients 7j and Qj may vary with each choice.
Assume for the moment that the potential earnings of i and hence its po­
tential contribution to the household income is observable for each child and 
denote this amount by u\. Then, depending on the amount of time dedicated 
to work, the actual contribution can be written according to the choices j :
ijio =  I\ u'i
V i \  =  M y * )  =  M I < W i  
yi2 -  Diuo =  D Kwi.
These expressions indicate that under choice j  — 0 a fraction A of these 
potential earnings is realized. Under choice j  — 1. where the child attends 
school and works, only a fraction M K  of u\ is realized. If a child goes to 
school ( j  =  2). it may contribute to domestic production for a value of D K  
times the potential market earnings. Combining the above with equation (4.1) 
yields
Uio — 7o Zi k  OoU-i + fioWiQ k  i’io 
Un — 71 Zi k  aO  — i k  dru’ii k  i i i  
Ui2 — 7‘¿Zi k  0 ‘2^  — i k  /ba’¿2 k  l'i2 
with k0 =  a 0A. 3\ =  o 1 di A . 32 — o 2D1\.
(4.2)
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If potential earnings could be observed for each i and estimates of the co- 
efiicients a j  were available, the model in equation (4.2) could be used for 
microsimulation by looking at the effect of an exogenous variation of the 
household income under the schooling options j  — 1, 2.
4.2.2 Estimation and Identification
In reality, however, earnings are only observed for those children who work 
for remuneration. While domestic work may contribute substantially to the 
households production, it remains unobservable. But the representation in 
equation (4.2) requires some value for tr* for each child, no matter if the 
income is realized on the market or through home production. To overcome 
this the observed market earnings under choices Si ~ {0 . 1} will be used to 
impute potential earnings for those children that either work at home or go to 
school. Following the standard wage equation literature (Mincer, 1974), the 
observed earnings tn can be explained by:
log Wi — SXi + in • 1{S ; = 1} + (/¿. (4.3)
The vector A'* contains the standard regressors for a wage equation, in partic­
ular age. years of schooling, etc. and 6 is the corresponding parameter vector. 
The indicator function 1 { ...}  accounts for the fact that earnings of a child un­
der option Si =  1 might be significantly lower because some time m is spent 
at school. In practice, a control for sample selection (e.g. (Heckman, 1979)) 
is necessary to control for possible biases. For those children whose wages 
are not observed, a potential wage can be imputed using the estimates of 
equation (4.3) and drawing a random element of the residuals vector tq. This 
gives a complete description of the earnings vector tr.
Assuming exponentially distributed errors, the choice model in equation (4.2) 
is known as the multinomial logit model (McFadden, 1973). In this model, 
the coefficients are identified only relative to a certain choice category. In the 
following, choice j  = 0 was chosen as the base cat ('gory. In this case, the model 
yields estimates of the relative coefficients (7* — 70), (a* — o 0) and (d* — d0). 
(k = 1,2). In general, this is not a problem. But since the cash transfer is state 
dependent, it is necessary to identify all three coefficients (o t), o ^ a 2) that are 
related to the household income in order to do a microsimulation. Following 
an argument from BFL. the coefficients can be identified by making one simple 
structural assumption. Call the estimated coefficients from the multinominal
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logit model dj and d2. Then it follows that
Qi -  Ou =  d]
C\ 2 — Oo ~  d -2 
a  i A IK  — Qo/v =  6* 
a 2DK  — o0A' = ¿2
Notice that in equation (4,3) the coefficient of the indicator function gives 
an estimate of AI. namely M  -  expm. because this is an estimate of the 
difference in earnings realized under alternative j  =  1. W ith an estimate of 
AL any arbitrary combination of I\ and D allows to identify the coefficients
Qj as:
o<j — o i (li
cii — b i / K  no ,  -- ----------- :—
1 -  M
d2 =  Ck i 4- a2 — di 
£) _  ^2/A" +  dp
d 2 *
Asstime that K  =  1, i.e. children who do not attend school realize their full 
potential earnings either in the market or through home production. The 
estimates «1 and d2 can easily be transformed into the structural parameters 
Oj of the model.
4.2.3 Impact Simulation
Having identified the levels of the income coefficients Oj, the impact of the 
cash transfer is simulated using the following conditional payment:
lUo ~  7o ^  4- OyVLt 4- duU’i +  i’io
fAi ~  7 i ^ t +  o 1 (Vr_i 4~ TRi) 4 rf\Wi + t'i]
Ei2 — +  Q2(T_* 4- THi) 4 ihu'i +  t'i2,
where TRi is the transfer paid conditional on school enrolment, which in 
turn depends on i's characteristics. At this stage1 it becomes clear why an 
identification of the o j coefficients is necessary. Being conditional on choices 
1 and 2, the transfer is asymmetric. The identified difference of coefficients 
c\j — oo would not not he enough to  simulate the impact.
I11 multinomial choice models, the residual terms vn — ¿’,o can neither he 
observed not precisely estimated. However, for each /. the set of residuals
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I'io.i'n and i\2  are bound to belong to certain intervals, such that given the 
parameter estimates and i s characteristics they are consistent with the actual 
choice. In particular, if choice j  — 0 is taken as a base choice (this means its 
utility is normalized to 0) and individual / has chosen choice j  =  1. it must 
be that:
Ui\ — t/io > 0 and Un — U12 > 0 . 
which can be expressed as
Zi{71 — 70) + y_i(ûi — Oo) + Vij{S 1 — do) + (ï’u -  '1*0) >
SUP[0 , Z i(72 — 7o) +  Y -i{Q2 ~  a o) +  PijOh ~ do) +  (i'ï2 — f’¿o)]^
when1 SUP[ ] denotes the supremum of the expression. This places a con­
dition on each pair of errors { ( i ’ti — no), (n 2 — no)}- each of which is drawn 
from a double exponential distribution. This condition ensures that residuals 
are choice consistent respecting the error distribution used in the multinomial 
logit specification.®
4.3 Ex-ante Evaluation of PROGRESA
The available data on PROGRESA was collected in five waves between Novem­
ber 1997 and November 1999.* 7 The first two waves of data available are the 
pre-programme survey data and were collected in November 1997 and in 
March 1998. However, only the first wave asked income related questions 
and questions regarding the occupational choice. Hence, only this wave will 
be list'd to perform the ex-ante simulation. The focus group are children be­
tween 10 and Hi years old. As documented elsewhere in the literature (Schultz, 
2001). the school enrolment of the (> to 9 year old is almost 100 percent.
In the first wave 17.5 percent of the respondents between 10 and lfi years 
old reported to receive payment for some work. Table 4.1 summarizes the 
weekly wage by age. To put these numbers into perspective, the household 
income per capita is also reported. It shows that children who work make 
a significant contribution to the household's monetary income, and this con­
tribution is increasing with age. In comparison, in Brazil BFL find similar 
figures, although the relative contribution there is lower. One has to bear 
in mind that households in rural Mexico tend to be rather large and include 
many (inactive) members, which affect the per capita figures.
0 Set1 appendix B .3  011 how to draw the residuals.
7 The reader who is not familiar with the main features of PROGRESA is referred to 
Appendix B .l . A detailed description of how the variables were derived from the survey 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.2.
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T a b le  4 .1 : Average weekly earnings and per capita house­
hold income
age obs.
average
earnings
average 
pc income
median
earnings
median 
pc income
10 572 33 42 27 30
11 550 38 42 27 30
12 423 52 43 27 31
13 379 70 46 39 32
14 450 111 47 100 34
15 704 149 53 120 36
16 878 152 58 140 41
10-16 3.956 95 47 60
Aofe: Table reports statistics of tlu)se children that are reported to 
work for remuneration. All values in Mexican pesos. 10 pesos roughly 
corresponded to 1.10 US Dollar in that period.
Table 4.2 gives the realizations of the choice variable that may take three 
values according to the occupation chosen. A breakdown by gender shows that 
girls are less likely to attend school throughout all age groups. On average, 
26.2 percent of the boys and 31.2 percent of the girls do not attend school. 
Enrolment ratios drop significantly after the age of 11. What is evident is 
that the option to work and go to school at the same1 time is particularly 
predominant in younger age groups, highlighting the necessity to allow for a 
t richotomous choice.
T ab le  4 .2 :  Reported status
boys 10 11 12 13
age
14 15 10 10-10
not school 2.5 4.4 11.1 21.7 34.3 51.3 00.8 20.2
work anti school 17.2 18.4 13.fi 10.2 7.0 0.3 5.0 11.5
school only 80. 3 77.2 75.3 08.1 58.1 12.5 27.0 02.3
observations i ,n]k 1.007 1,800 1,005 1.02* 1,023 1,477 11.081
girls 10 11 12 13 14 15 Hi 10-10
not school 3.0 4.4 17.4 30.5 41.0 00.4 73.2 31.2
work and school 10.8 17.4 10.2 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.0 8.9
school only 80.2 78.2 72.1 02.8 52.0 37.2 24.8 59.9
observations 1,724 1,700 1,011 1,581 1,490 1,493 1,293 10,892
¿Vote: Values indicated the percentage share each cell. For a definition of status, 
see text.
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Table B .2 in the appendix reports the sample means of some variables by 
occupational choice. Several interesting; aspects become apparent. On aver­
age. children who do not go to school or work and go to school come from 
households with higher monetary income, supporting the previous evidence 
that their work contributes significantly to the endowment of the household. 
Those who attend school are. on average, younger and have a higher rank.8 
Those who do not go to school tend to come from states with a higher me­
dian wage, although there is considerable variation across gender and age not 
reported in the table, reflecting regional variations in child labour demand. 
Unsurprisingly, children who go to school tend to come from households with 
higher parental education.
There is substantial variation across age and gender, which, in the case of 
PROGRESA, where the transfer schemes differ for boys and girls, becomes 
even more relevant. Even though the data set is very rich with 22.570 ob­
servations, a breakdown by gender, age, and occupational status would lead 
to some combinations containing very few observations. The estimations re­
ported in this section capture this difference by reporting results for various 
age groups. The 10-11 years old form the first group, the 12-13 years old the 
second and the 14-16 years old constitute the last group. Within each group, 
of course, gender differences are accounted for using indicator variables.
4.3.1 Estimation of the Earnings Vector
Inspection of the model in equation (4.2) reveals that the market earnings of 
each child, potential or realized, are an important ingredient in determining 
the decision to go to school or not. However, as mentioned earlier, market, 
wages are only observed for those children that report to work on the market 
and have to be imputed for all other individuals. This section reports the 
estimates of equation (4.3).
Clearly there might be a potential sample selection bias when looking only 
at those children who work. The issue of sample selection becomes difficult 
if one considers the selection into any of the three categories of the choice 
model.9 A feasible way of dealing with this is to consider just the decision to 
work or not to work as a potential source of a bias. In the present case, a 
simple Heckman procedure to correct for sample selection proves to work fine 
and shows that, indeed, there is a selection effect.
S The rank is defined as the position of the child with respect to all household members 
below the age of 19. For example, a child with rank 3 lias 2 elder siblings, and a child 
with rank 1 is the oldest child in the household below 19.
9 Rourguignoii et al. (2001b) discuss the mechanism suggested by Lee (1983).
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Results for one age group are presented in Table 4.3 ,10 Note that two 
exclusion restrictions are included in the selection equation. The rank of 
the child and the presence of the father in the household are assumed to 
influence the decision to work or not work only, but not to influence the wage. 
This seems plausible as there is no reason to believe that these factors affect 
market earnings. Interestingly, the higher the rank of a child the lower is the 
probability of working. This confirms the view that first-born children are 
sometimes disadvantaged in this respect. Also, the absence of a father in the 
household makes it more likely for children to work. . . .
T a b le  4 .3 : Estimation of the earnings equation
log(earnings) coefficient /-value
female -0.42 -3.08
years of schooling -0.07 -1.50
(years of schooling)2 0.004 0.87
median state earnings 0.74 6.07
status (1 if S j= 1) -0.91 -19.88
selection
rank -0.09 -3.23
father in hh -0.22 -5.29
female -0.77 -23.23
years of schooling 0.13 3.44
(years of schooling)2 -0.02 -6.03
median state earnings -0.17 -1.59
P 0.62
& 0.85
X 0.53 2.37
Number of obs 8241
Censored obs 0299
Uncensored obs 1942
Note: Table presents estimates for equation (4.it), rising 
a Heckman two step estimat ion to correct for sample se­
lection. Only children in the age group of 14-10 years. 
Age dummies and constants included but not reported.
10 A full set of results for all age groups is available upon request.
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In the wage equation, the variables have the expected effect. Females earn 
significantly less than males, and, as expected, those who work and go to 
school also earn significantly less as compared to those that just work. One 
important variable that accounts for the regional variation in child labour 
is the median earnings of children of that, particular age/gender group in the 
respective state. This variable, which proves to be significant, captures all age 
and local specific demand shifts to child labour. Additional years of schooling 
increase the wage, and the wage is also increasing in age. Those effects are 
not always significant, in particular because the regression is carried out by 
age group, and consequently he age induced variation is limited. In addition, 
the degree of schooling is very similar across the age group.
In order to impute potential wages for those that do not work, earnings 
were estimated by relying on the coefficients of that particular age group and 
adding a random draw from the estimated residuals vector from the earnings 
estimation.
4.3.2 Estimation of the Choice Model
Coefficients and values of the estimation of the multinomial choice model 
for one age group are given in Table 4.4. The coefficients were found to vary 
significantly across different ages, and it was not possible to fit a model that 
would cover all age groups in a satisfactory way. In this estimate, the outcome 
Sj — 0 is taken as a reference group.
T ab le  4 .4 : Estimation of multinomial logit model
work and school 
coefficient /-value
school only 
coefficient /-valueY-i 0.0001 2.75 -0.0002 -0.35n'i -0.0015 -1.09 -0.0035 -8.82
total members of household -0.059 -1.58 0.028 1,78
years of schooling -0.800 -1.44 0.005 0.24
(years of schooling)2 0.0-18 2.33 0.037 4.03
(age-years of schooling)2 -0.025 -1.17 0.010 1.04
female -1.192 -8.92 -0,175 -9.13
max parental education 0.007 0.28 0.085 7.70
children below 0 in household 0.055 0.00 -0.130 -3.82
rank -0.232 -2.19 0.045 1.07
median state earnings -1.272 -2.77 -1,193 -0.48
Sote: Table reports estimates of the multinomial logit for the group of IT  
10 year old. Outcome "not school"’ is t he comparison group. 8230 obser­
vations, Pseudo R 2 = 0.13. Age dummies ami constant included blit not 
reported.
90 4.3 Ex-ante Evaluation o f  PROGRESA
The fit of the multinomial choice model varies greatly across age groups. 
Inspection of Table 4.2 reveals that for the very young the proportion of the 
choice Si — 0 (not school) is very small, whereas for the older children the 
option Si =  1 (school and work) only has a small share. This asymmetry be­
tween the three choices is reflected in the poor fit of the model. The model's 
prediction is not satisfactory as can be seen from Table 4.5. This table com­
pares for each of the three outcomes the actual with the predicted outcome, 
disregarding the error term. A breakdown by ages shows that in most cases 
the choice of the smallest categories is entirely attributable to the error term, 
but not the estimated coefficients.
Table 4.5: Accuracy of model prediction 
p red icted  outcom e
original outcom e not school work / school school only total
not school 3,290 16 2.533 5.839
work and school 104 735 1.030 1.929
school only 1,389 229 11.647 13,265
total 4,843 980 15,210 21.033
Note: Table is a cross tabulation of the actual status and the predicted status. 
The share of correct predictions is 70 percent.
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, identification requires an assumption about 
A’, which is the amount of time dedicated to household production for those 
children that do not work for a market wage. Assuming K  =  1. one obtains 
estimates for each age group for the structural parameters <xj and rfj. Table 4.6 
illustrates the differences across age groups. Note that the coefficients Uj, 
which determine the reaction of each individual to household income other 
than As decrease significantly with age, falling from 0.120 to 0.011. This large 
difference between age groups does not depend on the choice of I\. Compared 
to BFL who also find a decreasing effect of YC* with age, the results here are 
slightly more pronounced. Estim ates of M  range around '34 to 40 percent, in 
line with previous findings. All coefficients are in the plausible range with the 
estimates of D  being very close to unity for the two younger age groups.
Table 4 .6 : Estimation of structural parameters assuming A' = 1.
age group M D cx0 Oi o 2 ßo ßi
10 - 11 0.380 0.996 0.125 0.126 0.125 0.125 0.048 0.125
1 2 - 13 0.335 0.918 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.009 0.024
14 - 16 0.402 0.619 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.006
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4.3.3 Impact Simulation
The PROGRESA transfer T is determined for each i by the gender and 
the years of schooling completed and transformed into a weekly subsidy.11 
The individualistic approach of this model makes it impossible to account 
for the maximum transfer that was payable for each household. In order not 
to contaminate the results, all household in which the transfer would have 
surpassed the monthly limit were dropped from the analysis.
Simulation of the transfer is straightforward. While the utility under choice 
j  ~  0 remains unchanged (the programme's conditionality), under choices 
j  =  1,2 the term a  jT  Ft i has to be added to the index. Together with the 
estimated residuals this gives a new utility level Uj and an option j  is chosen 
such as to maximize utility. The difference of the distributions under Uj and 
Uj determines the impact of the programme.
T ab le  4 .7 : Estimated transition matrix 
simulated outcome
original outcom e not school work / school school only total
not school 3,570 117 992 4.G85
work and school 0 1,582 1 1.583
school only 0 6 10.815 10.821
total 3,570 1,705 11.808 17.089
Note: Table presents the transition from the observed occupational choices (rows) 
to the simulated choices after the programme (columns).
This is done for each age group separately and according to t s character­
istics. Table 4.7 gives the overall transition from the actual to the simulated 
status. The impact of the programme is clearly visible. The number of chil­
dren not going to school decreases, and the decrease is captured mainly by an 
increase in the number of those that go to school only, while a few individuals 
switch to the option work and school. A closer look at the effect by gender 
and age group will be done in Section 4.5.
11 See Table B .l in Appendix B .l  for details.
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The effect of PR O G R ESA  on school enrolment ratios has been extensively 
analysed in the literature. The findings of this section are in line with the 
previous studies, such as Schultz (2001). Behrman et al. (2001). and Attanasio 
et ah (2001). and will therefore be presented in a concise way. The comparison 
between school attendance before and after the programme was launched will 
be confined to making a cross section comparison between wave 5 (November 
99) and waves 1 and 2.
4.4.1 Pre-programme Differences
A common finding is that, in PRO G R ESA , by and large, the randomization 
seems to be successful in that the control and treatment group do not exhibit 
large differences at the outset. A closer look at pre-programme differences 
in school enrolment reveals that with one exception there are no significant 
differences. Tables B .4 and B.5 in the Appendix report the average enrolment 
ratios by age in the control and in the treatment group, separately for boys 
and for girls.
As can he seen from Table B .4. while the overall sample exhibits one signif­
icant positive difference between treatment and control group in the category 
of 13 years old, restricting the analysis to the eligible sample, none of the dif­
ferences are significant. Indeed, the differences between control and treatment 
group are very small in value and range from -0.0 to 4 percentage points. In 
contrast, for girls (Table B.5) there is one significant difference in the pre­
programme values, where the treatment group exhibits a significantly lower 
value (-4.5 percent) in the category of 12 years old. In the the next age cate­
gory (13 years) the value of the treatment group is higher (4 percent, although 
not significant). Except for these two outliers all differences are negligible.
4.4.2 Difference Estimation
If the randomization of the experiment was successful, the difference-m-differenc 
(RD) estimator should coincide with the simple difference estimator (I)), 
which compares the treatment with the control group after the programme 
has been completed. In particular, since both groups were affected by the 
same macroeconomic shocks during the time period in question and there 
were no significant pre-programme differences between the groups, the simple 
D estimator identifies the effect.
The difference estimator (D) compares, by age and gender, the difference 
between the enrolment ratios of the control and the treatment group at the
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end of the programme.12 Tables 4.8 and 4.9 provide an estimate of these 
differences. Table 4.8 shows that the enrolment ratio among eligible boys 
(last, column) has risen, on average, by 4.9 percentage points. The increase 
was most pronounced in the age groups 13 to 15 years (up 8 points) and with 
just 2 percentage points it is lowest among the 10 to 11 years old. A look at 
the non-eligible population confirms that the targeting of the programme was 
successful, because with the exception of the 13 years old these do not differ 
between the two populations, A similar picture, emerges for the girls where 
the average effect was higher with G.l percentage points. Among the eligible 
the effect was highest for the 13 to 15 years old and, as for the boys, lowest 
in the youngest age group, where it is also insignificant.
T ab le  4 .8 : Difference estimator, hoys
age 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 10-16
full sample
difference
/-value
0.017
2 .5 2
0.019
2.36
0.050
3.69
0.045 0.010 
2 .4 4  1.79
0.082
3.18
0.041
1.00
0.013
5.46
not eligible
difference
/-value
-0.003
-0.19
0.010
0.44
0.041
0.90
-0.091 -0.041 
-2 .0 0  -0.71
0.005
1.08
0.031
0.50
0.009
0.43
eligible
difference
/-value
0.020
2 .6 9
0.020
2.37
0.051
3.60
0.070 0.054 
3 .4 7  2 .25
0.085
2 .99
0.044
1.55
0.049
5.78
Note: Table reports for earh cell the difference between in enrolment ratios 
between the treatment and the control group respectively, and the corre­
sponding /-values.
Figure 4.1 pictures the D estimator for eligible children by age and gender 
and compares it to the DD estimator. Inspection of the figure shows that 
especially for girls the two estimates are almost identical. Notice also that the 
kink in the DD estimate for 13 years old is a reflection of the pre-programme 
differences in that particular age group. For boys, the D estimate is slightly 
above the DD estimate but does follow the same pattern.
12 In the present case this is wave 5.
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T ab le  4 .9 : Difference estimator, girls
age 10 11 12 13 14 15 10 1 10-10
full sample
difference
/-value
0.001
0.14
O.tKKi
0.02
0.001
3 .9 0
0.084 0.077 
4 .1 0  3 .20
0.00!)
2 .64
0.058
2 .1 1
0.053
6.26
not eligible
difference
/-value
0.015
0.75
-0.032
-1.38
0.07!)
1.81
0.105 -0.042 
1 .9 3  -0.74
-0,048
-0.81
0.041
0.05
0.008
0,37
eligible
difference
/-value
-0.001
-0.21
0.013
1.15
0.059
3 .4 8
0.081 0.102 
3 -7 0  3 .84
0.09X
3 .3 7
0.002
2 .0 4
0.001
6.69
Note: Table reports for each cell the difference between in enrolment ratios 
between the treatment and the control group respectively, and the corre­
sponding /-values.
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4.5 Comparison of the Results and Discussion
This section brings together the results from the ex-ante and the ex-post 
evaluation. In order to do so. the trichotomous choice variable* is reduced by 
the work dimension so that it only reflects whether a child attends school or 
not. Figure 4.2 visualizes the results of the simulation and compares it to 
the difference estimate, by gender and age. The corresponding numbers can 
be found in Table 4.10. In addition, the figure depicts 90 percent confidence 
intervals around the simulations, which were obtained using the bootstrap 
mechanism described in Section B.4.
The first observation is that the simulated and the real effect are more or 
less of the same magnitude and follow a similar pattern across ages. The 
simulation peaks for the 13 year old children, both for boys and for girls. The 
next observation is that the simulated effect is above the difference estimate 
for young ones and switches below the real effect for the 15 and 10 years old. 
Overall, while the difference estimate proposes an increase in school enrolment 
ratios by 5.4 percentage points, the simulated effect is G.4 points. Hence, in 
general the simulation can be regarded as a good approximation of the real 
effect.
F ig u re  4 .2 : Simulated effect and D estimate
diff effect — * - - -  simulated »----------- *■ 9 0 %  interval
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T a b le  4 .1 0 : Simulation. D and DD estimates
age 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 10-16
boys before .975 .952 .8S5 .789 .015 .470 .301 .726
sim. impact .021 .041 .071 .130 .059 .048 .042 .059
D impact .020 .020 .051 .070 .054 .085 .014 .019
DL) impact .024 .016 .040 .028 .020 .002 .015 .031
girls before .907 .953 .815 .680 .538 .389 .271 .660
sim. impact .025 .045 .117 .142 .000 .050 .034 .009
D impact -.001 .013 .059 .081 .102 .098 .002 .059
DI) impact -.010 .014 .091 .003 .116 .101 .021 .056
total before .971 .953 .850 .738 .591 .432 .316 .693
sim. impact .023 .043 .094 .130 .002 .052 .038 .064
D impact .009 .017 .055 .075 .078 .091 .053 .051
DD impact .004 .015 .008 .040 .071 .081 .018 .043
Note: Tables reports the enrolment ratios in the respective situation of the 
eligible household.
The reason why for some age groups the predictions deviate from the actual 
effect are related to the relatively poor fit of the multinomial choice model. 
As can he seen from Table 4.2. the three outcomes of the dependent variable 
are wry unequally distributed for each age. group. For example, among the 
10 and 11 years old. school attendance is clearly dominating and the fraction 
of children that work but do not go to school is very small. The same is true 
for the category “work and go to school“ among the 15 and Hi years old. 
This, in turn, causes the estimates of the multinomial choice model to have 
poor predictive power for these categories. In fact, for the young ones, the 
estimated model would not predict any of the individuals to Ik1 in the “not 
school” group. Those that do not go school are driven into that category 
by large individual shocks. This has consequences for the simulation exercise 
where many more children are presumed to go to school than actually do.
If thm* categories are distributed unevenly, maybe a dichotomous frame­
work would yield better predictions. The obvious variable to focus on in this 
context would he school attendance. In the case of the 10 and 11 years old 
this would of course not solve the problem of a very small non attendance 
group, because enrolment ratios are almost 100 percent from the beginning, 
hut it might he useful to do so for the elder children. This requires a new 
setup of the simulation framework.
One important point where the procedure in this paper departs from UFL 
is the issue of sample selection problems when estimating the earnings equa­
tion (4.5). In contrast to the findings of BFL. for the case ol PHOGUFSA
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this analysis finds that a simple Heckman correction mechanism proves to 
work well. Indeed, there is a significant selection efFect which influences the 
estimated results. Not accounting for it would lead to inconsistent estimates 
of the coefficients, which, in turn, would give biased estimates of the potential 
earnings for those individuals that do not report earnings.
Inspection of the transition matrix in Table 4.7 shows that the programme 
is also likely to reduce the incidence of child labour. Some 90 percent of the 
children that will start going to school are predicted not to work on the market, 
whereas 10 percent will do both, go to school and work. The contribution to 
household income - be it through monetary income or home production - will 
be much lower if children attend school, hence, reducing the time they spend 
working.
4.6 Concluding Remark
This paper applies a microsimulation method to evaluate the impact of a 
conditional cash transfer program and compares the effect with the actual 
outcome of the policy. The simulation correctly predicts that school enrolment 
ratios among the target population will increase as a result of a cash payment 
for school attendance. Hence, the model is a valuable tool to asses the effects 
of such schemes which, by increasing educational attainment, are also likely 
to reduce poverty in the long run.
A discrete model of occupational choice is used which allows for three out­
comes: attend school, work, or do both. The model picks up the main mech­
anism through which the transfer affects the schooling decision, considering 
explicitly actual and potential market earnings of each child. While the overall 
performance of the microsimulation is good, a closer inspection reveals that 
the method does not perform well if the population is unequally distributed 
over the three categories. This is a common problem of choice models. One 
solution is to employ a microsimulation method for a dichotomous framework. 
While this comes at the cost of loosing important features of the estimates 
such as the effect of the programme on the amount worked, it might improve 
the forecasting abilities with respect to school enrolment ratios.
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CHAPTER 5
On the Use of Panel Unit Root Test on 
Cross-Sectionally Dependent Data: An 
Application to PPP
5.1 Introduction
Panel unit root tests are becoming a standard tool in the analysis of mostly 
macroeconomic panels. Two procedures, the Levin. Lin and Chu (2002)1 
and the Ini, Pesaran and Shin (1997) test for unit roots are among the most 
popular. The tests have been applied to a range of macroeconomic problems. 
e.g. to the question whether real exchange rates are random walk processes or 
not (e.g. O'Connell (1998), Papell (1997)) or to investigate the mean reversion 
properties of the current account (Wu. 2000). Evans and Karras (1990) use 
panel unit root tests to analyze the convergence of regions in the US using 
a modified Levin et al. (2002) test procedure, while Strauss (2000) addresses 
the question of permanent components in regional GDP using these panel unit 
root tests.
However, relatively little is known about the size and power properties 
of these tests when any of the distributional assumptions underlying their 
construction is violated. The asymptotic distribution of both test statistics 
relies on the independence of the sections of the panel. This assumption might 
often be violated in real data, especially in a macroeconomic context.
1 A previous version of this test was known as Levin and Lin (1993). See also Levin and
Lin (1992).
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Given their widespread use, it is important to know more about the relia­
bility of the test results. The impact, of such dependence on the performance 
of the tests is studied in this paper. Two different forms of sectional depen­
dence are considered. In the short run (Section 5.3.1). positive cross-sectional 
dependence of the error terms is analyzed. It is found that in the case of 
common shocks, eliminating common time effects is remedy enough to restore 
the size properties reasonably well. In fact, the test statistic does converge 
to a standard normal distribution. In this respect this paper contrasts the 
finding of O’Connell (1998). who attests severe size distortions to the Levin 
et al. (2002) test in the presence of common contemporaneous correlation. 
When the contemporaneous correlation takes different forms, however, severe 
size distortions do occur. Long-run sectional dependence might be present 
if the series of the panel are cointegrated (Section 5.3.2). In this case, the 
series are nonst at ionary but share a common stochastic trend. Early work 
on the study of this effect on panel unit root tests has been done by Crow­
der (1997) in a simple cointegration framework. The effect cointegration has 
on unit root test is analytically studied in Lyhagen (2000). However, data 
generating process considered in this paper resembles more the one consid­
ered in Banerjee et al. (2000). In line with the results of these studies, it is 
found that the tests are oversized as a consequence of cointegration, as long 
as the errors are kept independent. In Section 5.3.3 cointegration is combined 
with sectional correlation, i.e. long- and sliort-run dependence are brought 
together. This seems natural as there is no prior reason to believe that these 
phenomena should be mutually exclusive. The result is surprising. Consid­
ered separately, long- and short-run dependencies tend to yield oversized test- 
results. If brought together, under some parameter configurations the size dis­
tortions go in the opposite direction: the over-rejection of the null hypothesis 
of a unit root vanishes and the tests become undersized. As a result, without 
further knowledge about the data generating process, panel unit root tests in 
presence of sectional dependence are inconclusive.
The application in Section 5.4 contributes to the purchasing power parity 
debate by addressing the question of mean reversion in a panel of real ex­
change rates. A panel of 18 exchange rates is first analyzed by estimating 
the contemporaneous covariance matrix of the error terms and corresponding 
standard errors. Different ways of estimating covariance matrices in the pres­
ence of heteroseedasticity and serial correlation are discussed and a bootstrap 
algorithm developed by Politis and Romano (1991) is suggested as a way of 
obtaining standard errors for these estimates. To know whether long-run sec­
tional dependence is present in the data, a cointegration analysis following 
Johansen (1995) on a subset of exchange rates is conducted. Together with
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the simulation results obtained earlier, the existence of both dependencies in 
the data puts a big caveat on the use of panel unit root tests in this context 
in particular, and on cross-sectionally dependent data in general.
5.2 Panel Unit Root Tests
The test developed by Levin et ah (2002) (henceforth LLC) can be seen as a 
natural extension of the Dickey and Fuller (1981) test for a unit root to a set 
of time series. It builds on the method previously suggested by Quail (1990) 
and Breitung and Meyer (1991). In the light of the criticism by Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) of the use of pooled regressions of the LLC type, Im et al. (1997) 
(henceforth IPS) allow for heterogeneity of the series under the alternative and 
do not make use of traditional panel estimation techniques. They propose 
instead a group-mean Lagrange multiplier test and a group mean test based 
on the individual ADF test statistics. The asymptotic properties for both 
tests are derived by assuming a diagonal path limit. The behaviour of the 
cross-section dimension (N ) and the time dimension (T) are functionally tied, 
i.e. (T(N ), N —► oc). For LLC. as both go to infinity, T  increases faster than 
Ah such that N /T  —> 0. whereas IPS only require y/N /T  —* 0.
This section presents the framework for the analysis of panel unit root tests. 
As in the univariate case, three forms of deterministics are considered starting 
from the following data generating process (DGP) that yields nonstationary 
series if the autoregressive coefficient pi is equal to one:
A xlt =  (pi -  + fH +  pi • t +  at.
The index i indicates the section of the panel (i =  1......AT) and the time
index t ranges from 1 to T. The constant of each section is denoted by 
p i  and pi • t represents a time trend in the data. The assumptions on the 
error term tit. are discussed further below. Table 5.1 summarizes the a priori 
restrictions and the hypotheses to be tested in each of the three models. 
The most general specification, model m  =  3 in the classification of LLC, 
is designed to discriminate between a set of 1(1) processes with drift under 
the null and a set of trendstationary processes under the alternative. In 
model 2. the trend parameter is restricted to zero a priori. It is used to 
discriminate between a set of 1(1) processes without drift under the null and 
allows stationary processes with an expected value different from zero under 
the alternative. This model will be used throughout the Monte Carlo study. 
In the simplest- model, under the null hypothesis of a unit root. sr# is a set of
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T a b le  5.1: Different models and hypotheses
model a prior i Null-hypothesis and alternative
m — 3 /ƒ(*>J 1 o p i  -  I V  i (=> Pi  ^  0. ßi =  0)
//S3) 1 1 <  1 Vi (=* ßi /  0)
m =  '2 A  =  o 11{2)I J Q p* =  1 V i (=> Pi  =  0)
//¡2) 1 Pi |< 0 V i (=> pi -ƒ 0)
m= 1 A  =  o //ll)/ , 0 pï =  0 V i
Pi  =  0 //p 1 Pi |< 0 V i
1( 1) processes without drift, while under the alternative it is a set of stationary 
processes all with an expected value of zero.
5.2.1 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002)
The LLC test is implemented in four steps.
S tep  1 : E lim in atio n  o f tim e sp ecific  effects. The cross-section average 
at t is subtracted from the data. i.e. x if =  Xu — which is equivalent
to the introduction of time specific dummy variables. This step will ¡»lay a 
crucial role in the simulation exercise in Section 5.3.
S tep  2: C om p u tation  of A D F -s ta t is t ic s  and n orm alized  residuals.
The choice of the lags Li to he included should he based on a common infor­
mation criterion (e.g. Akaike or Schwartz) and done after the elimination of 
time specific effects. Instead of the usual equation:
Li
A.? n  - StJ n— i T  )   ^O j j  T  fii “t  Hit T  t n .
the coefficient of interest. <V is estimated bv partitioning the regression using 
the Frisch-Waugh theorem to obtain residuals from each step:
Li
^  0\j A t g - j  -F  p\   ^ q - ii\  V  -f e ,lt = >  v.u  
j =i 
Lt
Xif-l =  +  /42> +  $ 2)t T Ti/-1 => i'it-1-
1
The regression of the residuals gives an estimator for dp.
fHt —  fiiVit.-j T t'it.. (5.1)
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In order to control for heterogeneity in the variances of the series, the residuals 
are normalized by the standard error <7ei of regression (5.1), estimated by:
S tep  3: C om p u tation  o f  th e  long-run variance. For each series the 
long-run variance is computed using the first differences:
The choice of covariance weights ensures positive estimates of the long-run 
variances. LLC suggest the Bartlett weights, wkt — 1 — t /(A' + 1). The 
estimate is consistent if the truncation parameter I\ grows exponentially at a 
rate less than T , LLC suggest K  = 3.2 I T 1/3. The ratio of the estimated long- 
run variation and the standard deviation is computed, which under the null 
approaches one. For the adjustment, the average of this ratio across sections 
is also needed:2
Step 4: Computation of the test statistic. Under the null hypothesis 
the normalized residuals €u are independent- of the normalized lagged residuals 
tVi-i- This is estimated using OLS:
Under the null hypothesis and in model 1, the regression /.-statistic ts is 
asymptotically normal, but has to be adjusted in models 2 and 3, so that, in 
general:
2 In the case of a trend the steps above should be implemented after demeaning the
differenced series.
and the normalization is done as follows:
~ L-tr ,c it = —  and ~ Vit-l
&ei
èie — tivù-1 +  tu- (5.3)
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where SE(<$) is the standard error of 5, cr( is the standard error of the re­
gression (o.3). fi*m f and <7*  ^ are necessary adjustments for the mean and the 
standard deviation. These vary according to m, the model chosen and T. the 
average number of observations per section in the panel adjusting for lagged 
differences. T  =  T  — (see Table 2 in LLC).
The asymptotic properties are derived in Levin and Lin (1993, Section 4).3 In 
model specifications 2 and 3 the estimator 6 has a downward bias, which is due 
to the dynamic specification of the panel, especially for small T  and N  (Xickell. 
1981). This makes the mean adjustments necessary. Furthermore, under the 
null, the variance of the estimator S falls at the rate — reflecting super­
consistency. As N  grows large, the variance of 6 gets smaller and smaller, 
which makes the variance adjustment necessary. If not adjusted, mean and 
variance bias would force the /-value to negative infinity in models 2 and 3. 
Under the alternative, Xu is already stationary, so Ax it has asymptotically zero 
variation at zero frequency, meaning that each standard deviation ratio a* as 
well as the average ratio Spj becomes small. In this case the mean adjustment 
does not influence the /-value adjustm ent. so that the adjusted value diverges 
to negative infinity. This shows the advantage of using an estimate of the long- 
run variance to discriminate between stationary and nonstationary processes.
5.2.2 Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997)
The IPS test extends the LLC framework by allowing for a mixture of sta­
tionary and nonstationary series under the alternative hypothesis. The test 
is defined for models 2 and 3, and the alternative is modified to:
H['rs) =  Pi < 0, V i =  1. 2, . . .^ ! ,Pi =  0 . V i =  A', + 1......A’.
IPS suggest a group mean lagrange multiplier (LM) test and a group mean 
/-test based on the individual ADF /-values. In simulations done by the 
authors the /-test outperforms the LM test slightly. According to the ADF 
lag order chosen in each section and the length 7\ adjustments are necessary 
to the mean and variance. The test statistics becomes:
\/iV| t t f x  -  I 2 i l i  E[U ,T(Li' 0 )  I Pi ~  0 ] }  hIIPS)
Vf.  ------ 1 ■ = — }~ -  Ar(0 . 1).
V £ E t i  Var[tix(Li. 0 )  | =  0]
3 See also page 139 in the Appendix for a detailed treatment of the asymptotic properties 
in the case m =  1.
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The adjustments £[...] and Var[...] are tabulated in the paper. The expression 
f v.r =  ti.T{f'i*Qi) is the mean of the actual ADF test statistics. IPS
also suggest the inclusion of time specific eiTects in the regression or. alterna­
tively, the demeaning of the panel at each t. Note. however, that in contrast 
to LLC, the IP S-test uses an average of /-statistics and not a single estimated 
/-value from the pooled series.
5.3 The Effect of Cross-sectional Dependence
The model considered in this paper is designed to discriminate between a set 
of 1(1) series without drift and a set of A It (p) series with expectation different 
from zero. In terms of standard macroeconomic time series, this configuration 
refers to. for example, interest rates, exchange rates and possibly price indices. 
The DGP takes the following form:
Both x, and y t are (AT x 1) vectors, p  and et are (2A" x 1) vectors. The 
vector of interest is always x ,. The y, are used to simulate potentially shared 
stochastic trends if desired. The matrices A and B  determine the long-run 
relation between the variables and will be defined according to the set of 
experiments. For example, if
and a = 0 . then x* will be a set of independent 1(1) variables without drift. 
The short-run correlation is modeled through the error structure:
Note that contemporaneous correlation only affects the vector x*, not y*. The 
innovation variance is chosen to he a 2 =  1 throughout the paper. In general.
(5.4)
A  =  a and p  =  0 ,
the correlation matrix S  takes the following form:4
/ 1 \
1
E\€,f€t\ “  1N x N
i J
where the correlations are | ^  |< 1.
4 Considering only the first A’ elements of €t .
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5.3.1 Cross-sectional Correlation
The first set of experiments is designed to measure the impart of cross- 
sectional correlation.5 * The absence of error correlation (u/y = 0, V/, j )  pro­
duces the desired size properties, see Table C .l in the Appendix. Once a 
common, positive sectional correlation is introduced (uiij =  0.7. V/. j ) .  the 
tests appears to be slightly oversized (Table 5.2). especially for small A7. This 
contrasts sharply the findings of O'Connell (1998) who finds size distortions 
of as much as f>0 percent for the 5 percent size. Such distortions can be re­
produced if step one of the LLC test, he. the elimination of common time 
effects, is not carried out. The results for different values of are presented 
in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for the LLC and IPS test respectively.
Table 5 .2 : Size properties with common shocks, common time ef­
fects eliiniated
U/ — 0 . / ' LLC
nominal size WA IPS
N =  5 N =  10 AT =  20 A7 =  5 A7 =  10 .V =  20
T  =  25 .128 .115 .111 .110 TOO .104
r =  50 .127 .112 .106 .117 .108 .102
T  =  100 .115 .110
oo
.110 .108 .101
nominal size 5%
II CT» N =  10 N  =  20 N =  5 N =  10 N =  20
T =  25 .0G5 .052 .059 .064 .052 .058
T  =  50 .067 .054 .049 .068 .053 .050
T =  100 .060 .056 .055 .054 .058 .055
nominal size VA
N — 5 N =  10 Ar =  20 N =  5 N  =  10 N =  20
T  =  25 .014 .009 .Old .010 .010 .015
T  =  50 .015 .011 .011 .016 .012 .013
T  =  100 .011 .012 .014 .014 .015 .011
Sa te:  Based on 4,000 replications. The values reported are the percentage 
of rejections using the indicated nominal level. Ideally, real and nominal size 
should be equal.
The power of the LLC1 test and the IPS test was analyzed for the two alter­
natives p ~  .9 and p =  .95, where p — 1 — o. This exercise was repeated for 
varying covariance structures, u; =  {0 .0 .7 ,0 .8 ,0 .9 } , N =  25, T  = {GO. 100}.
5 All simulations were carried out in the software package STATA using the modules
Bornhorst and Baum (200]a) and Bornliorst and Baum (2001b).
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and p> ~ 1. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.3 for the 
LLC test and in Table 5.4 for the IPS test. They show that once common 
time effects are eliminated, the power of the tests is not severely affected by 
cross-sectional correlation. More interestingly, the distortions in power and 
size are independent of the degree of cross-sectional dependence.
Table 5 .3 : Size and power properties of LLC for varying and
P
N =  25 nom. size power
P -  .9 P -  .95
jj =  0 109? 5% 1 7 10% 57c 17c 10% 5%: 1%
r  =  (¡o .09 .04 .005 .99 .98 .85 .56 .38 .13
r =  ioo .01 .04 .002 1 1 1 .83 .68 .31
ijj =  0.7 109? 5% 1 7 107 57c 1 7 10% 57. 1 7
T =  GO .10 .04 .005 .99 .98 .84 .54 .37 .12
T =  100 .11 .04 .009 1 1 .99 .79 .64 .29
¡j =  0.8 10% 5% 17c 10% 5% 17c 1 0 7 5 7 1 7
T — (»0 .10 .04 .005 .98 .96 .80 .54 .36 .10
T  =  100 .11 .05 .011 1 1 1 .80 .60 .24
=  0.0 10% 5% 17c 1 0 7 57c 1 7 107- 5 7 1 7
T =  GO .10 .04 .005 .99 .97 .82 .54 .36 .12
II o .11 .04 .008 1 1 1 .79 .64 .28
Note: Based on 2.000 replications. One minus the power is the probabil­
ity that the test fails to reject the null if it is false for a given significance 
level.
The natural question that arises is why demeaning, or. equivalently, the in­
clusion of time dummies, seems to be such an effective instrument if errors are 
correlated in the way studied here. The expected value of the outer product 
of the error terms is (considering the relevant first N  elements) E [etCt\ =  E . 
The elimination of time effects can be rewritten as:
(e, -  £ ,)(e , -  e ,)' =  [ ( i  -  ^ ) e , ]  [ ( i  -  - ^ ) e , ]  where 1 = (1 .......1)
Q e ( (Q e,)' = Q e ^J Q ' =  Q £ Q '.
where Q is:
Q =
Arx A'
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T ab le  5 .4 : Size and power properties of IPS for varying u; and 
P
II IO Cn nom. size power
P -  .9 P =  .95
-; =  0 107 5% 1 7 10%. 5% 1 7 1 0 7 5 7 1 7
T  =  GO .11 .05 .013 1 1 .99 .86 .76 .46oo11 .11 .05 .010 1 1 1 1 .99 .95
u; =  0.7 m 5% 1 7 10% 5 7 17c 10%. 57 1 7
T  =  GO .12 .07 .010 1 1 .99 .87 .77 .47
r =  loo .12 .05 .008 1 1 1 1 .99 .93
(j =  0.8 10% r.% 1% 107 5 7 1 7 10%. 0%. 1%.
7’ =  GO .12 .07 010 1 1 .99 .89 .78 .47ooIIhi .12 .05 .006 1 1 1 1 .99 .93
u; =  0.9 10% 5% 17c 107 5 7 1 7 10%. 5 7 1 7j II CÏ © .12 .07 .010 1 1 .99 .87 .77 .46
T =  100 .11 .05 .009 1 1 1 1 .99 .94
Note: See Table 5.3.
If E  takes the form where all off-diagonal elements are equal to a?, the above 
expression further simplifies to:
Q E Q ' =
=  ( ! “ */)
N -  1 
N
AT-1  -1
N -  1 ... II
1 
1
N - l  J
Ä  ^
1 ... ^ (5.6)
After demeaning, the degree of cross-sectional correlation (the value of jj) 
leaves the relation of the off-diagonal to the diagonal elements unchanged, 
but it is this relation which determines the degree to which independence is 
violated. It is therefore not surprising that the LLC and IPS test do not 
show significant differences in power and size for varying More'over, for 
reasonable large A\ the off-diagonal entries are small, e.g. with N  =  20 the 
remaining effective' correlation is -0.05. For large N  this approaches zero, 
just as it is in the absence of any cross correlation. In fact, as shown in 
Appendix 0 .1, the test statistic approaches a standard normal distribution.
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This argument is limited, however, to the special form of S  where all •
Because this might not always be the case, the correlation matrix is now cho­
sen to be a band matrix, where the correlation coefficient decreases with the 
distance from the main diagonal. The idea behind this spécification is that 
there might be some natural ordering of the sections, reflecting e.g. the geo­
graphical distribution of units in a spatial model. Errors are more correlated 
the closer two sections are:
E[et€t\ — £N x N
1 u/1 , ,2 sJj , ,3 U/ . . .  ujn ~ 1
1 LJ1 •J2 . ..  u ; * - 2
1 u;1 . . .  UJN ~ S
1
. . .  w 1ur
V 1 /
(5.7)
Table 5.5 reports the effect of this disturbance has on the performance of the 
LLC test, given =  0.7 and varying N  and T. It shows that the test performs 
quite poorly. Increasing N  seem to worsen the results.
T ab le  5 .5 : Size properties of LLC with errors as in equation (5.7)
t J  -  0 .T
nom. size 10% 
A' = 10 N  =  25
nom. size 5% 
N  =  10 N =  25
nom. size 1% 
N  = 1 0  N =  25
T =  20 .227 .235 .150 .170 .000 .080
T =  GO .249 .250 .170 .180 .004 .078ooII .258 .252 .177 .180 .008 .084
Note: Based on 10,000 replications.
Short-run correlation of this type does affect the size properties, no matter 
if common time effects are eliminated or not. In the case of common effects, 
the distortions are far less worrisome than previously claimed.
5.3.2 Cross-Sectional Cointegration
There are several parameters that influence the specific form of cointegration 
that one can observe in a vector of time series. One aspect is the number of 
cointegrating vectors (CIVs) in a system, or, complementarily, the number of 
stochastic trends driving it. Another set of parameters are the values of the 
loading matrix. In the extreme case. <\11 variables are just linear combinations 
of one stochastic trend, and the ‘long-run’ equilibrium is realized almost im­
mediately after a shock. The performance of the tests might depend on how 
strongly the variables are tied to the long-run relation. In a set of experiments
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not reported lien*, where eointegration takes that form, both the LLC and the 
IPS test were very badly oversized. Since in that setup a common stochastic 
trend is a time specific effect common to all series, step one of LLC just elim­
inates it and transforms all series into stationary processes. Lower values of 
the loading matrix A may seem more realistic and loosen the tightness of the 
long-run relation. Here the DGP takes the following form:
A = ° . l ( - 1 _°T )  g 1 )
the cointegrating matrix C  is:
1
0
-1
1
u
-1
0
0
... 0 
... 0 \
0 0 1 -1 ... 0
0 0 0 u ... 0
/0 0 0 0 ... u
The number of zero rows (b) determines the number of common trends driving 
the system. Then* are AT—b cointegrating relationships. The following number 
of cointegrating vectors were considered: A* — 1. A'/2 and Ar/4. in case of a 
fraction the integer part of it is chosen.
T a b le  5 .6 : Size properties with cointegration. b — A’ — 1
LLC IPS
b ---- X  -  1 nominal size lO/f
X  -  5 A’ -  10 A -  20 X  -  5 X  -  10 A' 20
T  -  25 .167 .157 .158 .161 .150 .101
T =  50 .192 .167 .173 .261 .255 .274
T  =  100 .249 .227 .203 .520 ,179 .119
nominal size ~)7<
AT -  5 X -- 10 A* -  20 X  - - 5 X  10 X  20
T  =: 25 .094 .078 .088 .090 .080 .090
T  -  50 .105 .081 .088 .153 .1 17 .171
T = 100 .149 .142 .117 .383 4i78 .350
nominal size VA
X --- 5 A* -  10 X ---- 20 X  5 AT -  10 A’ - 20
T  -  25 .024 .019 .024 .030 .024 .020
T  -  50 .024 .017 .017 .014 .011 .055
7 100 .041 .029 .034 .159 .182 .198
Aofe: Based on -1.000 rep lica tions.
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Table 5.6 reports the results for C IV  — N — 1. The tests are oversized 
and tlie problem increases in T. Together with Tables 0.2  and 0 .3  in the 
Appendix, where results for other values of C IV  are presented, it becomes 
clear that the tests perform worse the more C IV  a are present.
An analytical treatment of the asymptotic behaviour of the LLC test statis­
tics for the cases considered in the simulation exercise would give insights into 
the origins of the size distortions. The interested reader is referred to Lyha- 
gen (2000). who provides an analytical argument for the special case in which 
there are N — 1 cointegrating relations and an instantaneous adjustment to the 
equilibrium takes place (o =  1). He derives the limiting distributions for the 
¿-statistic. The variety of parameters that can determine the cointegration 
among the sections (number of Cl Vs. a) makes a general analytical treatment 
of this bias rather complicated. Furthermore, the additional insight of an an­
alytical treatment is limited as a potential correction of the size distortion 
would have to account for all possible cases.
5.3.3 Cross-Sectional Correlation and Cointegration
The two previous sections indicated that both kinds of dependencies have over­
sizing effects and therefore yield to an over-rejection of the null-hypothesis. 
Neither econometric nor economic theory gives any reason to believe that the 
two dependencies are mutually exclusive. In this sections the two are brought 
together. The cointegration is chosen to be as in the above section, and, in 
addition, the errors are correlated in the way specified in Section 5.3.1.
The results reported in Table 5.7 are surprising. The distribution of the 
test statistic is shifted to the right. The bias increases with T  and yields a 
consideratile distortion in the opposite direction. This of course causes the 
power of the test to come close to unity.
In theory, corrections to the test statistics are possible. The variety of 
cases (A\ T. number of CIVs. a ), however, limits the practicability of such 
an approach. Hence, in practice, a careful assessment of the dependencies 
present in the data is necessary before applying any unit root test.
5.4 Should Panel Unit Root Tests be Applied to 
Exchange Rates?
W ith the growth of the panel unit root methodology, the debate over the 
validity of the purchasing power parity (P IT 1) has experienced a revival. While 
previous research could hardly find any empirical evidence for PPP. one could
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T ab le  5 .7 : Size properties with cointegration and correlation
C IV  =  N /2 LLC IPS
=  0.7 nominal size 10%
N  =  5 N  =  10 N — 20 N  =  5 A* 7 =  10 Ar =  20
T  =  25 .092 .055 .029 .005 .030 .015
T  =  50 .094 .058 .029 .054 .035 .007
T  =  100 .111 .004 .025 .001 .024 .004
nominal size 5%
A7 = 5 AT=  10 A7 =  20 N  = 5 N  =  10 N  =  20
T  -  25 .049 .030 .012 .038 .019 .007
T  =  50 .055 .033 .014 .030 .010 .004
r  =  loo .007 .039 .012 .035 .010 .002
nominal size 1%
N  =  5 N =  10 N  =  20 A7 =  5 N  =  10 N  =  20
T  =  25 .011 .007 .002 .011 .003 .001
T  -  50 .018 .001 .003 .007 .001 .001
T  =  100 m 2 .013 .002 .011 .004 .000
N o te : Based on 4,000 replications.
expect more insight from the application of panel methods.0 In a non technical 
way. PPP means that once different currencies are controlled for. the same 
basket of goods should cost the same amount of money no matter in which 
country it is purchased. The existence of permanent deviations from such an 
equilibrium seems implausible as it would allow arbitrage gains, which in turn 
would push the real exchange* rate back to the equilibrium. Although nobody 
believes in arbitrage possibilities with fast food, a popular application of P P P  
is the Economist's Big Mac index. Assuming PPP holds, actual exchange 
rates are expressed as the deviation from the MeParity, hinting on the current 
under- or overvaluation of currencies.' Although many arguments have* been 
put forward in the theoretical literature why PPP  might fail, P P P  is still 
a very popular concept and something many economists like to believe in. 
However, one cannot reject the impression that much of the debate centres 
on the applied methods.
0 For a survey of empirical results before the panel era, see e.g. Front and Iiogoff (1!)!)5).
7 The fall of the Euro after its introduction was predictable if one had believed in Burg- 
ernomics. For more on the issue, see Economist (2001, April 21st).
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5.4.1 PPP - Revisited
If PPP holds, in the long run the real exchange rate between two countries 
is stable and deviations from equilibrium are not permanent. Let Eit denote 
the nominal exchange rage between country i and a base country at time t. 
Then, multiplying a basket of goods (normalized to one) with the ratio of the 
prices in country i. P*,. and in the country of the base currency, pj*1**, defines 
the real exchange rate Q#:
Qu = 1 Pit.p>base
or, taking logs:
(ju -  Pit - P ^ se -  eit. (5.8)
Since prices and exchange rates are recognized to be nonstat ionary time series, 
a natural way of looking at the problem is to ask if there is a linear combination 
of the series which renders a stationary real exchange rate. i.e. if the prices 
and the exchange rate are cointegrated.
A distinction is made between the strong and weak form of PPP. The weak 
form allows for coefficients different from (1, -1) on the price indices. The weak 
form of P P P  has its economic justification in the presence of measurement 
errors, which would persist in the long run, or varying effects of productivity 
si locks which may cause the cointegrating coefficients to differ from unity. The 
weak form of PPP has been tested in an error correction approach, e.g. by 
Cheung and Lai (1993) or Corbae and Ouliaris (1991). Edison et al. (1997) and 
Kouretas (1997) apply a Johansen (1995) procedure, the latter to investigate 
P PP  of the Canadian dollar and five other currencies.
The strong form of PPP, restricts the coefficients to (1. -1) a priori and tests 
the resulting real exchange rate for a unit root. Only this test is of interest in 
the panel unit root framework. The PPP hypothesis translates into the sta­
tionarity of the real exchange rate qu;. Only if this series is mean reverting and 
does not accumulate shocks permanently, can P P P  hold. Interestingly, the 
majority of the studies apply tests that have a unit root as a null hypothesis 
and literally accept stationarity if nonstationarity is rejected, which clearly is 
a loose interpretation of the unit root rejection. Kouretas (1997) and Kuo and 
Mikkola (1999) are two studies which test both stationarity and nonstation- 
arity in a panel framework. In a univariate framework, Engel (2000) points 
out that even if one rejects the unit root and fails to reject stationarity there 
is a possibility of a unit root in the series. This might be caused by a size 
distortion in the unit roots tests and the low power of the stationarity tests.
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Several issues make P P P  an interesting application from the perspective of 
panel unit root tests. The increased power when taking into account a set 
of time series allows for a more precise statement on the stationaritv of the 
series. W hile single country analyses often reject PPP1 because a unit root is 
found in the real exchange rate, this might be due to the low power of sin­
gle equation unit root tests with an autoregressive coefficient close to unity. 
Therefore, the panel approach might give more insights. However, there are 
drawbacks on the use of panel methods. Interestingly, some authors find dif­
fering results according to the base currency chosen. Papell (1997) rejects the 
unit root when the Deutschmark is chosen as a base currency, but has mixed 
results when the panel is US8 based. Note that the series to he tested for a 
unit root formed following equation (5.8) exhibit cross-sectional correlation by 
construction, as they are expressed with respect to one base currency. Hence, 
shocks that affect this exchange rate are directly reflected in the entire panel. 
This means that the degree of cross-sectional correlation depends on the base 
currency chosen. However, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 in Section 5.3.1 show that the 
actual value of the cross-sectional correlation does not influence the perfor­
mance of the test. It is more plausible that the choice of the base currency 
affects the degree to which the data is contaminated with cointegration.
There is, of course, a debate on what long-run means in this context. While- 
some authors argue that P P P  should hold regardless to the exchange rate 
regime, and consequently apply the tests to long series from, say 1919-1990 
ilvuo and Mikkola, 1999). or even over 100 years (Engel, 2000), most of the 
studies rely on the time period of the current float , i.e. from 1973 onwards.
All studies mentioned above, including Pedroni (1999), do not consider the 
possibility of cross-sectional cointegration. Banerjee et al. (2001) confirm the 
result of the previous cointegration analysis that if cross-sectional cointegra­
tion is not taken into account when the real exchange rate is computed, severe 
distortions may arise. Although one should be aware of the possibility of cross- 
sectional cointegrating relations and the serious distortions this causes, one 
has to recognize that large dimensional systems cannot be estimated without 
an a priori restriction. To illustrate this argument-, a full .Johansen estimation 
of the weak form of P PP  would yield a system of N  countries, each with 3 
variables, so that an unrestricted estimation of the cointegration matrix n  
would not be feasible with some 100 observations.
As mentioned earlier, the study by O'Connell (1998) examines PP P  in 
the presence of short-run dependencies in the form of cross-sectional correla­
tions. Moreover, the size and power of the LLO test are explicitly analyzed. 
O'Connell comes to the conclusion that the performance of the LLC test in 
the presence of cross-sectional correlation is very poor and suggests a new
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GLS type estimator. The impact of the O'Connell critique was considerable 
and has to some extent discredited the LLC test. There are some things 
worthwhile noticing.
Apparently O'Connell does not use the adjusted i-value when he evaluates 
his simulations results. Not adjusting the ¿-values means that the finite sam­
ple adjustments are not made. Also, common time effects are not eliminated 
in his simulation exercise. This becomes clear as the distortion in size he 
reports can only be reproduced if one does not perform this elimination. The 
poor power properties that are attested to the LLC test are not related to the 
cross-sectional correlation (see Table 5.3). It should be pointed out that with 
a specification of p =  0.96 even univariate unit root tests have poor power 
results (Scliwert. 1989). Thus the poor power properties are not panel spe­
cific. The proposed GLS estimate may seem more appealing than the removal 
of common time effects. However, this procedure involves the estimation of 
a covariance matrix and relies on the consistency and accuracy of this point 
estimate.
5.4.2 Shortrun Dependence
The main finding of the simulation exercise above is that it is essential to know 
more about the covariance structure of the data before applying unit roots 
tests. This poses some methodological problems because estimators have to 
deal with possible heterosoedasticity and serial correlation in the data. Robust 
estimators are needed. In addition, once a point estimate of a covariance 
matrix is obtained, it is necessary to conduct some inference on the parameters 
in order to asses the significance of the correlations. Parametric (Den Haan 
and Levin. 1996) and nonparametric (Newey and West. 1987) methods for 
robust estimations of covariance matrices are discussed in Appendix C.2. In 
addition, a bootstrap algorithm (Politis and Romano, 1994) is suggested to 
test for significance of the estimated correlations. The data used are a panel 
of real exchange rates for 18 OECD countries, using the US$ as the lnxse 
currency.8 To be consistent with the covariance estimators that operate under 
stationarity. the first difference of t he real exchange rates form the basis for t he 
following analysis. This is consistent while working under the null hypothesis 
of a unit root. The parametric (Table 5.9) and the nonparametric (Table C .6 
in the Appendix) estimation yield similar results for the covariance matrix 
and show clear signs of significant positive correlation.9
8 The data used is from the IMF data sets, namely the International Financial Statistics 
and covers quarterly nominal spot exchange rates and CPI, for the period 1973:1 to 
1997:3 for 18 OECD countries. A plot of the data can be found in the Appendix.
9 The estimates presented are not sensitive to the choice of parameters (information cri­
terion, lag lengths, truncation A'). Although the two estimates are not identical, their
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One can argue that the parametric estimate is superior because it explic­
itly considers prewhitening which is the main drawback of the nonparametric 
estimator used. On the other hand the differenced exchange rates do not, in 
general, have very high order autoregressive components,10 so the impact of 
serial correlation on the nonparametric estimator might be limited.
More than the nonparametric estimate, the parametric estimates detect 
negative correlation of the Canadian Dollar with most other currencies in 
the point, estimates. However, the standard errors indicate that it is not 
significant. Recalling that all variables are constructed the following way: 
Xu =  and that from the 18 countries chosen most are Eu­
ropean. it is not surprising that Canada seems to react in a different way to 
shocks -  if affected at all. The same is true for Korea. The Japanese Yen, 
on the other hand, does exhibit similar reactions to the European currencies. 
In the parametric case, the standard errors are in a plausible range of 0.02 
to 0 .2 , whereas in the nonparametric case, the standard errors become very 
small, especially if the estimated correlation is close to unity. Overall, the 
parametric estimation seems more plausible.
Having in mind the results from the simulation and the asymptotic consid­
erations of Section 5.3. it is desirable to have a homogeneous dataset in terms 
of error correlation. Therefore, the two countries with a different error cor­
relation (Canada and Korea) were dropped from the sample yielding a panel 
with almost equally correlated errors. The tests on different structures of the 
the covariance matrix of the remaining 16 countries reported in Table 5.8 in­
dicate that a common correlation coefficient in the order of .6 to .8 cannot, he 
rejected, with 0.7 yielding an exceptionally low test statistic.
T able 5.8: Testing different covariance struc­
tures for 16 currencies
aJ
p =  0.2”)
Q />-val
0.5 295.82 1.00
0.6 85.75 0.01
0.7 2.06 0.00
0.8 44.76 0.00
0.9 213.84 1.00
Note: Q is y distributed.
results are very similar, and the deviations from each other are in a plausible range (see, 
e.g.[Sect ion 6] Den Haau and Levin (1907)).
10 The average lag length is 2.7, with a range from zero to 7 in. one case.
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5.4.3 Long-run Dependence
A full assessment of the long-run dependency in the real exchange rate data 
is not possible using a maximum likelihood approach due to the few numbers 
of observations in relation to the entire system. A VAR(p) specification of the 
process that satisfies minimal residual properties would require a lag order 
higher than p  =  2. which is the highest feasible in the system of 16 exchange 
rates. Estimation might be achievable by imposing further a priori restrictions 
on the parameter matrices, but theory does not give any further guidance. 
However, the interesting question whether there is cointegration or not can 
positively be answered in subsystems of the 10 exchange rates. For the sake of 
presentation, here the result of a sub-sample of 9 exchange rates is presented.11 
A cointegration analysis following Johansen (1905) suggests that the data are 
cointegrated. The tract1 test detects at least three cointegrating relations in 
this sub-sample of the data (see Table 5.10). This exercise could be repeated 
with varying sub-samples yielding similar results.
Table 5 .1 0 : Three test for cointegration 
in a sub-sample of 9 ex­
change rates
Ho'. rank=p - T Z  lo g ( l -A i) 95%
p =  0 '234.5** 192.9
p  <  1 183.3** 156.0
P <  2 130.7** 124.2
P <  3 97.49* 94.2
p <  4 65.67 68.5
Note: * *  indicates that the hypothesis is re­
jected at least at tin* 93'#-level.
5.4.4 Results
The individual lags that were included in the different sections were deter­
mined after the removal of common time effects. This lag structure differs 
from the optimal lag structure if each of the series would he tested individ­
ually before demeaning. However, because the absence of serial correlation 1
11 A VAK{3) was fitted allowing for seasonal dummies and a constant. All Box Bierce 
statistics testing for the absence of serial autocorrelation up to 11 lags cannot be rejected, 
the same is true for ARCH(4) effects. Absence of vector autocorrelation is rejected at 
the 5 percent level, vector normality is not rejected.
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is essential for the LLC and IP S test this should be carried out after the de­
meaning. A series of tests was used to analyze the residuals of each series for 
their white noise properties. Table 5.11 reports the results and the main white 
noise indicators. Further, the ¿-values of the included lags were considered 
which had to be significant at least for the highest lag considered. Normality 
is not rejected for all residual series.
T ab le  5 .1 1 : ADF - lags selection 
USS based
lags AR(4) BP lags AR(4) BP
DE 3 .59 .99 FN 4 .25 .58
UK 1 .90 .34 GR 5 .87 .71
AT 1 .57 .87 ES 1 .78 .GO
BE 3 .77 .24 AU 3 .9G .84
DK 2 .44 .45 IT 2 .80 .85
FR 1 .74 .83 CH 1 .54 .85
NL 3 .47 .90 NW 3 .87 .12
JP 5 .41 .GO s w 2 .84 .85
ATote: In all cases the null hypothesis is absence of the re­
spective disturbance. The reported values are the p  values 
at which this hypothesis can be rejected. A R(4) stands for 
a test on autocorrelation to the 4th order, B P  is the Breush 
Pagan test for hcteroscedasticity.
Both dependencies are present in the data. The simulation exercise has 
shown that in this case it is not possible to make predictions about the direc­
tion of a potential size bias. New critical values can be computed simulating 
panels of exchange rates, and thereby following as close as possible the pre­
sumed DGP. Therefore, a panel of 1G variables with 15 (and 8) cointegrating 
relations and an error correlation structure using the [joint estimate of Table
5.9 was simulated and the test statistic was computed. Under the alternative, 
variables with an autoregressive coefficient of p =  { .9 . .95} and the same error 
structure were simulated. Table 5.12 reports the results of the LLC and the 
IPS test, the percentiles of the normal and the simulated distribution. In addi­
tion, Figure 5.1 shows kernel densities of the estimated ¿-values, the standard 
normal distribution, the actual test value and the p =  0.9 alternative.
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T ab le  5 .1 2 : Test results
//-values adj. power (5 %)
test coefficient N(0,1) simulated
6 =  15 6 =  8
P =  -(J P = .95
LLC t* -1.911 0.028 0.014 0.020 0.94 0.38
IP S Vf -2.850 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.99 0.73
Note: Simulated values based on 4,000 replications.
under HO, CIV=8 ------------ under H1, rho=.9 ................. N{0,1)
Figure 5 .1 : LLC test results.
One has to keep in mind, however, that this test result is sensitive to the 
assumed structure of the data, in particular the presence of both long- and 
short-run dependence. While the short-run correlation with all errors sharing 
the same correlation coefficient does not appear to influence the test result, the 
presence of cointegration is much more worrisome. If one is willing to assume 
that the values obtained via the simulation reflect the true properties of the 
DGI\ the null of nonstationarity of the real exchange rates can he rejected at 
a very low //-value, hence providing some argument for the validity of PPF.
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5.5 Conclusion
The simulation exercise has shown that two of the most popular panel unit 
root tests are sensitive to dependencies among sections of the panel. Ana­
lyzed separately, both short-run dependence in the form of correlated errors 
and long-run dependence in the form of cointegration lead to a significant 
oversizing of the test. However, if put together, the effect goes into the op­
posite direction. The determination of the actual presence of dependencies 
is therefore necessary in order to interpret the test results. The estimation 
of and the inference on contemporaneous correlation is crucial, although not 
easy to perform.
The application to a set of real exchange rates has shown that both depen­
dencies are present in the data. Hence, the test results are likely to be biased. 
In order account for these dependencies, simulated critical values were used 
which origin from a data generating process that resembles the actual data. 
The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected providing some empirical 
evidence for the validity of the purchasing power parity theory. However, in 
the light of the simulation results obtained earlier, the reliability of the test 
results are questionable. This exemplifies the the problems with the use of 
panel unit root tests on sectional dependent data in general.
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A Appendix to Part I
A .l Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted using a computerized setup12 in three ses­
sions at the European University Institute near Florence, Italy. Participants 
were 110 Masters and PhD students from the faculties of Law (30%). History 
(15%), Social and Political Sciences (23%), and Economics (33%). Subjects 
originated from la different European countries. They were between 23 and 
3G years old (average: 27.7), and 04% were male. Because it was the first 
time that experiments were conducted at this place, the subjec t pool was not 
experienced in playing games. For each session a multiple of five subjects 
was recruited (session 1: 40, session 2: 30. session 3: 40). The profit earned 
by participants ranged from Euro 24 to Euro 47.90, with an average of Euro 
30.34 (s.d. 4.89), including a 5 Euro show-up fee paid to each candidate. Each 
session (including a 15 min. questionnaire at the end) lasted for about two 
hours. Participants were recruited via email and were invited to sign up on a 
website. Each session took place in three computer labs with 10 to 25 comput­
ers each, located in different buildings of the university campus. Upon arrival 
to an assigned computer lab. subjects randomly drew a seat number and an 
account number. This account number was later used to identify subjects for 
payment, which was organized anonymously. Further to that, the computer 
labs were* prepared using separators to individualize the environment. In each 
room, a professor of the university monitored the experiment in a discrete 
way.
Note that at no point in time were subjects deceived. Subjects could choose 
how often (max three times) they wanted to read through the instructions 
on the screen. They also had a hard copy of the instructions next to their 
machines. The instructions were followed by a short quiz of three questions 
covering the crucial aspects of the game. Almost all subjects appeared to 
have understood the game very well before playing (see results of the quiz 
in Section A .l) . No major clarification questions were asked. After reading 
through the instructions, subjects were asked to enter information about their 
age. gender, nationality, and number of siblings.13 To increase anonymity, the 
age displayed to fellow players was modified by adding a random number. 
This was also mentioned in the instructions further to a general anonymity 
and privacy statement.
12 Tin* Z-Tree software described in Fischbacher (liKH>)
l:t During the recruitment process it was made sure that subjects were recruited only from 
countries which have a substantial number of students at the university. This restriction 
was introduced to avoid identification of the subjects during the game.
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Each session consisted of six treatments in which subjects were randomly 
matched in groups of five players
In the first four of these treatments subjects played the following repeated 
version of the trust game. At the beginning of the treatment, each player 
could see some information about the four other players in his group, the 
information included the players' nationality, age. gender, and the number of 
siblings. The subjects then decided to whom and how much of their initial 
endowment of 100 they were willing to transfer. No entry in any of the boxes 
corresponded to making no choice, which was also an option. In the next step 
subjects saw who among the other players had chosen them and how much 
they had received from these partners. In addition, this amount was shown 
multiplied by three. For each player from whom a transfer was received, 
they could choose how much to return back. Then, subjects were presented a 
summary of all transfers and returns they had been involved with. These steps 
were repeated six times. Then, groups were reshuffled and a new treatment 
was played. Due to the limited amount of subjects in each session and the 
large size of each group, the re-matching had to be done on a random basis, 
hence it is not ruled out that subjects could meet again in subsequent groups.
The fifth treatment differed from the previous four because it did not allow 
free choice of partners. Subjects, were again matched in groups of five players, 
but instead of being able to choose a partner, they were randomly assigned 
to one of the fellow players. In every period of this treatment players faced a 
new noil-modifiable random choice of partner.
The sixth and final treatment was instead identical to the first four and 
thus allowed free choice of partners.
Instructions 
Screen 1
• You will randomly be matched with 4 o th er players to play a game.
• Each game consists of th re e  stages which will be described on the 
following screens.
• The game will be repeated for 6 period s with the sam e players.
• After the G periods, you will randomly be re-m atch ed  with four new 
players. •
• This re-matching will be repeated six  tim es (time permitting).
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Screen 2
Stage 1 of 3
Your endowment in each period is 100 points, equivalent to 0 .35  E u ros 
You can choose if you want to transfer any points to your fellow players or 
not. If so, you decide to  w hom  and how much. You can choose only one 
p erson  and you can transfer any amount between 0 and  100. If you decided 
not to transfer points at all, just click the button.
Every transfer made in stage 1 will be m ultiplied by th e  facto r 3 as it 
arrives on the other player's account.
Screen 3
In stage 1 the other 4 players have simultaneously made a similar decision to 
yours. Due to the simultaneity their choice does not depend on your decision.
Stage 2 of 3
You will see who of the other players have chosen you and how m uch has 
been transferred to you. It might be that you were chosen by none, 1, 2, 3 or 
even all 4 players.
If you got a transfer from a player, you can decide if and how much you want 
to transfer back to th is player. You can transfer back anything betw een 
zero and th r e e  tim es the initial transfer to you. If you were chosen by more 
than one player, you can choose different amounts for each of them.
Screen 4
Stage 3 of 3 , ■,
In this stage you see the results of the period, how much you transferred 
and how much the player you have chosen initially tran sferred  back  to you. 
You will also see the profit in Euro you made in this period.
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Screen 5
Remember...
• After you finished playing the three stages, you will play this game six 
times with the same players.
• After the G periods, you will randomly be re -m atch ed  with four new
players.
• This re-matching will be repeated s ix  tim es (time permitting).
Do you want to read the instructions again or continue directly with a short 
quiz?
Screen Before the Predetermined Treatment
The game you will play now is slightly d ifferen t from the one you have 
played before.
Contrary to the previous game, in Stage 1 you will n o t have th e  possibility  
to  choose a player. Instead, a random  choice  will be made for you. 
You can only decide how m uch you want to transfer to the player already 
determined.
Notice that this also affects stage 2. as it is now random by how many players 
you were chosen.
Privacy Statement
The privacy and Anonymity statement reads as follows.
All information we collect undergoes a strict anonymization process, not only 
ensuring anonymity among players but also ensuring that you stay anony­
mous to us. No private information will be collected. During the experiment 
you will see some information about your fellow players. We have ensured 
that you cannot identify them personally, and vice versa, they cannot identify 
you. Remember that this experiment runs over different rooms, thus involv­
ing much more individuals than those seated in your room. At the end of 
the session, you will be asked to type in the account number you obtained 
before. Please keep this number, because after notification you can pick up 
an envelope with your payment at the porters' lodge.
Screenshots
See Figures A.l to A.5 for some screenshots of the game.
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Figure A.2: Screenshot of the first stage
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Figure A .3: Screenshot of the second stage
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Figure A .4: Screenshot of the third stage
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F ig u re  A . 5: Screenshot of the first stage of the predetermined treatment
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Quiz
Note: Subjects always saw the actual values of the expressions involving
x a : z .
Question 1: [Subjects had to choose an amount A" between 1 and 100.] “Imag­
ine you transferred A' [joints to player two in stage 1. Assume further that 
she made no transfer to you in stage 1. How many points can you transfer 
back to her in stage 2 at most?'’
A: 3A B: Ar C: 0
Question 2: [Subjects drew random number Y  between 0 and 100 by clicking 
on a button.] “Your drew the number Y. Assume you transferred this amount 
to one player in stage one. How much can the other player transfer back to 
you at most?-'
A: 0 B: 3Y  C: Y
Question 3: “Please press the button below to determine randomly how much 
you will be paid back. Remember that this number can be between 0 and 
3Y.r [next screen] “Summary Question: Initially, from your 100 points you 
transferred Y  to the player. Let us assume the player transferred you back Z 
in the next stage. You had no interaction with other players. Based on this, 
what is the balance on your account?’’
A: 0 B: 3Y C: 1 0 0 - Y  +  Z
Table A .l summarizes the results. Subjects got a feedback screen after each 
answer indicating if they were correct or mistaken and stating the correct 
answer. While in the first question many subjects made mistakes, in questions 
2 and 3 almost all subject answered correctly.
T ab le  A . l :  Results of the quiz, 
in per cent
Question
Answer 1 2 3
A 19 1 1
B 21 95* 5
C 00* 4 94*
Note: * denotes the correct answer.
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A.2 Additional Figures
Figu re A .6 : Histogram of transfer, periodwise
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F ig u re  A .8: Histogram of transfer, predetermined treatment, period wise
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B .l Key Elements of PROGRESA
PR O G R E SA  is the acronym of Programa de Educación. Salud y  Alimentación 
and is a programme that aims at developing the human capital of people living 
in i)Oor rural households in M exico.14 Launched by the federal government of 
Mexico in 1907. the International Food and Policy Research Institute (IFP R I) 
joined the effort a year later together with other research and development 
institutions. The programme is still running band is now known as O PO R­
TUN IDADES.
One o f the main objectives of the programme is to improve the school 
attendance of children. Eligible households with school aged children receive 
grants conditional on school attendance. The size of the grant increases with 
the grade (starting from the third year of primary school) and. for secondary 
education, is slightly higher for girls than for boys (see Table B .l).
Initially. 500 localities were chosen to participate in the programme. For 
logistic reasons and evaluation purposes, the sample was divided into to a 
treatment (320) and a control (186) group, where the programme started two 
years later. The selection into the treatment and control group can be consid­
ered as having been random - at least with respect to the variables that interest 
in this analysis. Within each village the survey covers all households (roughly 
24.000 observations) and collects extensive information on consumption, in­
come, nutrition and other issues. For each household member, including each 
child, there is information about age. gender, education, labor supply, income 
(various forms), school enrolment, nutrition, and health status. Detailed in­
formation about the localities is also available. However, the questionnaire 
used varies substantially between waves.
Based on the information collected in the first round of interviews an el­
igibility criterion was established and the sample was classified into eligible 
and non eligible households. Later the eligibility was extended (known as the 
densificación) such that now finally some 8Ü percent of the households were 
eligible to  participate in the programme.
14 For a detailed description of the programme and an extensive documentation, 
www.ifpri org/tliemes/progresH.htin.
see
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T a b l e B . l :  PROGRESA transfer scheme
Priamry school Secondary school
transfer
grade transfer grade boys girls*^ rd 130 v t 380 4004 th 150 oo 440
r. th tJ 190 3rd 420 480
6 th 260
Note: Values indicate bimonthly transfers in Mexican pesos payable to each 
eligible child on attendance of the specific grade (values valid for the first 
semester 1998). 10 pesos rough!)' corresponded to 1.10 US Dollar in that pe­
riod. A maximum of 1,170 pesos was payable to each household.
B.2 Data
The data of the first five waves is publicly available from the website of IF- 
P R I.15
T ab le  B .2 : Sample means by reported status
Variable
not
school
work and 
school
school
only
age 14.45 11.85 12.28
female .52 .41 .47
years of schooling 5.74 4.61 5.06
rank 1.73 2.13 2.19
children below G in lib .87 .94 .88
median child wage in state 90.0 30.23 41.68
number of total lih members 7.31 6.90 7.20
weekly per capita household income 53.93 53.21 42.56
schooling of most educated parent 2.65 3.18 3.39
age of the oldest parent 46.27 43.93 45.03
share of control .40 .34 .38
observations 6,478 2.306 13.795
Note: Data from children 1 0 -1 6  wars old in the wave 1 that were included 
in the estimation.
15 See http://www.ifpri.org/data/dataset.htrn
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Construction of Main Variables
The following; is a rough indication on how the variables used in the analysis 
were constructed from the survey questions in wave 1. Expressions such as 
p08 refer to the number in the questionnaire and the variable name in the 
original data set.16
Si is the occupational choice variable. It takes value 0 if the answer 
top21 is "No", it takes value 1 if the answer top21 is "Yes" and 
any of the answers to p22.p23. p301 or p302 indicate that i works 
for income. It takes value 2 if the answer to//21 is "Yes“ and the 
other aforementioned questions do not indicate labour income. 
If someone does not report income but reports to be working
Vi
observations are dropped.
is the weekly monet ary income of i's household, i.e. J2i=i lh
Vi denotes the income of individual i. Using all sources of mon­
etary income (questions p22.p23.p301 and p302), the pay­
ment received (p291//t,p31a2.p3162). the period of payment 
(p291p.p31al.p3lM ) and the amount of hours worked (p2G12) 
a weekly income variable for each individual i is constructed.
V-i
afidi
fem aìc.i
edu-j
is the household’s income without i s contribution, i.e. Vi — ip. 
refers to question p08. 
refers to question p l l .
refers to question p20. Years of schooling completed are calcu­
lated from primaria onwards, where each of the G nive/es counts 
as one year. Hence after completion of the secundaria (3 niv<*- 
les). one has 9 years of schooling.
rank'i
Ni
is computed as the number of household members that are older
than i but less than 19 years old plus one.
is the total number of persons living in the household.
child f is the total number of children below the age of G in the house­
hold of i.
p (X )7 'i
treat i 
statc.U'i
indicates if / belongs to an eligible household, using jwbreden . 
indicates if /* belongs to a treatment village, using conihasl. 
the median earnings of /'s gender/age group in his or her respec­
tive state. There are 7 states in the sample.
For tilt' ex-post analysis, in addition to the aforementioned variables from 
wave 1. the analogous variables from waves 2 and a for age. schooling, gender 
etc. were used.
lii STATA codes aie available upon request.
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B.3 Simulation of Choice Consistent Residuals
For notational convenience, drop index i  and call Jr6  the probability index 
that captures all variables. Then the underlying random utility model takes 
the form
Assuming that Uj derives from a double exponential distribution with inde­
pendent draws, the choice probabilities pj can be written as:17
The distribution of uj conditional on the a choice k  ^ j  has the following
The inverse of this function is used to draw residuals in the following sequence:
where rnd() is a random number between [0.1].
B.4 Bootstrap Mechanism Used
The algorithm consists of 4 steps.
Step 1 Compute the original sample estimates: estimation of equations (4.3) 
and (4.2) and simulation of the programme.
Step 2 Ilandom draw with replacement of a new sample containing as many 
observations as the originial sample and compute all estimates described 
in stef> 1.
Stef) 3 Repeat step 2 for 1000 times collecting the predicted values of the 
age/gender specific impact. Use only the inner 90 percent of the values.
Stef) 4 Use the distribution of values obtained in step 3 to obtain confidence 
intervals around the estimates obtained in step 1.
17 For details, see Bourguignon ft al. (2001«). I am grateful to Phillippe Leite for helpful 
comments on this point and sharing the STATA code.
Uj =  x 6 j  +  U j.
pj — Prob(ir¡3j +  Uj > x(5k +  uk for all k ^  j )
u k -  -  log{ - p k  • log(mrf())
Uj =  — log(exp”u* -(pj/pk)) -  log(n?d())
if j  = k 
if j * k
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B.5 Additional Tables
Table B .4 :  Pre-programme differences, boys
age 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
full sample
progresa 0.972 0.956 0.892 0.892 0.659 0.496 0.344
control 0.977 0.952 0.883 0.753 0.647 0.467 0.322
difference -0.005 0.004 0.009 0.048 0.011 0.028 0.022
/-value 0.65 0.34 0.60 2 .3 3 0.46 1.13 0.89
not eligible
progresa 0.975 0.985 0.906 0.864 0.772 0.622 0.298
control 0.975 0.961 0.924 0.773 0.712 0.54 0.253
difference 0.000 0.024 -0.018 0.091 0.061 0.083 0.045
/-value 0.01 1.10 0.56 2 .0 8 1.14 1.17 0.99
eligible
progresa 0.971 0.952 0.888 0.788 0.635 0.47 0.361
control 0.977 0.951 0.874 0.749 0.634 0.447 0.35
difference -0.006 0.000 0.014 0.040 0.001 0.023 0.011
/-value 0.70 0.04 0.85 1.72 0.05 0.81 0.38
Noto: Table reports for each cell school enrolment ratios, the dif­
ference and the /-values. First wave only.
Table B .5 :  Pre-programme differences, girls
age 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
full sample
progresa 0.970 0.955 0.808 0.703 0.557 0.409 0.286
control 0.967 0.955 0.850 0.677 0.544 0.374 0.236
difiere] ice 0.003 0.000 -0.042 0.026 0.013 0.035 0.049
/-valué 0.38 0.02 2 .2 0 1.13 0.51 1.37 2 .0 1
not eligible
progresa 0.972 0.974 0.867 0.720 0.669 (».523 0.298
control 0.990 0.956 0.894 0.788 0.589 0.377 0.222
difieren ce -0.018 0.018 -0.026 -0.068 0.08« 1 0.146 0.076
/-valué 1.00 0.78 0.67 1.30 1.41 2.55 1.57
eligible
progresa 0.970 0.952 0.795 0.700 0.531 0.378 0.282
control 0.963 0.955 0.841 0.653 0.533 0.373 0.242
diflerence 0.007 -0.003 -0.045 0.047 -0.002 0.005 0.040
/-valué 0.75 0.25 2 .0 9 1.80 0.07 0.19 1.41
Noto: Table reports for each cell school enrolment ratios, the differ­
ence and the /-values. First wave only.
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C .l Asymptotic Normality of LLC with Common Shocks
Absence of Shocks
Consider a model without constant and no additional lagged differences, along 
the lines of Levin et al. (2002). Following the notation from Section 5.2.1, in 
thi s case, for large N  and 7\ no adjustments are necessary and /.J = t$. The 
least squares estimator of S proposed by LLC under the null hypothesis is:18
and, using an estimator for the standard deviation19 ¿r, the corresponding 
¿-value is:
Sectional correlation is a violation concerning the N. Taking the easiest form 
of multi index asymptotics, namely sequential limits (Phillips and Moon, 1999) 
first the limiting distributions when T  goes to infinity is, for N  fixed:20
Define
( C . l )
one obtains
(C.2)
18 See Section 5.2.1.
10 For example:
20 These results arc due to Phillips and Durlauf (1980), cf. Levin and Lin (1992, p. 14)
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If the errors were uncorrelated and a  a consistent estimator of o . averaging 
over the sections of the panel would give the known result that U =* Ar( 0 ,1). 
The convergence in probability of the denominator of equation (C.2) is es­
tablished by the following application of a law of large numbers (Billingsley. 
198G. p. 290):
T h e o re m  C .l  Suppose that for each time-series dimension T, the variables
ZiT are independent and identically distributed across individuals i, with mean4 2
p r  and variance 0 < af- <  oo, and that // — \miT-+oc P t - If linir—oc ^  — 0. 
Then £  Zar A
The inner expression of the denominator has expectation 1/2 and for all / 
the expectations of the variance are finite. Hence, the denominator converges 
to \/0.b. The convergence in distribution of the numerator is established by 
Applying the following central limit theorem (Billingsley, 1980, p. 308):
T h e o re m  C .2  Suppose that for each time-series dimension T. the variables 
are independent and identically distributed across individuals L with mean 
Pt and variance 0 < a\ < oo, and that p — lim r-,«, p.j, and a 1 =  liinr-*«, o\. 
Then ^  Zi\(Zit -  / i t ) JV(0. <x2)-
For each /. the numerator has expectation 0 and finite variance 1/2. Hence, 
it converges in distribution to A7(0 ,0.5). Using the results obtained in (C .l) 
and applying both theorems, (C .2) converges to N (0, l ) .21
Common Shocks
In the case of sectional correlation, however, the crucial assumption used in 
both theorems about the independence of the random variables is violated 
and their application fails. The numerator of (C.2) no longer converges to 
A '(0.0.b). To be more precise, assume the easiest c ase in which the correlation 
among sections takes the following form:22
£|sii£u] /  0 And Cor[£ii£ij] =  for / ^  j
21 For the variance, notice that V ~ a r ( = ^4 = 1.
22 Note that if V'«r(eif) = 1 the covariances equal the correlation coefficients.
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To see which central limit theorem can be applied, it is necessary to check the 
properties of f i  =  lim,\=K Z i l i  tu-
£ [si] =  £ [ - f =  ¿ í u ]  =  0 and
' /<lr(£i] =  ' /ar(—^  y ^ í i i ]  =  f ( 5 3  Var(in ) +  2 ^ 1  X  Cí>i’( í i i - £ i j ) )
* i= l 1=1 i— 1 j=t + l
=  ¿ ( 4  +  -  l p i ) =  1 + ¿>(Ar -  1)
The variance of the numerator increases with N. Central limit theorems for 
dependent random variables require a finite variance to establish convergence 
(see, e.g. Billingsley (1986, p, 3T6) and White (2001, p. 122)). Hence, no 
convergence result can be stated for this general form of dependence.
However, the analysis of the elimination of common time effects above (see 
page 107) has shown that the effective disturbance to the correlation matrix 
after  removing common time effects is itself a function of N. More specifically, 
using the result from equation (5.6) that = (1 — one
can rewrite the above after removing common time effects as:
I 'H C i] =  -  +
(Z’i — 1
— / T "'
As N  goes to infinity the variance converges to the same value as in the case 
without sectional correlation. Using a central limit theorem which does not 
require independence (White, 2001, p. 125):
T h e o re m  C .3  Suppose that for each time series dimension T, Z¿r is a sta­
tionary process with mean p r  and variance 0 < erf <  x\ and that U ar(-^ =
E &  2 „ )  i  o% where 0 < „% < oc. Then ^  Z S ^ r )  => A '((U & ).
Since each section has a finite variance and the variance of the average over 
all sections converges to 1/2, the numerator converges to Ar(0,0.5). For the 
denominator write:
£[&¿$2¿] /  0 alul Coi'[£2i§2j\ =  ¿2  for i j.
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Again, checking the properties of =  limjv_*oc -fa it is easily seen
that:
c J  -- -  as before and
A' A - 1 Af
= '"n rl- t ¿ 6 . 1  =  ^ ( ¿ v’«r (s2.) + -Y1 I I  C M fii-s  w))
î=  1 X = 1 i ~ l  jT-i+1
1 / X  . . . . .  „  \ 1 _ A -  1
-  T f H T  +  A(A “  XH =  3VV +  ^ “ Â T -
Tlie viiriance of the denominator decreases with N. Following White (2001. 
p. 44), the following law of large numbers is applicable to weakly dependent 
data:
T h e o re m  C .4  Suppose Z* is a stationary ergodie scalar sequence with E\Zi\ — 
11 < oc. Then Z* ^  p .
Almost sure convergence (a.s.) implies convergence in probability (Davidson 
{1994)). Hence, the denominator converges in probability to \/(0.5) regard­
less to the dependence in the data. Summarizing, with common sectional 
correlation and after removing common time effects, (C.2) will converge in 
distribution to Ar(0 ,1) as it is the case without sectional correlation. This 
is in line with the simulation results obtained earlier, that the problem of 
oversizing diminishes with N  and T.
Other Shocks
In the case where the covariance matrix takes the form of a band matrix 
(see page 109) if common time effects were not eliminated, the variance of 
the numerator, in terms of the expressions above, would again not converge 
for large N  as it becomes lT ir(^ i) =  1/2 +  b common time
effects are eliminated, the structure of the correlation matrix becomes even 
less homogeneous and no convergence is achieved. The resulting matrix is a 
straightforward but rather unpleasant combination of N 's and u/s. Here is a 
innnerical example:
if E  -
1 \
.7 1
.49 .7 1
.34 .49 .7 1 )
then Q £ Q ' -
/ 1 
.40 
- .8 1  
\ “ -79
1
- .4 2
-.8 1
1
.40
\
i /
Hence, the eliminat ion of common time effects in this case does not provide 
any remedy for the test. The test statistic will not converge to a N(0,1).
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C.2 Estimation of and Inference on (Co-)Variances
Much attention has been devoted to so called heteroscedasticity and autocor­
relation consistent (HAC) or robust estimators of covariances from to station­
ary series. Under nonstationarity, covariances are not constant over time and 
methods designed for stationary series can no longer be used. In this case one 
can either use the differences of the series to compute the covariances or the 
residuals from regression on the lagged variable. Sc-hwert (1989) finds that, in 
the univariate case, the difference based approach has a smaller bias in finite 
samples. Therefore, and in order to proceed consistently under the null of 
non-st at ionarity, the following lines apply to the first differences of an 1(1) 
process without drift.
Analogous to the univariate problem of variance estimation, the aim is to get 
a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix at zero frequency.23 To estimate 
the spectrum of an unknown DGP correctly, all T  autocovariances have to be 
estimated, which is not feasible with T  observations. The class of parametric 
estimators imposes a certain structure on the data and constructs estimators 
that would be implied by the model, while nonparametric procedures use a 
weighted average of autoeovariances.
Parametric Estimators
The parametric estimator VAR HAC (vector autoregressive heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent) was developed by Den Ilaan and Levin (1990) 
and fits a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series under consideration 
using an information criterion to determine the optimal lag length. To the 
residuals of that VAR a standard covariance estimator is applied.
More specifically, for each section i of the A'-dimensional stationary of the 
process x*. an autoregressive process is fitted using a lag order suggested by 
either the Akaike (AIC) or the Schwarz' Bayesian (BIO) information criterion, 
and given a maximum lag order. The optimal lag order may differ across 
sections. The coefficients are collected in a matrix AntjyXAr) for each lag k. 
taking zei'o values for section i if k exceeds the maximum lag order of that 
section. For the highest lag length K  chosen, a VAR is fitted and the residuals 
e f, are used to compute the innovation matrix:
23 For tin* following, see Den Ilaan and Levin (1907).
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The the spectral density estimator is then given by:
gVARHAc =  {J -  ¿ A , ] - ' .  (C.3)
k — 1 A —1
Den Haan and Levin (199b) analyze the performance of this estimator com­
part'd to some nonparametrie alternatives and find better finite sample prop­
erties. According to their results, the individual choice of lag lengths for each 
section makes this procedure superior to nonparametrie estimates, in which 
one weighting function is applied to all sections.
Nonparametrie Estimators
In the nonparametrie case two concepts are introduced to handle the problem 
of estimating the covariances: windowing and weighting. The most frequently 
used kernels in the time series literature are the Bartlett kernel and the Parzen 
kernel. For the Bartlett kernel, the weights assigned to the autocovariances 
decline from 1 (the sample variance) to 0 (when the truncation is reached). 
This kernel ensures a positive estimation of the long-run variance -  or, in 
the multivariate case -  a positive definite estimate of the covariance matrix 
(Xewey and West, 1987). Since the theoretical guidance in the choice of the 
truncation is quite unsatisfactory, it might be useful in empirical applications 
to conduct robustness checks in terms of varying kernels and truncation pa­
rameters. Starting point for the estimation of the c-ovariance matrix in the 
presence of serial correlation is:
K
S(m) =  f o  +  £ > A-T( f T + f ; ) .  (C.4)
T — 1
where1 w^r is ft kernel. I\ a truncation parameter, and
i ?
f r  =  Y  ^ 2  (X> -  * ) ( XI-T -  X)'-
i = t  +  1
Refinements to this estimator are possible. Kernel based estimations of the 
long-run variance matrix in the presence of serial correlation were found to 
give quite1 poor results. The m ajor source of bias is that kernels, which ensure 
a positive definite spectral density matrix place weights less then unity on au- 
tocovariances other then at lags zero. Andrews and Monahan (1992) therefore 
suggest a kernel based prewhitening of the series and observe an improvement 
using this technique. In an expression similar to equation (C.3) the covariance 
matrix is placed between the inverse of the prewhitening coefficients. Newey 
and West (1991) propose1 an automated bandwidth selection procedure for the 
estimator in equation (C.4).
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C.3 Bootstrap Methods for Dependent Data
Inference on covariance matrix estimators is rarely done. But the estimation 
results itself arci meaningless if they remain unrelated to some standard errors. 
In both the parametric and nonparametric case, bootstrap methods may be 
used to make* inference on the estimates.
There is little known about the properties of bootstrap algorithms when 
the underlying process contains a unit root. But even if the root of the 
process conies close to unity, Bose (1988) shows that bootstrap approximations 
deteriorate. However, bootstrapping results will remain valid if the bootstraps 
are applied to the differenced data. Hence, the following applies to the first 
differences of a lion-stationary process.
For time dependent data, however, the algorithms have to be extended be­
cause random resampling would not account for the time dependency of the 
data, which, as it is the case for the covariance matrix, is a crucial part of 
the estimator.24 25 For time dependent processes, resampling in the frequency 
domain is suggested e.g. by Franke and Haerdle (1992) for the univariate case. 
This method is designed for making inference about the entire spectrum. In 
this context the only estimate of interest is the variation of the covariance 
matrix at zero frequency, and therefore these methods do not seem appropri­
ate. In the time series domain the following methods are suggested. The so 
called model-based resampling requires reasonable good knowledge of the true 
model. In short, the assumed DGP is applied to the series, innovations are 
computed and then used to resample a series again assuming the same DGP. 
Among the methods that do not require knowledge of the DGP is the so called 
block resampling. The basic idea here is to divide the data into b blocks of 
equal length /. The new resampled series is a randomly order of blocks. Typ­
ically. those estimates will be biased, because the resampled series are more 
independent than the original one. since whenever a block changes, artifi­
cial independence is introduced. Furthermore, this break causes the artificial 
series to exhibit nonstationarity properties, because distribution parameters 
become time dependent.2;>
The Stationary Bootstrap
The stationary bootstrap suggested by Politis and Romano (1994) is a sophis­
tication of the aforementioned methods. Moreover, this bootstrap is unbiased 
and does not produce nonstationarity in the above sense. Another advantage 
of this method is that its validity for the covariance estimation of a multi­
24 See e.g. Davison and Ilinkley (1997).
25 For methods on how to overcome this and other problems, see Hall et al. (1995).
146 C Appendix to Chapter 5
variate process was shown, which is precisely what is needed in this context 
(Politis and Romano. 1994, Theorem 4). The algorithm is as follows:
• Let x f he a Ar-dimensional vector of time series from t — 1 ,.... T.
• Define btj — {x , ,x /+1, ...xi+/_i} as a block of I subsequent observations 
in the sample, starting at some t. If the end of the sample is reached 
before the end of the block (i.e. t. +  / >  T ), the block is filled up with 
observations of the beginning of the sample (x^  =  xo, x.y+i =  Xi ...).
• The length / of the blocks is determined randomly, where the lengths
follow a geometrical distribution with some fixed parameter p < [0.1]. 
The probability of a block length m  is Pr{/ =  m } =  (1 — pYm~^p for in 
=  1 .2 .........Denote those random numbers by L*.
• Once the lag length is determined, the beginning of the block is deter­
mined by a random variable /j which is discretely uniformly distributed 
on [l.T ].
• The pseudo time series x j  =  { x j . . . x f }  is generated by the random 
sequence of blocks B ii>i l ,B i2j j2..., where the end is trimmed at T. The 
resampling is done B  times.
• Let the true vector of parameters of interest be 9. In the same way as
the distribution of x  can be approximated by the large number of pseudo
series x*. the distribution of 9  conditional on x  can be approximated by ' ♦ 1 
the distribution of 9  (x*).
• Applying this procedure to the inference on a covariance matrix. 9  is a 
vector containing the correlations between the N  units of the the vector 
X/. If one restricts attention to the triangle below the diagonal, this 
amounts to (^(AT — 1)AT) =  d, elements. Denote by 9{x) a consistent 
(parametric or nonparametric) estimator of the covariance matrix. After 
com ¡Jilting the covariances for each resampled x*. one can estimate the 
asymptotic variance of the estimator bv:2<J
The diagonal elements of V  contain the variances of each element of the 
estimator, hence the root of the diagonal contains the standard error to 
be placed around the ¡joint estimates 9.
2ii Set1 Greene (2000, p. 174).
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• Assuming that the bootstrapped values follow a normal distribution, 
then a simple test for 0  =  6\ is:
Q = ( 0 - 0 iy v - 1( 0 - 0 l ) (C.6)
where V  is an estimate of the covariance matrix of the form:
V [0] =
n  b= l
Then Q will be approximately \d distributed, where d is the dimension 
of 0 ,27
C.4 Additional Tables and Figures
T a b le  C .l :  Size properties when all assumptions are fulfilled
& = .0
N = 5
LLC 
N = 10
nominal 
N = 20
size 10% 
N = 5
IPS
N = 10
oCNII
T  =  ‘25 .130 .120 .118 .120 .114 .109
T  = 50 .122 .101 .101 .114 .100 .104
T =  100 .118 .100 .100 .101 .101 .098
nominal size 5CX
N = 5
oII N = 20 N = 5 N  = 10 JV = 20
T  =  25 .073 .058 .058 .009 .059 .059
T  = 50 .002 .053 .017 .0G4 .052 .054
T =  100 .058 .050 .049 .058 .057 .048
nominal size 1CA
A7 -  5 N =  10 N = 20 N = 5 N  =  10 K = 20
T  =  25 .015 .011 .010 .018 .012 .012
T  =  50 .013 .011 .009 .015 .013 .009ooli .013 .010 .009 .013 .012 .009
Kote: Based on 4,000 replications.
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T able  C .2 : Size properties with coint.egrat.ion
C IV  = Ay 2
AT = 5
LLC 
N =  10
nominal 
N = 20
size 10% 
A7 = 5
IPS
Ar — 10 oCMII
<
r  = 25 .155 .140 .147 .150 .142 .142oil8s .109 .151 .145 .179 .185 .194
T  = 100 .178 .100 .149 .207 .291 .301
nominal size o%;
i 11 i C
ii
1 N =  10 N = 20 N =  5 N  = 10
oCMII
T  = 25 .081 .080 .077 .081 .083 .080
T ~  50 .080 .077 .072 .099 .103 .116ooIISs .010 .088 .078 .107 .188 .202
nominal size 1%
N =  5 N  = 10 II ro o N  = 5 II o
oCMII*
T  =  25 .017 .014 -01G .020 .017 .022
T  = 50 .020 .014 .013 .031 .027 .024
S II o o .020 .022 .014 .052 .004 .072
Note: Based on 4,000 replications.
T ab le  C .3 : Size properties with cointegration, b — N/A
LLC IPS
II nominal size 10%
N = 5 N =  10 N -  20 N = 5 N = 10 N =  20
T  =  25 .144 .137 .135 .120 .132 .139
T  = 50 .147 .132 .130 .152 .143 .142
T  = 100 .164 .140 .142 .184 .184 .180
nominal size 5%
A7 — 5 N =  10 N = 20 A7 = 5 N = 10 N = 20
T  = 25 .074 .072 .073 .009 .077 .074
T  = 50 .074 .070 .072 .085 .078 .077
T  -  100 .070 .082 .074 .108 .109 .112
nominal size 1%
A7 = 5 N =  10 11 I M
 
1
° N = 5 N  = 10 A7 = 20
T  = 25 .010 .014 .014 .019 .021 .017
T  = 50 .014 .010 .017 .021 .010 .019
T  -  100 .021 .017 .019 .029 .020 .024
Note: Based on 1,000 replications.
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T ab le  C .4 : Size properties with cointegration and correlation for 
b =  N - l
LLC IPST—H1II-o nominal size 10%
u = 0.7 N = 5 N = 10 iV = 20 N = 5 N = 10 II ro o
T  = 25 .092 .050 .023 .079 .045 .022
T  = 50 .084 .045 .020 .086 .032 .013
T = 100 .052 .038 .013 .122 .062 .019
nominal size 5%
N = 5 N = 10 Ar — 20 Ar — 5 N = 10 AT = 20
T  = 25 .045 .027 .017 .042 .021 .011
T  = 50 .042 .019 .007 .043 .013 .005
T  = 100 .025 .018 .007 .064 .031 .008
nominal size 1%
N = 5 N  = 10 N = 20 N = 5 Ar = 10 Ar -  20
T  = 25 .010 .007 .003 .011 .006 .002
T  = 50 .011 .004 .001 .010 .003 .001
T  = 100 .008 .005 .001 .018 .007 .001
Note: Based on 4,OCR) replications.
T a b le  C .5 : Size properties with cointegration and correlation 
for b — N /4
LLC IPS
b = A'/4 nominal size 10%
u) =  0.7 N = 5 N = 10 A7- 2 0 AT-  5 N = 10 N = 20
r  = 25 .080 .054 .020 .059 .033 .013
T  = 50 .091 .068 .029 .046 .021 .005
T = 100 .118 .068 .039 .048 .016 .005
nominal size 5%
Af -  5 N =  10 N = 20 AT -  5 N = 10
oCN11
T = 25 .043 .029 .012 .034 .017 .005
T  = 50 .054 .041 .014 .023 .011 .003
"S II o o .081 .042 .025 .028 .010 .001
nominal size 1%
AT = 5 AT = 10 N = 20 Ar = 5 N = 10 Ar -  20
T  = 25 .013 .007 .002 .008 .003 .001
T  =  50 .017 .012 .004 .005 .002 .001ooII .030 .018 .009 .008 .003 .000
Note: Based on 4,000 replications.
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